


SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE (OSINT) HANDBOOK


OSINT SUPPORT TO THE A TEAM



Robert David STEELE Vivas
USMC, CIA, MA, MPA, NWC, OSS.Net

Date of Information: 23 June 2004

Coat of Arms of OSS.Net, Inc.



The over-all theme of the shield reflects a commitment to the establishment of "ground truth" in support of the international community.

In the upper left quadrant is the candle and saucer of knowledge, on a gold field. The upper right quadrant is the compass rose on a blue field. The gold field represents the utility of open sources as a vehicle for "shedding light" on national security and national competitiveness issues in much broader terms than traditionally understood. In particular, open sources can "shed light" on non-traditional topics for which existing national intelligence capabilities are unsuited. The blue field emphasizes the importance of the maritime heritage in navigating uncharted waters, and of the environment.

The lower half, divided from the upper left to lower right by a "checkerboard" pattern representative of The Great Game, contains three roses with thorns and the Chinese symbol for revolution ("fire in the lake") on the left, and the red lion on the right. The roses and thorns represent the opportunities as well as the dangers associated with intelligence support to policy initiatives in each of the three "worlds" – the First World and its allies, the Second World including Russia and the Balkans, and the Third World, with its very broad range of nations and problems. The character for revolution symbolizes not only the revolution in relationships between elements of the three worlds, but also the revolution in the processes and priorities of strategic as well as tactical intelligence, and the forthcoming revolution in the relationship between the intelligence and the information communities, and between producers and consumers of intelligence. The red lion symbolizes the role of power projection as the *raison d'être* for intelligence—actionable intelligence.

The motto, "E VERITATE POTENS" ("From Truth, Power" or literally, "one is made powerful through truth") reflects the belief that power applied with knowledge, and tools of power developed in the context of specific threats, will be more successful and less costly to the Nation than power applied blindly, or capabilities designed and funded without reference to the actual threat or circumstances. As we all strive to redefine national security and improve national competitiveness, open sources will play an extraordinarily important role in nurturing both a sense of security and the reality of prosperity for the community of nations, tribes, enterprises, and citizens. *St.*

CAVEAT

When I was invited to lecture at Fort Bragg for a day on Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), there was no expectation on the part of the Command, nor any funding assigned, regarding the creation of a SOF OSINT Handbook. This is a “nice to have” add-on that I decided to spend a few days on, because what SOF does is very important, and I believe that there is a need for more focused attention on this capability.

Put plainly, I over-reached. Although Ben Benavides from Fort Huachuca shared with me his superb set of links, many of them turned out to be accessible only from .mil addresses, and the time and budget that I was able to allocate did not permit the development of the operationally-oriented tables of sources that I would have liked.

SOCJIC and NGIC have an equivalent amount of information relevant to SOF OSINT, but as a private sector party with an unofficial project, I could not expect them to stop everything and contribute.

Therefore, with thanks to Congressman Simmons for the Foreword, and with thanks to LtCol Boyd for giving me an opportunity to think about SOF OSINT, I respectfully turn this over with the hope that at some point in the near future SOF can bring together the Army’s few OSINT wizards (all named by Congressman Simmons in his Foreword, with contact information at the back of this draft), and finish the book. I’ve tried to give you enough to make it clear the job needs to be done.

I believe that SOCJIC is planning an OSINT sources and methods conference in December in Tampa. I hope this strawman gets discussed there.

God Bless SOF. Take the lead, please. *St.*

**OSS International Press
Oakton, Virginia**

Copyright © by OSS Inc. All rights to the collection as a whole reserved. However, an unlimited unrestricted copyright is granted to U.S. Special Operations Forces in general, and to the JFK Special Warfare Training Group and School specifically, so that they may if desired move forward with completion of this strawman for SOF utilization.

Please visit Amazon.com to see our other books, *ON INTELLIGENCE*, *THE NEW CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE*, and *PEACEKEEPING INTELLIGENCE*. By Christmas 2004 we should also have published *COMMERCIAL INTELLIGENCE* and *NATIONAL SECURITY INTELLIGENCE*.

OSS International Press is the book-publishing arm of OSS.Net, Inc., publisher of *Proceedings of the Global Information Forum* (annual), *OSS Notices* (occasional series), and the ten-book series *ON INTELLIGENCE*. Visit www.oss.net.

Published by OSS International Press (OSS)
Post Office Box 369
Oakton, Virginia 22124 USA
(703) 242-1700 Facsimile (703) 242-1711
Email oss@oss.net, Web: www.oss.net

June 2004

Printed and bound in the United States of America

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA

Steele Vivas, Robert David (author of draft)

Special Operations Forces Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) Handbook/drafted by
Robert David Steele Vivas

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0-9715661-2-7 (alk. paper)

1. Intelligence service. 2. Military intelligence. 3. Law enforcement intelligence. 4. Internet. 5. Organizational change. 6. Strategic planning. 7. Leadership. 8. Information Technology. 9. Knowledge, theory of. 10. Power (Social sciences). 11. Information science—social aspects. 12. National security—management of. 13. Political planning.

I. Title.

JK468.I6S74 2004 (DRAFT)

327.1273—dc21

00-029284

Foreword

In the mid-1990s, it was my honor to command the 434th Military Intelligence Detachment (MID), a U.S. Army Reserve unit associated with Yale University and located in New Haven, Connecticut. With the active participation of CWO-4 Alan D. Tompkins and SGT Eliot A. Jardines, our unit wrote the first handbook for Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) for the U.S. Army.

In 1994, our unit was honored with the Golden Candle Award presented by Open Source Solutions in recognition of its “unusual dedication and persistence ... in preparing a primer, *Open Source Intelligence Resources for the Military Intelligence Officer*, which is of value to all joint and coalition personnel.” The following year the Reserve Officers Association gave the 434th MID its “Outstanding USAR Small Unit Award” for 1995-1996, due in no small part because of its contributions to OSINT.

In 1997 General Peter Schoomaker, USA then Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Special Operations Command, was briefed on OSINT, understood its value, and ordered the creation of an OSINT support cell within the Special Operations Command Joint Intelligence Center (SOCJIC). Today that small unit, for a negligible amount of money, is responsible for satisfying 40% of the all-source intelligence requirements generated by all elements of USSOCOM.

In 2000, General William F. Kernan, USA, then serving as both the ranking flag officer of the Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) and as the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT), agreed to a suggestion by Brigadier General James Cox of Canada, then the Deputy J-2 at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), validated by General Kernan’s Deputy at the Atlantic Command, Admiral Sir James Perwone of the United Kingdom, and commissioned three study guides for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): the *NATO Open Source Intelligence Handbook*, the *NATO Open Source Intelligence Reader*, and (NATO) *Intelligence Exploitation of the Internet*. All three of these documents remain valid and useful today.

In the years between 1994 and today, over 40 countries have developed some form of OSINT Center or Cell, most of them for military use.

In 2004, the Queen of England awarded the Order of the British Empire (OBE), a very significant honor, to Detective Steve Edwards, who created England’s first substantive OSINT capability within Scotland Yard, a capability that has lowered the cost and reduced the time it takes to put criminals—including terrorists and arms smugglers—into jail.

SOF OSINT HANDBOOK--Foreword

In a world where emerging threats and non-state actors are the primary sources of instability, and where conventional forces remain important but largely static, OSINT has become the foundation as well as the context for the all-source intelligence endeavor.

It is not possible to be an all-source professional without focusing very carefully on OSINT as a contributor to every step in the intelligence cycle, from requirements development to collection management to source discovery and validation, to multi-source fusion, to compelling actionable presentation.

Perhaps more to the point, if you leverage OSINT properly, you can free up scarce classified resources to focus on information that is not accessible through OSINT, and you can improve the value of our very expensive data mining systems, some costing tens of millions of dollars, by a factor of five to ten.

OSINT is at the heart of the revolution in intelligence, and I encourage everyone in uniform, in every mission area, to understand this reality. OSINT can provide up to 80% of the intelligence we need, on the fly, for unconventional and low intensity missions against non-state actors.

However, OSINT also has applications to policy development, to strategy and force structure development, to acquisition management, and to logistics. For this reason, I believe that OSINT must be treated differently from the classified intelligence disciplines. OSINT must be subject at all times to quality control from the all-source intelligence professionals, but it must not be buried in a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF), behind either a Green Door or a Black Door.

OSINT, to be truly effective, and especially so in support of Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, Information Operations, and Logistics, must be “outside the wire” and able to interact with all ranks at all times. OSINT must lend itself to sharing at any moment with non-U.S. and non-military parties including non-governmental organizations and universities. OSINT is the “common language” that can help create a common view of the battlefield among disparate parties, most of whom will not have clearances or desire to be burdened with classified information. OSINT is a force multiplier.

Let me mention several U.S. Army focal points for OSINT that have labored without proper appreciation over the past ten years. Chief among these are the OSINT Branch, led by Mr. Ben Harrison with the strong support of Mr. James Hardee, in the SOCIJIC; the information management division, led by Mr. William Crislip, of the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC); the Foreign Military Studies Office (FSMO), led by Dr. Jacob Kipp at Fort Leavenworth and represented by Mr. Ed Waller in Washington; and finally, a leader in OSINT training, Mr. Ben Benavides, at Fort Huachuca, AZ, who worked with me and the 434th MID during our pioneering work on OSINT in the mid-1990s. These are our “OSINT wise men” and we must listen to them about needed OSINT investments.

SOF OSINT HANDBOOK--Foreword

We are succeeding at OSINT, and will get better at OSINT, because USSOCOM has enforced the use of the COLISEUM requirements management system in validating and tracking requests for OSINT across all elements of the SOF community. I hope the rest of the U.S. Army will stop treating OSINT as an informal sideline and get with the program. OSINT is here to stay, and OSINT will make the U.S. Army stronger. I hope every element of the U.S. Army will submit OSINT requirements in support of its mission, and I hope shortfalls in organic OSINT capabilities will be documented and sent forward through the chain of command.

I think we can and should have the smartest Army in the world, an Army in which every person of every rank knows how to use OSINT to conduct information operations as far as they can on their own, as a small unit, as a Command. In the aggregate, the U.S. Army can achieve information superiority through the integration of “top-down” secret intelligence and “bottom-up” open source intelligence.

As someone who has spent over thirty five years as a Military Intelligence Officer in the U.S. Army, on both Active and Reserve assignments, my years with the 434th MID were among the most exciting and productive in my career, due in no small part to our revolutionary work with OSINT. At a time in our history where the performance of the U.S. Intelligence Community is being questioned, and where every scrap of information is needed to piece together the puzzle presented by terrorist operations, there could be no better time to incorporate the value of OSINT to the overall intelligence product available to our policy makers and military forces.

For those who have gone before, for those who are serving now, and for those who will be working these problems in the future, this book is an invitation to think about a whole new dimension of intelligence acquisition, analysis and production that is needed now more than ever before. I urge the reader to take it to heart and to mind. God Bless and Go Army!!

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Rob Simmons". The signature is stylized, with a large, looped "R" and "S".

Rob Simmons
Member of Congress
Second District, Connecticut
Colonel, USAR, RET

[This Page Blank]

Table of Contents

FOREWORD	i
TABLE OF CONTENTS	v
LIST OF FIGURES	vii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	ix
PREFACE	xi
Part I: Open Source Tradecraft—The Basics	1
Introduction to Open Source Intelligence	3
Introduction to the Expeditionary Factors Analysis Model	7
Introduction to the Revolutionary Analysis Model	11
Introduction to Analytic Tradecraft	13
Introduction to Social Networking & Expert Networks	15
Part II: Primer on the Utility of Open Sources to the Mission	19
Strategic Historical & Cultural Understanding	21
-- History of the Region	21
-- History of Foreign Powers in the Region	26
-- History of the US in the Region	27
-- History of Anti-Americanism in the Region	29
Operational Understanding for Campaign Planning	31
-- Regional Power: Sources, Status, Change Agents	32
-- Internal Security Issues	34
-- Internal Stability Issues	35
-- Weak Links (Theirs & Ours)	36
Tactical Sub-State Understanding for Unit Effectiveness	37
-- Tribal Orders of Battle Down to Village and Elder Level	37
-- Center of Gravity Profiles and Key Communicator Biographies	39
-- Local Media: How Do They Communicate?	40
-- Content Analysis: What Are Their PSYOP Themes?	41
Technical Understanding for Policy, Acquisition, Operations	43
-- Introduction to NATO OSINT Handbook	43
-- Understanding US Policy & US Presence	44
-- Understanding Other Players: What Are They Saying Now?	45
-- Embarkation & Acquisition Intelligence	45
-- Gaming the Mission: Any Self-Inflicted Wounds?	46
Part III: Applying Open Sources to Specific Mission Areas	47
Civil Affairs	49
-- Human Intelligence (Demographics, Socio-Economic, Displaced Persons, Crime)	53
-- Technical Intelligence (C4I, Transportation, Power, Financial)	54
-- Welfare Intelligence (Water, Food, Medical)	56
-- Cultural Intelligence (Protected or Restricted Targets)	57
-- Liaison Intelligence (Continuity & Unity of Operations)	58

SOF OSINT HANDBOOK—Table of Contents

Psychological Operations	59
-- Target Audience Analysis (TAA)	63
-- Mapping Legitimate Grievances and Related Enemy PSYOP	64
-- Mapping Desired Objectives and Possible Friendly PSYOP	65
-- Creating Actionable Intelligence—Litmus Test for Effective Themes	65
Target Analysis	69
-- Detailed Description & Vulnerability Assessment	NA
-- Natural Environment (Terrain & Weather)	NA
-- Human & Technical Environment	NA
-- Route Planning	NA
Terrain Analysis	75
-- Key Factors in Terrain Analysis (Altitude, Line of Sight, Canopy, Defilade, Bridges)	75
-- Introduction to Commercial/Russian Tactical Military Charts	76
-- Introduction to Commercial Imagery Options	78
-- Introduction to Alternative Terrain Reconnaissance (UAV, Scouts)	79
Weather Analysis	81
-- Temperature	NA
-- Visibility & Timing of Sun & Moon	NA
-- Wind	NA
-- Inclement Weather	NA
Part IV: U.S. Army Open Source Resources for SOF Needs	83
Special Operations Command Joint Intelligence Center (SOCJIC)	85
National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC)	87
Foreign Military Studies Office (FSMO), Fort Leavenworth	89
OSINT Training, Fort Huachuca	91
Part V: Generic Open Source Information References	93
COLLUSIUM—How to Use It	95
HARMONY—How to Use It	97
WIBL—How to Use It	101
NATO OSINT Guides—Where and How	103
USMC Expeditionary Factors Study—Where and How	105
OSS.Net (Links, Proceedings, Networking)	107
ABBREVIATIONS [NOT INCLUDED IN FIRST DRAFT]	NA
ABOUT THE AUTHORS [NOT INCLUDED IN FIRST DRAFT]	NA
INDEX [NOT INCLUDED IN FIRST DRAFT]	NA

List of Figures

01 OSINT Support to the A Team	Cover
02 Global Collection Shortfalls	4
03 Integrated Intelligence Analysis Model	8
04 Special Aviation Degree of Difficulty Example	9
05 Threat Changes Depending on the Level of Analysis	9
06 Tribal Areas of Influence in Afghanistan	10
07 Framework for the Analysis of Revolutionary Potential	12
08 Selected Interesting Experts (on South Asia)	17
09 Selected Interesting Institutions (on South Asia)	17
10 Top Experts on Afghanistan (Regardless of Subject)	18
11 Global Realities Impacting on All Regions	31
12 Template for Content Analysis	42
13 Template for Mapping Civil Affairs Contracts	50
14 Mainstream Communications Overview for Thailand	54
15 Segmenting the Target Audience	63
16 PSYOP Message to Reach Back & White Hat Power	65
17 Rough Map of Southern Thailand	69
18 Photo of Phuket Island Coastline in Southern Thailand	70
19 Phuket Airport Terminal Lay-Out	71
20 Partial List of Regular Airlines Serving Phuket Airport	71
21 Overview of Phuket Airport Runway (Photograph)	72
22 Phuket Airport Orientation Map	72
23 Historical Chart of Phuket Area	77
24 Phuket Weather Current and Three-Day Outlook	81

SOF OSINT HANDBOOK—List of Figures

[This Page Blank]

Acknowledgements

Modern OSINT started in 1992, when MajGen Harry Jenkins, USMC, then Director of Command, Control, Communications, Computing, Intelligence, and Information (C4I2) at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, agreed that a national conference on OSINT was needed. His decision came on the heels of four years of unsuccessful efforts to get the national and military intelligence agencies to take OSINT seriously after the nascent U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence Command (then a Center, MCIC) discovered that 80% of what it needed in order to produce policy, acquisition, and operations intelligence was not secret, not online, not in English, and not available from anyone in the National Capital Area (NCA).

Since then, over 6,500 international intelligence professionals, most of them military intelligence professionals but also including law enforcement and business intelligence professionals as well as academics and journalists, have been trained by the annual OSINT conference, and there are successful OSINT centers in many countries. Within the United States of America, the most successful operationally-oriented OSINT capability is to be found within the U.S. Special Operations Command, Joint Intelligence Center (SOCJIC). There is also an emerging capability in the Special Operations Joint Interagency Collaboration Center (SOJICC).

Since 1992, there have been a number of Army pioneers in OSINT, and they all merit recognition here.

- OSS '94: U.S. Army 434th Military Intelligence Detachment, for its creation of the first general overview of the utility of open sources to the military. Col Rob Simmons, Commanding.¹
- OSS '94: U.S. Army Project PATHFINDER, under the leadership of Mr. Tim Hendrickson of the National Ground Intelligence Center, for moving forward with the objective of creating a useful analyst's toolkit.
- OSS '95: Col Mike Pheneger, USA (Ret.), former J-2 U.S. Special Operations Command, for his paradigm-shattering unclassified exposures of our lack of tactical military maps for 90% of the world, and our enormous over-investment in duplicative and contradictory orders of battle.
- OSS '97: Sgt Elliot Jardines, U.S. Army Reserve, for the publication of *Open Source Quarterly* and his individual attempts to popularize open sources.
- OSS '98: Colonel Barbara Fast, Commanding Officer, 66th Military Intelligence Brigade, because her senior enlisted personnel insisted we recognize her leadership in exploiting open sources.
- OSS '00: U.S. Special Operations Command, presented to the Director of Intelligence and Information Operations Center for his leadership and the accomplishments of the Joint Intelligence Center in establishing the first operationally-focused Open Source Cell to provide timely, relevant, and unique support to U.S. Special Operations Forces

¹ Col Simmons is today Congressman Simmons (R-CT-02). CWO-4 Alan Simpson, USA, now deceased, was an important catalyst at the 434th, and is included in this first award to any U.S. Army element.

SOF OSINT HANDBOOK--Acknowledgements

- OSS '01: Major Kristan Wheaton, U.S. Army. For restoring the tradition of the statesman-warrior, and bringing to bear a unique combination of intellect, legal training, faith in the military virtues, and a deep familiarity with the many sources of conflict in the Balkan and Aegean regions. In particular, Maj Wheaton is recognized for his incisive and essential documentation of the deep chasm between early warning reports from the analyst at the front, and the attention span of the preoccupied Commander-in-Chief—his book, *The Warning Solution: Intelligent Analysis in the Age of Information Overload*, may come to be regarded as "Ref A" for commanders and their intelligence professionals in the 21st Century.
- OSS '02: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. For consistent excellence in providing the leadership of the U.S. Army and the Department of Defense with provocative, thoughtful, open source information at the strategic level, and for building bridges between the U.S. military and the global strategic community. The efforts of Dr. Steve Metz, with his work on future war and strategic asymmetry, and Dr. Max Manwaring, with groundbreaking analysis of global instability and internal war, are especially noted.
- OSS '02: Foreign Military Studies Office, Joint Reserve Intelligence Center, Fort Leavenworth. For establishment of the Emerging Threat centers of excellence with emphasis on open source information, to include the establishment of a flexible World Basic Information Library and the direct support of operations by the Joint Forces Command Headquarters Homeland Security Open Source Intelligence Team based in the Ft. Leavenworth Joint Reserve Intelligence Center.
- OSS '02: Mr. William Crislip, National Ground Intelligence Center. For his persistent and effective leadership, management of scarce resources, integration of open source into all-source analysis and establishment of one of the very few stable open source programs in the U.S. Department of Defense.
- OSS '02: Mr. Joseph V. Latella Sr., Land Information Warfare Activity. For his tireless effort as Chief, Open Source Division, in creating the first operationally-focused open source cell to provide timely, relevant, and unique support to globally-deployed members of the Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) of the U.S. Army. His new initiatives in media and trend analysis as well as Internet data harvesting have contributed directly to both Homeland Security and the Global War on Terrorism.
- OSS '03: Mr. James Hardee and Mr. Ben Harrison, Joint Intelligence Center, U.S. Special Operations Command. For persistence and innovation in devising low-cost and responsive open source intelligence solutions in support of both all-source intelligence and sensitive global operations. In documenting that open sources can meet forty percent of the intelligence needs of a global command, they have established a compelling justification for the funding of independent open source intelligence capabilities at every level of government.

There are many other pioneers, both from other U.S. military services and other U.S. government elements, and from the many international organizations, most of them military, that have elected to take OSINT seriously.²

2004 is a break-out year for OSINT. Those of us who broke trail from 1988-2004 now yield our place to the second generation of OSINT leaders emerging in all Nations, but especially within SOF. The SOF "mind-set" is the best mind-set for leading the Revolution in Intelligence Affairs (RIA) and for leading the transformation of U.S. national security in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) as well as the "white hat" challenges of stabilization in every clime and place. God Bless SOF—OSINT will make SOF stronger, and SOF will make OSINT a foundation discipline. *St.*

² The complete list of names with full citations can be seen at www.oss.net by clicking on OSINT Honors (The Pathfinders) in the middle of the left-hand column of the home page.

Preface

“Intelligence must be able to tell us, down to individual personalities and neighborhoods, ‘who,’ ‘where,’ and ‘how much’ of ‘what’ is needed, and whether what has been applied has been effective. If it doesn’t know, it must have assets able to obtain and report the information within six hours of demand.”

A. M. Gray, CMC

General Alfred M. Gray, then Commandant of the Marine Corps, published these words in an article, “Global Intelligence Challenges in the 1990’s” that was published in the Winter 1989-1990 issue of the *American Intelligence Journal*. General Gray, who appreciated very much the role that Special Operations Forces (SOF) and Airborne or Expeditionary forces play as our Nation’s rapid response capability, was very concerned about the slowness with which the U.S. national and defense intelligence communities were coming to grips with both the urgency of understanding lower tier countries and emerging threats, and the potential of open sources of information, in all languages and dialects, in meeting a considerable proportion of our needs of basic intelligence.

Today, almost fifteen years after those words were written (it was my privilege to be General Gray’s assistant on this article), many still don’t get it. Most senior intelligence leaders continue to disparage open sources of information and refuse to either recognize the discipline as a separate line item in the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) budget, or they delete it from the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP), or they decline to admit that existing attention to Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) is anything less than satisfactory. Army, and SOF, do get it. Go Army.

This strawman is put forward in part because there is still no OSINT center of excellence within the Department of Defense (DoD) or its subordinate elements where validated doctrine might be developed. It is my personal hope that within the year we will see SOF become both the Executive Agent for a national OSINT program (including the OSINT portion of the Joint Intelligence Campaign Plan, and also the operational focal point for institutionalizing OSINT support to the all-source intelligence process, as well as to policy, operations, logistics, and acquisition management. We can then hope for an official Field Manual to be developed.

Put simply, OSINT offers any Commander the best possible return on investment (ROI) for whatever resources—be they man-hours or dollars or Command interest—can be earmarked for this emerging discipline. OSINT is also the fastest way for any enlisted or commissioned member of the Armed Forces to enhance their professional development. Some of it is free, some of it is not. I dedicate this non-doctrinal special instruction material to each of you, its first recipients, hoping that you will be energized by this, add substance to it, and carry it forward throughout your careers.

St.

Robert David STEELE Vivas

SOF OSINT HANDBOOK--Preface

[This Page Blank]

Part I

Open Source Tradecraft: The Basics

Part I provides an orientation to open source intelligence (OSINT), the U.S. Marine Corps Expeditionary Factors analysis model, my own model for the analysis of revolutionary factors, to the concept of analytic tradecraft, and finally to the emerging practice of using social networking and expert networks to dramatically enhance intelligence collection, processing, and analysis.

Introduction to Open Source Intelligence is not a substitute for broader reading. It covers the basic definition, describes a range of sources as well as potential allies with whom the burden can be shared in collecting, processing, and analyzing open sources of information, and it introduces a number of useful references for further study—none of them very long or complex.

Introduction to the Expeditionary Factors Analysis Model describes an immediately-available resource funded by the U.S. taxpayer and available to any uniformed person on request. This study, which I defined and led in 1989-1991, is now in its fourth cycle and is the flagship product of the U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence Command. It uses only open sources of information, and produces an unclassified collection of country mission area factor reports that can be exploited in support of Special Operations Forces (SOF).

Introduction to the Revolutionary Analysis Model provides a simple to understand framework for thinking about revolutionary factors that could impact on your mission. Too often we tend to settle for narrow concepts of revolution, for example, mass demonstrations in the streets. This model helps explain the multiple dimensions within which revolutionary change can take place in a society, and the relationship among differing dimensions. Open sources of information are well-suited to understanding revolutionary change.

Introduction to Analytic Tradecraft is included because the heart of open source intelligence (as opposed to open source information collation) is not how much of the source information you can gather, but what you do with it once you get it. The SOF mind-set is a good one, ideally suited for the analysis of unconventional and non-traditional or emerging threats. This chapter introduces the work of Mr. Jack Davis, and provides some guidelines for improving your analytic tradecraft.

Introduction to Social Networking & Expert Networks is the final piece in your orientation to “the new craft of intelligence.” A big part of your success in creating OSINT is not going to come from sources by themselves, or from analytic tradecraft, but rather from your own initiative in developing social and expert networks that can give you decades worth of insight and experience in the space of one telephone call, one email, one personal interview. “Knowing who knows,” or being able to rapidly identify several world-class sources, may save you team from making expensive mistakes.

[This Page Blank]

Introduction to Open Source Intelligence

This chapter is not a substitute for broader reading. It covers the basic definition, describes a range of sources as well as potential allies with whom the burden can be shared in collecting, processing, and analyzing open sources of information, and it introduces a number of useful references for further study—none of them very long or complex.

Although there are varying definitions of Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), most of them reflect a limited understanding that stems from a bureaucratic reluctance to fully engage the power of OSINT in support of all-source intelligence and all supported mission areas.

open-source intelligence - 1. Information of potential intelligence value that is available to the general public. Also called OSINT. (Joint Pub 1-02) 2. OSINT sources include books, magazines, newspapers, maps, commercial electronic networks and databases, and radio and television broadcasts. OSINT involves no information that is classified at its origin or acquired through controlled collection. (MCWP 2-1)

The above “official” definition glosses over the distinction between data, information, and intelligence, while also avoiding any mention of the most important source of OSINT, overt human observation and interaction.

This is the definition I want you to have in mind as we move forward together in thinking about how OSINT can contribute to the success of your mission:


Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) combines the proven process of intelligence (requirements definition, collection management, source discovery and validation, multi-source fusion, and compelling actionable presentation) with a deep and broad understanding of what open sources of information (OSIF) are available in 29+ languages and all additional dialects. While legally and ethically available, roughly 80% of those sources are not known to and not exploited by standard bureaucratic elements of the U.S. Government such as the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) of the Central Intelligence Agency.

SOF OSINT HANDBOOK—Introduction to Open Source Intelligence

Now let's take just three points out of this for additional emphasis.

First, we must understand that open sources of information (OSIF) do not become OSINT just because they have been collected. Only when you combine analytic tradecraft—the proven process of intelligence—with the right sources—do you create OSINT.

Second, I want you to clearly understand just how little we collect from the open source world, and how important it is for you to realize the depth and breadth of the possibilities if you take OSINT seriously. The figure below illustrates the relationship between what can be known and what is known through classified sources. The bottom line: we are collecting roughly 10% of what can and need be known, spilling close to 80% of that after the fact, and consequently making very important and expensive decisions—decisions about life and death for the operators in the field—based on roughly 2% of what can and need be known.



*29 predominant languages, over 3,000 distinct languages in all.

Arabic, Catalan, Chinese, Danish, Dari, Dutch, English, Farsi, Finnish, French, German, Indonesian, Irish, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Kurdish, Kurmanji, Norwegian, Pashto, Polish, Portuguese, Russian, Serbian, Spanish, Swedish, Tamil, Turkish, Urdu...now add Aramaic, Berber, 2000 dialects.....

Figure 2: Global Collection Shortfalls

This is your challenge. Your success in the future will depend, to a very large degree, on whether you are able to get a grip on unclassified information in the relevant indigenous languages, and do so in time to make a difference.

SOF OSINT HANDBOOK—Introduction to Open Source Intelligence

You will not succeed if you fall prey to the idea that open sources can only be collected and translated by agents of the U.S. Government who have security clearances.

Finally, I want to emphasize that the good stuff—the stuff that can make a critical difference to your mission accomplishment—is generally not being collected, processed, analyzed, and disseminated by the traditional U.S. Intelligence Community upon which so many Commands have come to rely on for all intelligence, all information from sources external to the Command.

When it comes to OSINT, you are very much on your own. This handbook is intended to help you do your job in the absence of sufficient OSINT being delivered to you by traditional bureaucracies.

There is good news. You are not alone. Whenever you are preparing for a mission, whether it is in Indonesia or Colombia, or Turkmenistan or Burundi, there are legions of others who have a wealth of experience, a sufficiency of open sources of information, full competency in the indigenous languages and dialects, and—this is the hard part—mixed feelings about cooperating with elements of the U.S. Government.

I call these the seven tribes of intelligence. In the chapter on social networking and expert networks we will discuss how to operationalize this knowledge, for right now let's just define the tribes.

There are seven intelligence tribes in every area of operation (AO), both indigenous to that area, and from out-of-area countries.

First, we have the national intelligence tribe—the spies and the signals and imagery and other technical intelligence specialists, and the all-source analysts that serve national government policy makers, usually just a handful of individuals. We still need this tribe, but we must make it smarter and connect it to the real world of open sources.

Second, we have the military intelligence tribe—the strategic, operational, tactical, and technical intelligence specialists that support military policy, military acquisition, and military operations.

Third, we have the law enforcement intelligence tribe—preventive policing, pro-active counterintelligence, a tribe very much in its infancy, but doing well in some areas such as London, where Scotland Yard has grown wisely.

Fourth, we have the business intelligence tribe—business intelligence is too often confused with data mining, middle managers think they know everything they need to know, and the competition rather than the customer is the focus of effort, but at least the tribe exists.

Fifth, we have the academic intelligence tribe—many brilliant scholars and diligent students, all eager to contribute the world brain, held back mostly by a lack of connectivity and structure. This tribe is actually the most important tribe with respect to helping governments detect tax avoidance and import-export pricing fraud, or crop insurance and medical claim fraud. It is also the most important in terms of historical understanding and cultural intelligence research.

SOF OSINT HANDBOOK—Introduction to Open Source Intelligence

Sixth, we have the ground truth tribe, consisting of a handful of investigative journalists that actually leave their hotel rooms to go into the jungle, or Chechnya, or the mines of Papua New Guinea, and a vast multitude of non-governmental (NGO) and international governmental (IGO) specialists, among whom the World Bank and the European Centre for Conflict Prevention (ECCP) stand out. This tribe lacks processing power, and needs to be fully integrated into the world brain that is emerging.

Seventh, and finally, we have the citizen intelligence tribe, where I group religions, civil societies, and neighborhood associations as well as labor unions and individual “lone scouts.” Faith-based diplomacy, empowered labor unions, energized “cultural creative” associations, and citizens who share values and information for the common good comprise the foundation as well as the glue for bring all the tribes together, across national and cultural boundaries.

All of these tribes have much more experience than you do at collecting and exploiting indigenous open sources of information. A major part of your success will come from being able to develop overt human networks, relationships of trust and mutual exchange, which permit you to leverage their access and their knowledge.

In cultivating these sources of overt information, you must avoid the traditional mistake of the U.S. Intelligence Community, and especially of the Defense Intelligence Agency: you cannot ask for information, and then tell them that what you know is classified and cannot be shared. You must devise approved means of sharing unclassified information, and making the information exchange as much of a two-way street as possible.

The current definitive guides to OSINT are the *NATO Open Source Intelligence Handbook*, the *NATO Open Source Intelligence Reader*, and the *(NATO) Intelligence Exploitation of the Internet*. The definitive historical history of OSINT in recent times is contained in the 30 volumes of Proceedings from the annual OSINT conference sponsored by OSS.Net. Included in the latter are a wealth of training materials. At the end of this handbook are pointers to a number of U.S. Army and U.S. Government sources of OSINT support.

The URL below will take you to the OSINT Reference Portal through which you can download electronic copies of the NATO references as well as other relevant materials.

http://www.oss.net/extra/news/?module_instance=1&id=2322

You can also Google for <Open Source Intelligence OSINT> without brackets. Do not overlook the monthly OSINT MeetUp where information sharing takes place. You can join an existing meeting, or start your own local meeting, at www.osint.meetup.com.

Miminal Recommended Reading:

NATO Open Source Intelligence Handbook (November 2001)

(NATO) Intelligence Exploitation of the Internet (October 2002)

Optional Additional Reading:

All references available free through the URL above (the OSINT Reference Portal)

The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political (\$34.95 via Amazon)

Introduction to the Expeditionary Factors Analysis Model

In 1988, the U.S. Marine Corps was given its own intelligence center, in part because it was not able to obtain adequate intelligence support from any national, defense, or service intelligence center, for the distinct area of expeditionary operations, a hybrid form of operation that required a unique combination of blue water, brown water, coastal zone, and deep inland intelligence. The model that I introduce here¹ was created when our Marine Corps warfighters asked us to find a way to generate an automatic “paragraph 2” to any operational order. We worked with them to define both what they needed to know, and how they defined “degrees of difficulty,” an aspect of intelligence support that had never been clarified before that time.

There are five key points to “take away” from this section:

First, no mission area factor can be evaluated unless there is a clear understanding with the operator being supported as to what constitutes a high, medium, or low level of threat or degree of difficulty.

Second, no mission area factor can be considered in isolation. The military, the geographic, and the civil factors all need to be taken into account together, as a whole.


Third, the threat changes depending on the level of analysis. A tank, for example, may be a high threat technically, low tactically because of poor training and parts availability, medium operationally because of the number scattered around,, and low strategically because they cannot be sustained in battle over two weeks.

Fourth, we cannot limit our “order of battle” calculations to conventional uniformed opponents. Terrorists, criminals, and corrupt officials are all part of the “threat.” Smugglers of drugs, small arms, and people are an especially important threat in terms of unexpected detection of SOF infiltration and covert observation activities.

Fifth, open sources of information are very helpful in arriving at “strategic generalizations” against when SOF can plan for generic capabilities and expectations. It is helpful to know, for example, that 1:50,000 combat charts for the Third World are generally not available from the National Geospatial Agency, but they are available from the Russian military through a commercial vendor based in the US. It is helpful to know that most of the time you are going to be under canopy, with a line of sight distance of less than 1000 meters, in hot humid temperatures, and so on.

¹ If not provided as hand-outs, both the model and the 1991 strategic generalizations are available at www.oss.net, under the Archives for 1999 (OSS1999-P1-12 and OSS1999-P1-13, respectively).

Now let's look at the high-level depiction of this model.



Integrated Intelligence Analysis

STRATEGIC LEVEL : integrated application of all national sources of power. **Military:** ability to sustain operations over time & space. **Geographic:** Geo-political location, resources, distances. **Civil:** Allies (or enemies of import, esp. contiguous ones

OPERATIONAL LEVEL: selection of time, space, and nature of engagements. **Military:** quantities of military power available for immediate commitment. **Geographic:** internal natural resources supporting self-sustainment. **Civil:** internal preconditions & precipitants of volatility among all sectors.

TACTICAL LEVEL: application of finite power at fixed time & place. **Military:** impact of training & maintenance on existing capabilities. **Geographic:** internal geographic conditions affecting mobility & defense. **Civil:** Internal group dynamics affecting cohesion & operations.

TECHNICAL LEVEL: system-specific capabilities addressed in isolation. **Military:** effectiveness of specific system absent any constraints. **Geographic:** internal climate affecting performance. **Civil:** infrastructure enabling or blocking system use.

Figure 3: Integrated Intelligence Analysis Model

Beneath this model, for each mission area, we went on to define “degrees of difficulty.” I have to stress that this advanced model of analysis has not yet been adopted by the U.S. Intelligence Community, which still lives by the “list theory” of threat reporting—long lists with very little in the way of integrated analysis of training, logistics, terrain compatibility, or related factors. Of course this is only when they realize a threat exists, and their fancy satellites can actually find the things on the ground. Our ability to support you when you go in harm’s way in what are quaintly called “lower tier” countries—this is code for “not important enough to warrant classified coverage”—is severely limited. OSINT—and direct covert human observation—may be your primary INT, not just a supporting INT.

What I have found is that a common understanding of “degrees of difficulty” is helpful in evaluating the threat intuitively and holistically, rather than in a cookbook or “list” fashion. It also allows you to create a “country profile” that in one snapshot tells anyone in the SOF family precisely where that country fits in terms of the threat, the environment, and the logistics challenge. It also allows the leader to focus in right away on the areas where command attention is needed, for example, the lack of maps, the need for hard language interpreters, the urgency of having man-portable air defense, active camouflage, and so on.

SOF OSINT HANDBOOK—Introduction to the Expeditionary Factors Analysis Model

Below is just one example, for aviation, of how “degrees of difficulty” can be used to distinguish among special aviation threat environments.

Difficulty	Description	Representative Countries
1	No substantive air OOB or air defense	Grenada, Surinam, Liberia, Papua NG
2	DC-3/props, early anti-air guns	Haiti, Lebanon, Uganda, Sri Lanka
3	Day jets, hand-held SAMS	Venezuela, Oman, Sudan, Bangladesh
4	Early radar, early Smart, EW radar	Nicaragua, N. Yemen, Ethiopia, Thailand
5	3 rd Gen. radar & SAM, stand-off PGM,	Cuba, Libya, Angola, Viet-Nam
6	NATO/Bloc level night all-weather	Egypt, Iran, Syria, N. Korea, China

Figure 4: Special Aviation Degree of Difficulty Example

Available systems must always be evaluated in relation to the specific mission and specific location. Many tanks around the capital city might represent a high threat there, but if there is no cross-country mobility, the bridges in your AO are limited to ten tons, and there is zero likelihood of the tanks being moved into your immediate vicinity, then this is an irrelevant threat. It is not enough to ask “how many of what do they have?” You also have to know where they are, whether they are trained up, gassed up, loaded up, mobile, and capable of being a factor in your specific operation.

Available systems also have to be evaluated based on the level of analysis that you need to apply to your mission. Below is one example, that of the Libyan T-72 tank in the late 1990’s, at which time the standard U.S. Intelligence Community evaluation was that this represented a “high” threat to any US force entering the country.

Level of Analysis	Description	Adjusted Threat Level
Strategic	Insufficient supplies to keep active over 2 weeks.	LOW
Operational	Significant numbers scattered around the country.	MEDIUM
Tactical	Badly trained troops, stored in open, cannibalized.	LOW
Technical	Latest available Soviet technology and armor plate.	HIGH

Figure 5: Threat Changes Depending on the Level of Analysis

Don’t ever let anyone tell you something is a “high” threat. Ask them where, exactly, and at what level of analysis. More often than not, it will reduce the threat. Sometimes it will cause you to take the threat more seriously.

Within this model, and the information you obtain from conventional classified sources, it is extremely important to be very sensitive to the distinction among four distinct types of forces: government forces; para-military forces (some government, some not); tribal forces; and criminal forces. Most of our all-source intelligence is relatively strong on the first and weak on the remaining three. The latter three forces are very important to you primarily because they are more likely to be both invisible to our technical collection systems, and also most likely to detect your infiltration and oppose you or report you when you least expect to be noticed.

Tribal and criminal gang studies are especially interesting in the context of learning about open sources of information because it turns out that classified sources are next to useless in creating orders of battle for sub-state or non-state actors. This is where you have to really learn how to go after academic, law enforcement, commercial, and non-governmental organization (NGO) sources.

SOF OSINT HANDBOOK—Introduction to the Expeditionary Factors Analysis Model

Below is an illustration of one high-level look at the spheres of influence of specific tribes relevant to the US efforts to construct the road from Kabul to Kandahar, with a view of the specific Afghan tribes in the inset box.




Figure 6: Tribal Areas of Influence in Afghanistan

Finally, we come to the concept of strategic generalizations. I like to tell every generation of warfighters that they are not only responsible for fighting the force they are given, but they are also responsible for putting in the requirements to create the force that will be fought by the next generation. It helps to know that your world is one quarter jungle, one quarter mountains, one quarter urban, and one quarter desert. You must be trained, equipped, and organized for all four. It helps to know that cross-country mobility is next to nothing in 80% of your world; that bridge loading constrains most heavy offensive weapons systems from being a factor in the Third World; that line of sight distance is generally under 1,000 meters; that three-quarters of the time the remote satellites cannot see below the canopy; that rain is common and your unmanned aerial vehicles really do have to be all-weather capable; that the Navy cannot get you there half the time; that just about everywhere is C-130 capable and we do not ever want to give up that platform; that your standard aviation temperature is not what the Navy and Air Force build to (warm and not humid), but rather hot and humid—this has severe implications for range, load, and loiter. In short, OSINT will help you understand the SOF world better, and help explain to your acquisition program managers why they need to fight for systems. Use this model to improve the value of OSINT to what you do.

Introduction to the Revolutionary Analysis Model

The day of being able to simply to “Order of Battle” analysis is over. This is especially true for those responsible for Civil Affairs (CA) and Psychological Operations (PSYOP), but it is also true for every mission area specialist, for every Team, for every Commander.

In addition to the Expeditionary Factors Analysis Model introduced in the previous model, it is necessary for the all-source intelligence analyst as well as the CA/PSYOP specialist to utilize a broader framework for thinking about sources of revolutionary change across every dimension of a society.

This framework is created by combining societal dimensions with personality aspects to create a matrix for structured evaluation and reflection. This matrix has the added advantage of helping to frame potential CA lines of inquiry, and potential PSYOP themes in support of the larger campaign plan.

The societal dimensions are as follows:¹

- Political-Legal. Who governs whom, how, to what end.
- Socio-Economic. Allocation of goods and services in process of managing the nation.
- Ideo-Cultural. Spiritual means of co-coordinating the population, managing inter-relatedness.
- Techno-Demographic. Technology and human resources as instruments of the state or tribe.
- Natural-Geographic. Water, energy, mineral, agricultural factors, geographic access.

- The personality attributes, a big part of the “why” of revolution, include:²
 - Perception. Ability to see discrepancies between what is and what might be.
 - Identity. Ability to recognize one’s own limitations and inherent external limitations.
 - Competence. Result of solid perception and solid identity.
 - Investment. Authentic and intense dedication to a common good or larger purpose.
 - Risk taking. Ability to risk one’s self and one’s beliefs in open confrontation.
 - Extroversion. Enabler for investment and suspension, opening way to interact with others.
 - Transcendence. Result of all of the above, as the immediate sub-set group is energized.
 - Synergy. Elevation of the larger group as sub-sets interact and reinforce one another.
 - Complexity. Reconciliation of contradictions and larger integration of all elements.

¹ These are all as developed for an unpublished graduate thesis, “Theory, Risk Assessment, and Internal War: A Framework for the Observation of Revolutionary Potential.” (Lehigh University, 1 April 1976).

² These are drawn from Charles Hampden Turner, *Radical Man: The Process of Psycho-Social Development* (Anchor, 1971).

SOF OSINT HANDBOOK—Introduction to the Revolutionary Analysis Model

Don't get bogged down with nuances. Just absorb this as a frame of reference. This is what the shorthand matrix of indicators looks like:

	Political-Legal	Socio-Economic	Ideo-Cultural	Techno-Demographic	Natural-Geographic
Perception	Isolation of elites, inadequate intelligence	Concentration of wealth; lack of public disclosure	Conflicting myths; inadequate socialization	Acceptance of media distortions; inadequate education	Reliance on single sector or product; concentrated land holdings
Identity	Lack of elite consensus; failure to define priorities	Loss of economic initiative; failure to do balanced growth	Loss of authority; failure to provide and honor national myth system	Failure to accept and exploit new technologies and new groups	Failure to integrate outlying territories into national system
Competence	Weak or inefficient government; too much or too little bureaucracy	Break-down of fiscal, monetary, development, or welfare policies	Humiliation of national leaders; loss of confidence by population	Failure to enforce priorities, with resulting loss of momentum	Failure to prepare for or cope with major national disasters
Investment	Ego-centric or parochial government	Excessive or insufficient mobility; lack of public sector	Cynicism; opportunism; corruption	Failure to nurture entrepreneurship or franchise all groups	Failure to preserve or properly exploit natural resources
Risk	Elite intransigence; repression; failure to adapt	Failure to deal with crime, especially white collar crime	Failure to deal with prejudice; desertion of the intellectuals	Failure to develop national R&D program to solve big issues	Failure to honor human rights; failure to protect animal species
Extroversion	Ineffective tension management; failure examine false premises	Structural differentiation; lack of national transportation grid	Elite adoption of foreign mores; failure to deal with alienation	Failure to develop C4I infrastructure; shared images	Failure to explore advantages of regional integration
Transcendence	Foreign control of government; arbitrary/excess government	Loss of key sectors to foreign providers; loss of quality control	Media censorship; suppression of intellectual discourse	Failure to control police, army, or terrorists; failure to employ <i>alphas</i>	Failure to respect natural constraints or support organic growth
Synergy	Failure to assimilate all individuals or respond to groups	Status discrepancies; lack of economic motivation	Absence of sublimating myths; failure of religion	Failure to provide program and technology assessment	Failure to distribute benefits between urban and rural areas
Complexity	Garrison, industrial, or welfare states	Unstable growth; excessive military spending	Cultural pre-disposition toward violence	Excessive urbanization; pollution	Lack of land for expansion, inefficient land or water use

Figure 7: Framework for the Analysis of Revolutionary Potential

I want to make one final point here, and that is this: governments are not good at monitoring all of these factors within their own country, much less other countries and sub-state sectors. You will not succeed at OSINT on revolutionary factors unless you harness the distributed knowledge of foreign nationals and private sector parties. OSINT requires networking at the collection level, at the processing level, and at the analysis level. Ideally, OSINT also leads to multinational policy understanding, not just unilateral appreciations.

Introduction to Analytic Tradecraft

Mr. Jack Davis is the *de facto* dean of the U.S. national intelligence community's analytic cadre. In 1995 he published a series of notes on what is now known as "analytic tradecraft", and in 1997 these were published by the Central Intelligence Agency and have become the standard reference on the subject.¹

Below we offer a summary of these notes, recommending that the work of Mr. Davis be read in its entirety.

Analytic Tradecraft #1: *Trade-offs analysis in client context*

- Greatest value of analysis is strategic--helping evaluate trade-offs in policy and acquisition and operational costs
- Analysis must be done in client context but with external views carefully represented

Analytic Tradecraft #2: *Nine evaluation criteria for credibility*

- Relevance to policy
- Analytic sophistication
- Unique information
- Timely and concise
- Facts/sources are stated
- Conclusions are offered
- Assumptions are stated
- Options are outlined

Analytic Tradecraft #3: *Assumptions must be specified*

- Separate "box" for assumptions gains consumer confidence
- List variables and relationships--some are factual, others not
- Obtain second views
- Question assumptions

¹ Jack Davis, *A Compendium of Analytic Tradecraft Notes* (CIA, February 1997), readily available online at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cia/tradecraft_notes/contents.htm or search Google for "analytic tradecraft". Should be read together with "New Rules for the New Craft of Intelligence", Chapter 15 of Robert David Steele, *THE NEW CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE: Personal, Public, & Political* (OSS, 2002). This chapter is free via the OSINT portal page, http://www.oss.net/extra/news/?module_instance=1&id=2322. A briefing by Robert Steele that integrates several slides about Jack Davis's work, entitled "ANALYSIS: Making Magic," is at http://www.oss.net/extra/news/?module_instance=1&id=1516.

Analytic Tradecraft #4: *Alternative outcomes must be specified*

- What are the alternative outcomes?
- If they occur, what signposts or events might be triggers?
- In choosing one outcome over others, what judgments were made?

Analytic Tradecraft #5: *Facts, opinions, sources*

- Distinguish between direct & indirect sources
- Be precise about sourcing of information
- Understand policy sensitivities
- Respect complexity
- Account for deception
- Label judgments

Analytic Tradecraft #6: *Harnessing internal and external expertise*

- Must rise above the competition--and use external experts
- Demonstrate research, scholarship, database access, ground truth, teamwork, experience
- Customize intelligence for specific individuals

Analytic Tradecraft #7: *The art of distillation and summarization*

- 30-second lead buys you 3 minutes for summary which *might* get them to read it all
- Focus on what's new
- Make it easy to read
- A few points, clearly
- Role play the audience

Analytic Tradecraft #8: *Deception, counterintelligence, timeliness*

- Account for denial & disinformation
- Gaps in collection?
- Odd contradictions?
- Odd confirmations?
- Use textbox to show reader that steps were taken to consider & defeat deception

I encourage everyone to study the original report, read Chapter 15 on the new rules, and download the briefing which mixes his stuff and mine, opening with a look at the new analytical environment, and closing with the observation that all analysts, however junior, are managers: they are managers of customer relations; of money for open sources; of external experts; and of classified collection.

Introduction to Social Networking & Expert Networks

There are two separate concepts that will help you connect to humans who know stuff. The first, originally popularized in the 1960's and 1970's as the "small world phenomenon" or "six degrees of separation,"¹ refers to the very high likelihood that you already know someone who knows someone....out to a sixth person who knows exactly what you need to know. And if you do not know someone directly, it is very likely you can find someone resident in the U.S. whom you can reach, that does know someone who knows someone...you get the idea.

A very famous example of this comes from President Bill Clinton and his need to know, the night that the U.S. bombed the Iraqi intelligence headquarters, whether our strike had been successful. Our (then) \$35 billion a year intelligence community could not tell him. We had no one on the ground and the satellites were not within range of the target for a thermal reading. President Clinton, without telling anyone, called CNN, CNN called its Jordan bureau, whose cameraman had a cousin who lived near the intelligence headquarters, who confirmed the strike." Four calls.²

Operationally, this can be useful as a means of helping you think about how to obtain both in-depth historical and cultural understanding for a specific mission area, and specific tactical information that might not be available through current online or offline sources—what is called "local knowledge" that has not been published and is only known to those in the immediate area. An example of this local knowledge might be which water wells are free of bodies and safe to drink from, and which have recently had bodies dumped in them and are therefore dangerous.

If you think back to both the expeditionary factors and the revolutionary analysis models, you can easily conceptualize a number of categories of individuals whom you might get in touch with through either direct personal contacts or indirect web and other directory identification.

For example, and skipping over the obvious availability of the U.S. defense attaché and foreign military assistance teams as well as any SOF ground walkers that are or have been in country recently.³

¹ Stanley Milgram, "The Small World Problem," *Psychology Today*, 1967. Google "small world problem" or visit Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Small_world_phenomenon.

² As told by Dick Clarke, *Against All Enemies* (Free Press, 2004), page 84.

³ It is a common misperception among US military personnel that they are not allowed to call strangers to ask for information. Maj Mark Coffin, USA, then Officer in Charge of the OSINT Cell within the Special Operations Command Joint Intelligence Center (SOCJIC) personally visited the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense responsible for intelligence oversight, and determined that calls can be made provided that there is no misrepresentation by the uniformed person, and they identify themselves. SOF also has recourse to commercial intelligence support specialists, who can meet Operations Security (OPSEC) needs by not identifying the client interest, and converting any SOF OSINT requirement into a graduate paper by an obscure Swedish or Canadian student.

- Military Vendors. Who is selling military hardware, software, vehicles, and munitions into the target area?
- Airlines. What American airlines are flying into the area in question and how do you get hold of the pilots and air crew?
- Ships. What US-based companies are running merchant shipping in and out of the ports, and what kind of access can you get to their officers and crew?
- Political. Who is the U.S. Government or U.S. labor union person that has been in-country most recently to help the local democratic party get organized?
- Economic. Who is running the US Chamber of Commerce in that country? What US companies have a US manager in place?
- Media. What journalists are writing extensively on that country, either from in-country or as regular visitors?
- Academic. Where are the US, UK, and Australian centers of excellence on this specific country? Who can you talk to there? Don't overlook the archeologists, anthropologists, and medical researchers—a lot of field work is done by these groups.
- Religion. What evangelical or other religious missions have gone to the country from the US recently?
- Citizens. Who is running tours into the area? Don't overlook the fanatical climbers and cavers who are willing to bribe their way into a dangerous area, as in Indonesia.

The above is not intended to suggest that you spend a lot of time “shot-gunning” for information, only that you be very aware of two realities: first, there are no clandestine assets immediately available to help you understand the specifics of your target area; and second, there are a significant number of people going in and out of that area who could be tapped into where the situation warrants.

This concept overlaps with the second concept, that of “citation analysis” or “the web of knowledge.” Mr. Eugene Garfield, founder of the *Social Science Citation Index* and the *Science Citation Index*, is the originator of this extraordinary method for both identifying networks of experts, and discovering the very latest knowledge in any field.

Mr. Garfield's genius was in realizing that the best and most relevant work tends to get cited by others, and that by tracking citations, he could do three things:

- 1) Based on numbers alone, determine the influence of the article or book.
- 2) Based on tracking specific relationships between articles and/or authors and/or their parent organization, identify networks or the “web” of knowledge and how it was growing, changing, responding to external influence.
- 3) By providing a link from past publications known to be “on target”, by following citations of that work, rapidly identify the latest work, within a month of its publication, which might

SOF OSINT HANDBOOK—Introduction to Social Networking & Expert Networks

not have been discoverable any other way. This is especially true for work in adjacent fields, for example, discovering useful recent anthropological studies highly relevant to understanding Muslim politics in southern Thailand.

Below is an example of what citation analysis can do for South Asia. A more extended report, easily produced, would provide their biographies and a complete list of their publications.⁴

LOCATION	NAME	INSTITUTION
HK	Hofstede G	UNIV HONG KONG./HONG KONG//PEOPLES R CHINA/
SRILAN	DeSilva WI	UNIV COLOMBO.DEPT DEMOG/COLOMBO 03//SRI LANKA/
SWEDEN	Jiggins J	SWEDISH UNIV AGR SCI./UPPSALA//SWEDEN/
UK	Dasgupta P	UNIV CAMBRIDGE./CAMBRIDGE CB3 9DD//ENGLAND/
UK	Halliday F	UNIV LONDON LONDON SCH ECON & POLIT SCI./LONDON WC2A 2AE//ENGLAND/
UK	Lipton M	UNIV SUSSEX.SCH AFRICAN & ASIAN STUDIES/BRIGHTON BN1 9QN/E SUSSEX/ENGLAND
UN	Bongaarts J	POPULAT COUNCIL,1 DAG HAMMARSKJOLD PLAZA/NEW YORK//NY/10017
USA	Caldwell JC	AUSTRALIAN NATL UNIV,GPO BOX 4/CANBERRA/ACT/AUSTRALIA/
USA	Engle RF	UNIV CALIF SAN DIEGO,DEPT ECON, 9500 GILMAN DR/LA JOLLA//CA/92093
USA	Levine NE	UNIV CALIF LOS ANGELES,DEPT ANTHROPOL/LOS ANGELES//CA/90024

Figure 8: Selected Interesting Experts (on South Asia)

LOCATION	INSTITUTION	SELECTED EXPERTS
AUS	AUSTRALIAN NATL UNIV,GPO BOX 4/CANBERRA/ACT/AUSTRALIA	Caldwell JC
FR	CNRS,MILIEUX SOC & CULTURE HIMALAYA/MEUDON//FRANCE	Toffin G
INDIA	INDIAN INST MANAGEMENT,DH RD,POB 16757/CALCUTTA700027/W BENGAL/INDIA/	Sen AK
SRI LANKA	POLICY STUDIES INST./COLOMBO//SRI LANKA/	Kelegama S
USA	BROWN UNIV,DEPT ECON, BOX B/PROVIDENCE//RI/02912	Pitt MM ; Khandker SR; McKernan SM; Latif MA
USA	CORNELL UNIV,/ITHACA//NY/14853	Sahn DE ; Dorosh PA; Younger SD
USA	EAST WEST CTR,1601 EAST WEST RD/HONOLULU//HI/96848	Mason KO; Emadi H; Balk D
USA	PRINCETON UNIV,WOODROW WILSON SCH PUBL & INT AFFAIRS/ PRINCETON//NJ/08544	Trussell J ; Vaughan B
USA	STANFORD UNIV./STANFORD//CA/94305	Shavelson RJ ; RuizPrimo MA; Wiley EW

Figure 9: Selected Interesting Institutions (on South Asia)

⁴ These are from a 1999 study done for a national client. Generally it costs \$1000 in online access fees and analyst time to get to the top 100 people, across all nationalities, on any published topic.

SOF OSINT HANDBOOK—Introduction to Social Networking & Expert Networks

Published experts know who the unpublished experts are (e.g. within governments and non-governmental organizations).

The below example is AUS/UK/US only.

TARGET	HOST	EXPERTS	ORGANIZATIONAL ADDRESSES
AFGHA	AUS	Mackinnon A ; Jorm AF; Christensen H; Korten AE; Jacomb PA; Rodgers B	MONASH UNIV,BIOSTAT & PSYCHOMETR UNIT, LOCKED BAG 11/PARKVILLE/VIC 052/AUSTRALIA/ AUSTRALIAN NAT UNIV /CANBERRA /ACT/ AUSTRALIA/; MENTAL HLTH RES INST VICTORIA,/PARKVILLE/VIC 3052/AUSTRALIA
AFGHA	AUS	Maley W	UNIV NEW S WALES,/KENSINGTON/NSW 2033/AUSTRALIA
AFGHA	UK	Ahmed AS	UNIV CAMBRIDGE,SELWYN COLL/CAMBRIDGE CB2 1TN//ENGLAND
AFGHA	UK	Galeotti M	UNIV KEELE,/KEELE ST5 5BG/STAFFS/ENGLAND
AFGHA	UK	Halliday F	UNIV LONDON LONDON SCH ECON & POLIT SCI,/LONDON WC2A 2AE//ENGLAND/
AFGHA	UK	Harrison S ; Dunham P	COVENTRY UNIV,CTR QUATERNARY SCI/COVENTRY CV1 5FB/W MIDLANDS/ ENGLAND/ ; COVENTRY UNIV,DEPT GEOG/COVENTRY CV1 5FB/W MIDLANDS/ENGLAND
AFGHA	UK	Urban M	BBC,NEWSNIGHT/LONDON//ENGLAND
AFGHA	USA	Adamec LW	UNIV ARIZONA,DEPT NEAR EASTERN STUDIES/TUCSON//AZ/85721
AFGHA	USA	Allan P ; Sienko S	1482 15TH ST,/FT LEE//NJ/07024 ; PACE UNIV,LUBIN SCH BUSINESS/NEW YORK//NY/10038; AT&T,/PARSIPPANY//NJ/
AFGHA	USA	Anderson JW	NORTHWESTERN UNIV,SCH MED/CHICAGO//IL
AFGHA	USA	Edwards DB	WILLIAMS COLL,/WILLIAMSTOWN//MA/01267
AFGHA	USA	Emadi H	EAST WEST CTR,INT RELAT PROGRAM/HONOLULU//HI/00000
AFGHA	USA	Kinzie JD	OREGON HLTH SCI UNIV,UHN 80,3181 SW SAM JACKSONPK RD/PORTLAND//OR/97201
AFGHA	USA	Magnus RH	NAVAL POSTGRAD SCH,DEPT NATL SECUR/MONTEREY//CA
AFGHA	USA	Moghadam VM	ILLINOIS STATE UNIV,/NORMAL//IL/61761
AFGHA	USA	Mollica RF ; McInnes K; Poole C; Tor S	HARVARD UNIV,SCH PUBL HLTH, SCH MED, PROGRAM REFUGEE TRAUMA, 8 STORY ST, 3RD FLOOR/CAMBRIDGE//MA/02138 ; BOSTON UNIV,SCH PUBL HLTH, DEPT EPIDEMIOLOG & BIostat/BOSTON//MA/02215
AFGHA	USA	NICHOLS R; RAIS RB	UNIV PENN/PHILADELPHIA//PA/19104
AFGHA	USA	Raskin A ; Mghir R	7658 WATER OAK PT RD,/PASADENA//MD/21122
AFGHA	USA	Rubin BR	COLUMBIA UNIV,DEPT POLIT SCI/NEW YORK//NY/10027
AFGHA	USA	Russos S; Keating K; Hovell MF ; Jones JA; Slymen DJ; Hofstetter CR; Rubin B; Morrison T	SAN DIEGO STATE UNIV,GRAD SCH PUBL HLTH, CTR BEHAV EPIDEMIOLOG & COMMUNITY HLTH/SAN DIEGO//CA/92123 ; SAN DIEGO STATE UNIV,GRAD SCH PUBL HLTH, CTR BEHAV EPIDEMIOLOG & COMMUNITY HLTH/SAN DIEGO//CA/92123
AFGHA	USA	Sagrestano LM ; Heavey CL; Christensen A	SO ILLINOIS UNIV,DEPT PSYCHOL/CARBONDALE //IL/62901; UNIV NEVADA,/LAS VEGAS//NV/89154; UNIV CALIF/LOS ANGELES//CA/90024
AFGHA	USA	Suhrke A	MICHELSSEN INST,/BERGEN//NORWAY/ ; CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT INT PEACE,/ WASHINGTON//DC/20037

Figure 10: Top Experts on Afghanistan (Regardless of Subject)

Your SOCJIC OSINT Branch knows how to do this. Leverage the experts!

Part II

Primer on the Utility of Open Sources to the Mission

Part II provides a professional overview of why open sources of information can be useful to any SOF mission, and in passing, provides some examples, by no means comprehensive, of specific sources and methods for identifying sources. The *NATO Open Source Intelligence Handbook* is the primary reference for the process of “doing” Open Source Intelligence (OSINT). The *SOF OSINT Handbook* is oriented toward developing an understanding of open sources in relation to the core SOF mission areas, and especially Civil Affairs (CA) and Psychological Operations (PSYOP).

Strategic Historical & Cultural Understanding addresses the critical importance to any SOF mission of going back in time to understand the history of the region, the history of foreign powers as well as the US in the region, and the history of Anti-Americanism in the region. If there is one thing SOF cannot afford when going in-country, it is to be delusional about just where we stand as we go about trying to win hearts & minds or capture single hostile individuals in a context where we do not realize the odds are stacked against us. *The greatest threat to SOF missions is not armed forces but rather hostile observers.* Understanding history and culture is fundamental.

Operational Understanding for Campaign Planning connects open sources of information to the theater level of warfare, and helps develop an understanding of open sources in relation to the current situation. Regional power sources, status discrepancies among tribal groups, change agents that are present or emergent, internal security and stability issues (water, food, energy, health, crime, for example) are all essential to understanding the weak links in a current social structure that SOF can either leverage for operational advantage, or must be aware of to avoid operational failure.

Tactical Sub-State Understanding for Unit Effectiveness gets to the heart of the matter for SOF units that will be working in-country. This chapter focuses on tribal orders of battle down to the village and elder level, on key leaders and value-based biographies, on understanding the local media and how groups and individuals communicate with one another, and finally, on content analysis—understanding *their* PSYOP themes.

Technical Understanding for Policy, Acquisition, & Operations begins with an introduction to the *NATO Open Source Intelligence Handbook*, which is the technical reference and companion to this volume, and then provides a very brief overview that relates open sources of information to policy, acquisition, and operations in general. One of the great things about OSINT is that it can be used to study domestic US policy debates as well as allied debates. Understanding the players, both friendly and third party, and understanding how the players are perceived locally, is at the heart of any successful CA or PSYOP endeavor. OSINT can also enhance SOF acquisition, and help SOF decide what to leave on the pier and what to take along on the mission. It can game the mission.

[This Page Blank]

Strategic Historical & Cultural Understanding

This chapter addresses the critical importance to any SOF mission of going back in time to understand the history of the region, the history of foreign powers as well as the US in the region, and the history of Anti-Americanism in the region. If there is one thing SOF cannot afford when going in-country, it is to be delusional about just where we stand as we go about trying to win hearts & minds or capture single hostile individuals in a context where we do not realize the odds are stacked against us. *The greatest threat to SOF missions is not armed forces but rather hostile observers.* Understanding history and culture is fundamental.

Before we begin, let me emphasize the urgency of devising responsive means for accessing open source information in the varied indigenous languages. Anything written in English is inevitably going to be dated, limited, and probably off-track or at least distracted by the inherent biases and limitations that come with being educated in an English-speaking country. It is a fact that in the U.S., the various academics responsible for foreign area studies have hit a new low. This is a consequence of the 1970's drive toward doing "quantitative comparative analysis" which is code for not having to learn a foreign language and not having to do field work in a foreign language. Too many academics became comfortable in the air-conditioned offices working with abstract statistics, and we have suffered an almost general collapse of our actual ability to "connect" to foreign areas through what used to be a very robust academic community that went from anthropology to linguistics to sociology to voodoo and zombie studies. There are still some small centers of excellence, but on balance, if you cannot access non-US citizen experts and foreign language content, you are going to be severely handicapped in getting at the nuances that can make a difference.

History of the Region

History not only matters, history provides some general "truths" that are helpful to every professional, but SOF professionals in particular. Consider this summary of the book *Lessons of History* by Will & Ariel Durant, whose eleven volume history of mankind, in English, is one of the classic works still relevant in our time.

They point out that geography matters; that inequality is natural; and that famine, pestilence, and war are Nature's way of balancing the population. They point out that birth control (or not) has *strategic* implications—we have only to look at the exploding Catholic population in Latin America as well as the exploding Chinese, Indonesian, and Indian populations, in comparison with the declining Anglo populations of the US, Europe, and Russia, to see where this is going. They also point out that history is color-blind and that morality is strength. *This is worth saying again: morality is strength. Immoral capitalism and immoral US policy are threats to US survival.*

SOF OSINT HANDBOOK—Strategic Historical & Cultural Understanding

It the war for hearts and minds, the higher moral ground is ten times more powerful than any array of weapons. Morality can be defined, and perceived, at all four levels of warfare.

- At the strategic level of warfare, the world will ask: “Is America using its power wisely, for the good of all, or selfishly, to enrich a few? Can we trust America?”
- At the operational level of warfare, the countries in the region, and their peoples, will ask: “Is this American force or presence a good thing or a bad thing? Is the military base attracting prostitutes and drug crime, or helping create jobs? Are we safer with Americans here, or are we being undermined?”
- At the tactical level of warfare, the village elders and the individual members of any given tribe will be asking: “Can I trust these Americans not to betray me if I help them? Can I use their medicine and accept their food and water without being compromised with my own people? Can I earn more respect, and perhaps a reward, by betraying the Americans to the local war lord?”
- At the technical level of warfare, the morality of means comes into play. “Is an airplane in the sky broadcasting replays of “Bay Watch” and filthy rock lyrics inspiring, or an abomination that blasphemes the local God and local culture? Is the jamming of a religious broadcast to overlay an American propaganda theme a good thing or a bad thing? Is the American use of translators from a tribe of “untouchables” an acceptable price to pay for understanding the Americans?”

In short, I want you to see history as a means of calculating a moral balance of power at each of the levels of warfare, both externally to the area of operations (i.e. the moral balance of power among foreign powers active in the region), and internally to the area of operations (among the tribes and between the tribes and the government and the warlords).

This moral calculus must be sensitive to cultural nuances, meaning that you cannot fall prey to the typical American view that we are the source of all good, that we are always right, and that anyone who does not agree with us is a backward heathen who needs to be educated and brought in line with our beliefs. The SOF mind-set must accept that “it is what it is” and work within than localized calculus.

Sometimes, your understanding of history and culture will be superior to that of the person who ordered the wrong mission for the wrong place at the wrong time, and it will be your moral responsibility to help the SOF Commander avoid a very dangerous mistake.

If you are wondering about this time why I have not mentioned the *CIA World Factbook* or other “standard” references, the reason is quite simple: they don’t do nuances. Your mission is too important to settle for cookie-cutter guidebooks. You need to create your own historical and cultural understanding in relation to your unique understanding of SOF, the mission, and the current context within which that mission is going to take place. Obviously you should draw on the area studies from the Library of Congress or Fort Bragg, but be alert for what is not included—such as a history of French seizure of three countries from Thailand, Japanese atrocities, or US corruption. There is a *reason* these guides don’t come to the top within Google—they are generally not the best references.

Keyword Guide¹

<**Timeline COUNTRY**> for example <Timeline Thailand> produces a number of useful overviews, including <http://timelines.ws/countries/THAILAND.HTML>² that provides a timeline from 10,000 BC and the following excellent overview:

Timeline Thailand: formerly Siam

The capital is Bangkok. It is located on a bend of the Chao Phraya River. Within its borders once flourished the kingdoms of Sukhothai, Ayuthaya and Lanna. The Thai language has 44 consonants and 32 vowels. The country covers 513,000 sq km. **Six main tribes inhabit the region: Karen, Hmong, Lahu, Lisu, Mien, and Akha.** The Thai new year, Songkran, is celebrated in mid-April.

Remember those tribes. We'll be coming back to them in the tactical chapter.

<**History COUNTRY**> for example <History Thailand> offers up hundreds of choices, including http://sunsite.au.ac.th/thailand/thai_his. Although the seventh one down, I like its emphasis on origins.

**[The origins of Thais](#) || [Khmer Influence](#) || [Lanna Period](#)
[Sukhothai Period](#) || [Ayutthaya Period](#) || [Ratanakosin Period](#) || [World War II & Post War](#)**

Rather than stopping with this one, we go on, and discover an archeological history site that makes the points that archeology, rather than political myth, represents the “true” history of Siam and Thailand. Not quite true—history is in the mind of the beholder—but relevant: you need to understand both. http://www.csmngt.com/thailand_history.htm produces great detail including:

The chain of events that resulted in today's Thai people.

- The Chinese / T'ai emigration followed by the Indian / Hindu immigration, diverse immigrants mixing with the indigenous people.
- T'ai immigration from the north & east (China) & the Hindu immigration came from the north & west (India).
- There is ongoing discussion as to whether the T'ai originated in southern China or northern Vietnam.
- The Indian / Hindu immigration followed the coast of the Andaman Sea south down the Malay Peninsula (to Indonesia) & east along the coast of the Gulf of Thailand (to Cambodia) into the southern region of Issan.

Although online searching is usually better if you keep the terms simple, sometimes simple does not work and you have to try variations. <Culture Thailand>, for example, produces tourist-type information. However, if you shift to <Ideology Thailand>, you get useful results. Similarly you can play with <Unrest Thailand> or <Instability Thailand> and so on.

¹ When <brackets> are used, they are removed when inserting the words into Google or any other search engine. When “quotations” are used, they are retained in the search to signify that the exact combination of words is desired. Google is used for this series of examples.

² The master site is <http://timelines.ws> and has a country index.

<Ideology Thailand> finds the following top two hits:

Muslim ideology fuels Thailand's southern violence

Muslim **ideology** fuels **Thailand's** southern violence. Associated Press May. 4, 2004 07:10 AM. ... www.azcentral.com/news/articles/0504Thailand04-ON.html - 56k

Conciousness and Ideology : Political Parties and Democratic ...

Conciousness and **Ideology** : Political Parties and. Democratic Movement in **Thailand**. Sungsidh Piriyarangan. Pasuk Phongpaichit. With ... www.chula.ac.th/studycenter/pesc/Research&Papers/conciousness.html - 9k

Further down in the list we find a US counter-revolutionary theorist, Noam Chomsky, and his thoughts, like those of Chalmers Johnson³ and Derek Leebaert, are important to you.

Counter-Revolutionary Violence: Bloodbaths in Fact and Propaganda. ...

... and that are now even more overwhelmingly evident, gives revealing insight into the nature and quality of imperial attitudes and **ideology**. **Thailand: A Corrupt ...** mass-multi-media.com/CRV/ - 101k -

Thailand: A Corrupt "Firm Base"

An illustrative case of great current relevance is Thailand, which emerged from World War II as the only state in Southeast Asia whose military leadership had collaborated with the Japanese to the extent of declaring war on the United States and Great Britain. Immediately after the war U.S. officials refused to go along with the British desire to dismantle the apparatus of military power in Thailand. Thereafter the U.S. gradually increased its support of the military faction. As a result, after but a few years of constitutional rule characterized by "temporizing" support of democratic forces by the U.S., the military were able to reestablish full control, and Phibun Songkhram became "the first pro-Axis dictator to regain power after the war...."¹³⁰¹ Phibun quickly mastered the art of extracting both moral and material support from the American cold warriors ("milking," to use Joe Stilwell's earthy reference to Chiang), constantly creating alarms of external and internal Red threats, encouraging local newspapers "to denounce the United States so that his government could appeal for more American aid on the grounds that it would help to pacify this 'anti-American' segment of public opinion"¹³¹¹; and, of course, serving as a loyal agent of his North American supporters in SEATO and elsewhere. In the apt language of the NLF's description of the Diem regime and its successors, this was a "country-selling government" in the Orwellian perceptions of Washington officialdom, however, this all reflected the free choice of the Thai people ("Thailand [sic] decided to adopt collective security as the basis for its foreign policy.")¹³²¹ Phibun used the diplomatic support, money and arms provided by the United States leadership as his primary source of political power in Thailand, frequently timing his violence against his opponents to "coincide with an important meeting of the SEATO alliance, thereby minimizing local and foreign criticism."¹³³¹ As the Thai police state consolidated itself and became both more bloody and more corrupt, American support was in no way diminished and criticism by American leaders, public and private, was minimal. In fact, "a notable trend throughout this period was the growing intimacy between the Thai military leaders and the top-level military officials from the United States."¹³⁴¹

³ Chalmers Johnson, *The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic* (Metropolitan Books, 2004). For a conservative Republican critique along similar lines, but with an economic thrust, see Clyde Prestowitz, *ROGUE NATION: American Unilateralism and the Failure of Good Intentions* (Basic Books, 2003).

SOF OSINT HANDBOOK—Strategic Historical & Cultural Understanding

Why is this important? It is important because you cannot be successful at winning hearts & minds if you do not understand the popular perceptions of the relationship between US military and financial power, and or between foreign perceptions of White House corruption and the corruption of the local elite, which uses police power to enrich itself and abuse the very people whose hearts and minds you are seeking to influence. I'll cover this more in the section on anti-Americanism.

You have the expeditionary and revolutionary models of analysis. Using terms brought out from those models, and searching the Internet in a structured thoughtful fashion, will yield a wealth of insights as well as a number of possible human expert points of contact.

In closing this section, I want to end with a focus on books and ideas. Books are structured knowledge. The Internet today—and I say this with the expectation that you have read *the (NATO) Intelligence Exploitation of the Internet* guide—is generally undated, unformatted, unsourced, unpaginated, and more often than not, unreliable. It is a fine starting point, but it is not the end-all.

Books, and reviews of books, are a second source that you can leverage on the fly. Amazon is now a treasure trove, not just of the books themselves, but of internal references within the books, and of reader reviews that summarize the books and criticize the books. It is now possible, in the space of a couple of hours, to absorb key ideas from 5-10 books that would otherwise have required weeks to order, read, and summarize.

When using Amazon, used the Advanced Search feature to look for books, and the generic search feature to look for references inside of books.

<Thailand Muslim> in the advanced search SUBJECT box yields the following book:

Moshe Yegar, *Between Integration and Secession: The Muslim Communities of the Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand, and Western Burma/Myanmar* (Rowman, 2002)

This in turn leads to another book, *A Brief Illustrated Guide to Understanding Islam*, which also has its own web site, <http://www.islam-guide.com>.

Searching the generic book feature leads to the following titles:

Islam and Malay nationalism : a case study of Malay-Muslims of southern Thailand by Surin Pitsuwan (Thai Khadi Research Institute, Thammasat University; (1985)

Religion and migration in southern Thailand : evidence from the 1970, 1980, and 1990 censuses by Philip Guest

Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand (South-East Asian Social Science Monographs) by Wan Kadir Che Man, et al (Oxford, 1995)

I will end this section by suggesting that you not just focus on the history of a country, or its peoples, but also in the history of ideas relevant to your mission. The ideas of Muslim separatism, or Malay nationalism, or Moro independence have a life of their own, and connections to other lands and other ideas, and it is worth your while to create a mental “map” that overlays demographics with history,

culture, and ideas. One book series that I have found useful is that edited by Philip P. Wiener, *Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas* (Scribner's, 1974). The final volume, the Index, has six full columns of references to key ideas related to Islam, including the following small sample:

Islam		
	Anti-Aristotelianism	Holy Land
	Causation	Jerusalem
	Classification of the sciences	Judaism
	Crisis in history	Mecca
	Crusades	Nationalism
	Divine will	Roman Catholic Church
	Double truth	Sacred
	Eastern Orthodox Church	Scholasticism
	Fatalism	Truth
	Free will	Unity

We will return to the mapping of ideas or themes in the tactical chapter.

History of Foreign Powers in the Region

Charting the history of foreign powers in the region is useful in several ways. First, any foreign power with a history in the region is likely to have home-based experts on the region that you should consider consulting. “Ground truth” depends on where you are sitting when you look, and the best historical and cultural studies are those that very deliberately seek to understand and integrate multiple perspectives, not just the US perspective.

Charting the history of foreign powers in the region is also useful from a counterintelligence perspective. These foreign powers have vested interests, they have both legal and illegal “stay-behinds”, and if what we want is coincident with what they want, they have assets that can help us, and if not, assets that can block us.

Finally, charting a history of foreign powers is important because *we* are a foreign power, and to the extent that a country has been ravaged and abused by another foreign power (e.g. the Japanese in China and throughout Asia or the Pope's Knights Templar on their Crusades), then we are tarred with that brush, and have to overcome deep-rooted antipathies or leverage deep-rooted affections, as the case may be.

<**History Thailand Foreign Powers**> produces a useful survey that emphasizes China's influence, http://www.guidetothailand.com/thailand-history/new_siam.htm. It also covers the minimalist Dutch presence, the more exploitative British presence that also occupied Burma, and the truly imperialist French, who began invading under Napoleon in the late 1800's and ultimately took Viet-Nam, Cambodia, and Laos away from Thailand. Interestingly, this particular history ignores both the Japanese occupation of Thailand and the fact that Thailand was one of the Axis powers in World War II.

It is worthwhile to remember that “foreign” influences can be present in the form of either businesses or religious teaching. Many countries in Asia have a very strong Chinese business presence, with a bond of corruption between the Chinese businessmen who own the country, and the indigenous

generals and political leaders who control the country—Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia all have Chinese economic communities with a very strong voice in local affairs. Similar, Islam is a growing influence within Asia,

<Islam numbers in Asia> produces several top-notch articles on the volatile results of majority (and often militaristic) prejudice and persecution of Muslim minorities, and how this fuels radical fundamentalist rage and recruitment.

<Islam statistics Asia> produces some truly scary numbers that are not reflected in any of the now out-dated country studies. <http://www.islamicweb.com/begin/results.htm> gives us the numbers that are associated with Islam being the fastest growing religion on Earth, the second largest religion now, growing at a rate of 25% in the US and 250% in Australia (remembering that percentages from a small base can seem very large).

<Islam statistics Thailand> produces http://atheism.about.com/library/irf/irf03/blirf_thailand.htm, a Religious Freedom report, with the following passages:

According to the Government's National Statistics Office, approximately 94 percent of the population is Buddhist, and 5 percent is Muslim; however, recent estimates by other government agencies, academics, and religious groups state that approximately 85 to 90 percent of the population is Theravada Buddhist, and up to 10 percent of the population is Muslim. Estimates also indicate that Christians constitute approximately 1 to 2 percent of the population. There are small animist, Hindu, Sikh, Taoist, Jewish, and Confucian populations. Islam is the dominant religion in four of the five southernmost provinces, which border Malaysia. Minority Muslim populations also live in 74 of the 76 provinces. The majority of Muslims are ethnic Malay, but the Muslim population encompasses groups of diverse ethnic and national origin, including descendants of immigrants from South Asia, China, Cambodia, and Indonesia. Government agencies did not use consistent figures to describe the size of the Muslim population during the period covered by this report, but most estimates suggest that Muslims constitute between 6 and 10 percent of the population. There are approximately 3,320 mosques in 59 provinces, with the largest number in Pattani province. All but a very small number of these mosques are associated with the Sunni branch of Islam. The remainder, estimated by the Religious Affairs Department (RAD) to be from 1 to 2 percent of the total, are associated with the Shi'a branch of Islam.

3,320 mosques—that is your challenge in Pattani province and the other southern provinces of Thailand. In the tactical chapter we will focus on identifying the specific mosques.

History of the US in the Region

When you are researching the history of the US in the region, or in a specific country, it is very important to remember the four levels of analysis, and not get distracted by what appears to be a very positive history at the strategic level. For Thailand, consider the following different “levels” of history in general terms:

- Strategic History: US ignores Thai role as a member of the Axis powers, immediately restores militaristic Thai government and creates very close military ties at the national level.

SOF OSINT HANDBOOK—Strategic Historical & Cultural Understanding

- Operational History: Thailand serves as one of the largest US military encampments in history during the Viet-Nam war, from which bombing and other missions are launched. This coincides with genocide in Cambodia and Burma, and massive migration and illegal immigration as well as massive criminal activity facilitated by the presence of US troops and the growing regional black market.
- Tactical History: There is no tactical history, other than minor operations carried out with national-level military units. There is no deep and abiding relationship between US forces or representatives and individual provincial or tribal leaders.
- Technical History: We teach Thai. Following are the actual relevant languages and dialects in Thailand:⁴

Other major languages: Akha, Bisu, Blang, Bru East, Bru West, Burmese, Cham West, Chinese Hakka, Chinese Mandarin, Chinese Min Dong, Chinese Min Nan, Chinese Yue, Chong, Hmong Daw, Hmong Njua, Iu Mien, Japanese, Karen Pa o, Karen Pwo East, Karen Pwo North, Karen S gaw, Kayah East, Kayan, Kensiu, Khmer North, Khmu, Khün, Korean, Kuy, Lahu, Lahu Shi, Lamet, Lao, Lawa East, Lawa West, Lisu, Lü, Mal, Malay, Malay Pattani, Mang, Moken, Moklen, Mon, Mpi, Nyaw, Palaung Pale, Phai, Phu Thai, Phuan, Phunoi, Saek, Shan, Sinhala, Sô, Song, Tai Daeng, Tai Dam, Tai Nüa, Tamil, Thai, Thai North, Thai North East, Thai Sign Language, Thai South, Urak Lawoi, Urdu, Vietnamese, Yoy

Other minor languages: Aleng, Baru, Belubn, B'ru, Bruu, Central Tai, Chau Pok, Chaw Talay, Chawnam, Cuoi, Dambro, Hkawa, Ht'in, Isaan, Isan, Issan, Jinping Dai, Kam Mu'ang, Kamet, Kammüang, Kammyang, Karen Pwo Western Thailand, Karenni, Kense, Kha Khmu, Kha Phay, Kha So, Khamen-boran, Khon Doi, Khon Mung, Khon Myang, Kui, Kui Souei, Kuoy, K'wa, La Nya, Lan Na, Lanatai, Lanna, Lao Phuan, Lao Song, Lao Song Dam, Lawoi, Lawta, Luu, Maniq, Mawas, Mengo, Meni, Menik, Moni, Mos, Mpi-mi, Mu'ang, Muhsur, Musseh Kwi, Musseh Lyang, Musser, Myang, Northern Lawa, Northern Thai, Nyo, Orak Lawoi', Pai-yi, Pak Tai, Pak Thai, Paktay, Pao, Payap, Phay, Phayap, Phlong, Phu Un, Phutai, Phuu Thai, Phyap, Prai, Pray I, Putai, Puthai, Sakai, Sen Chun, Siamese, Soai, Southern Pwo Karen, Southern Ta-ang, Standard Thai, Suai, Suay, Sui, Sui, Suoi, Tai Lue, Tai Man, Tai Nya, Tai Yay, Takanoon, Taleng, Taungtu, Thai Islam, Thai Lu, Thai Song, Thai Yay, Thaiklang, Thung Chan Pray, Tiong, Tmooy, Wa, Western Laotian, Wiang Papao Lua, Yo, Yoi, Yooi, Yooy, Yuan

Major dialects: Anlour, Antra, Bandu, Black Khoany, Bru Kok Sa-at, Buriram, Central Isan, Chang, Chaozhou, Chiangrai, Damrey, Dung, Fujian, Fuzhou, Hainan, Hmong Gu Mba, Ho, Hwethom, Ja-it, Kanchanaburi Pwo Karen, Khaskhong, Khorat Thai, Korat, Kraol, La-oor, L'be, Lower Lamet, Lu Shi Lisu, Mae Ping, Mae Sarieng, Mong Leng, Mung, Na, Nan, Northern Isan, Nyi, O, Omkoi, Palakhi, Panapu, Petchabun Miao, Phalo, Phang, Ratchaburi Pwo Karen, Shantou, Shehleh, Sisaket, So Makon, So Phong, So Slouy, So Trong, Southern Isan, Surin, Tai Wang, Tak Bai, Thai Malay, Tri, Upper Lamet, White Khoany

Other minor dialects: Black Lahu, Chaochow, Cin Haw, Foochow, Fuchow, Fukien, Haw, Hmong Qua Mba, Hod, Hokkien, Hui, Hui-tze, Hwei, Kalerng, Kaleung, Korat, Loheirn, Luhishi, Luhushi, Miao Lai, Musseh Daeng, Musser Dam, Northern Lahu, Palachi, Panghse, Pantha, Panthe, Pathee, Petchaburi Pwo Karen, Red Lahu, So Tri, So Trii, Southern Lahu, Striped Hmong, Suai Chang, Swatow, Tai Islam, Tai Tak Bai, Techu, Teochow, Tiuchiu, Western Mandarin, Yunnanese

I am not suggesting that we have to master all of these languages and dialects, but I want to emphasize that CA and PSYOP endeavors done only in Thai are likely to be diminished across the entire southern region where it matters most, unless we find ways to work in local dialects.

⁴ Pro-Tran Country Information, at <http://www.pro-tran.com/it/Laender-Information/Thailand.html>.

History of Anti-Americanism in the Region

Anti-Americanism has grown in ways that we never anticipated, in part because we have not been paying attention.

At the strategic level, according to Ziauddin Sardar and Merryl Wyn Davies, in *WHY DO PEOPLE HATE AMERICA?* (Icon Books, 2002)⁵, the general perception overseas is that:

- 1) Americans are uninformed about the real world
- 2) Americans are not in charge of their own foreign policy
- 3) What is done in the name of all Americans is severely detrimental to the rest of the world, and Americans will pay a heavy price if they allow this "hamburger virus/gunboat imperialism" to continue.

Reading the book as I did, I came away with the strong feeling that most people don't actually hate America, they are simply angry that Americans at the grass roots level are completely out of touch with reality and unaware of what is being done by the American elite.

A few key points that any CA/PSYOP program must bear in mind:

1) Foreigners are not stupid. They understand, as Dr. Samuel Johnson said in 1775, that Patriotism is the last refuge of the scoundrel." When patriotism is used to suppress dissent, to demand blind obedience, and to commit war crimes "in our name," then patriotism has lost its meaning. You may not agree and you may not like hearing this, but overseas, across all social classes and ethnic groups, there is a perception that the U.S. routinely condones war crimes, including indiscriminate bombing of civilians, and torture against detained person.

2) Foreigners, not just those of the Islamic faith, but all foreigners, are dumb-founded by the gap between how Americans see themselves as the center of the earth, the source of freedom, economic success, and rich cultural traditions, versus how foreigners see us: violating human rights, supporting the death penalty, the largest prison population of any nation, using more than our share of natural resources, killing the middle class and abusing tens of millions of working poor, most of them immigrants, etcetera.

3) Foreigners are acutely conscious of the importance of language as a metric for measuring diversity, which foreigners value, versus "cultural

⁵ This book joins three others books I have reviewed and recommend separately, as the "quartet for revolution" in how Americans must demand access to reliable information about the real world. They are Bill McKibben on *The Age of Missing Information* (a day in the woods contrasted with a year reviewing a day's worth of non-information on broadcast television); Anne Branscomb's *Who Owns Information* (not the citizen); and Roger Shattuck, *Forbidden Knowledge*. These are the higher level books--there are many others, both on the disgrace of the media and the abuse of secrecy by government, as well as on such excellent topics as *Who Will Tell the People: The Betrayal of American Democracy* by William Greider, and *The Closing of the American Mind* by Allan Bloom.

imperialism,"⁶ which Americans do not realize is how the spread of English, McDonald's, Hollywood, and filthy rock lyrics are seen. In combination, English, hamburgers, the urbanization of the world (disconnecting the poor from their own capitals), and the American control of the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund—all lead to America as being perceived to be invasive, predatory, and repressive. At multiple levels, from "hate" by Islamic fundamentalists, to "fear and disdain" by French purists, to "annoyance" by Asians to "infatuation" by teenagers, the Americans are seen as way too big for their britches--Americans are the proverbial bull in the china shop, and in the eyes of billions, American leaders lack morals--the failure of America to ratify treaties that honor the right of children to food and health, the failure of America to respect international conventions—the average of two military interventions a year since the Cold War (not to mention two countries invaded but not rescued), all add up to "blowback."

4) According to the authors, the impact of America overseas can be best summed up as a "hamburger virus" that comes as a complete package, and is especially pathological. McDonalds "serves" rather than "feeds". The "hamburger culture" is eradicating indigenous cultures everywhere, and often this is leading, decades later, to the realization that those cultures had thrived because they were well suited to the environment--the "hamburger culture" assumes that electricity will provide for air conditioning, that everyone can afford a car once the cities have been paved over, etcetera. When this turns out to not be the case, the losses that have occurred over decades cannot be turned back, and poverty, as well as ethnic strife, are the result.

5) Finally--and the authors have many other points to make in this excellent book, but this is the last one for this "summative" evaluation of their work--according to the authors the USA is what could be considered the ultimate manifestation of the "eighth crusade", with Christopher Columbus and the destruction of the native American Indians (both North and South) having been the seventh crusade. The authors are most interesting as they define the predominantly Catholic edicts from the Pope and from Kings and Queens, that declared that anyone not speaking their language (and therefore not able to understand their edicts) was a savage, an animal, and therefore suitable for enslavement. *In the eyes of much of the world, America is a culturally-oppressive force that is enslaving local governments and local economies for the benefit of a select wealthy elite that live in gated compounds, while demeaning, demoting, and destroying the balance of power and the balance with nature and the balance among tribes, that existed prior to the arrival of American "gunboat diplomacy" and "banana capitalism."*

You cannot win hearts and minds unless you first understand this point of view. People will smile and take your money or your time, but in their hearts, more often than not, is this very negative view of the American empire.

⁶ Edward W. Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (Vintage, 1994) writes on this from an Islamic perspective. The term "cultural imperialism" is now established as a useful search term. Said has also written *Covering Islam : How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World* (Vintage, 1997).

Operational Understanding for Campaign Planning

Missions, however secretive and narrowly-focused, take place in a regional context. If you use the four levels of analysis to think about OSINT support to your mission planning, then the operational level is where you collect and reflect on the “atmospherics.” Regional atmospherics relevant to the mission can be threat-related (small arms smuggling and mercenary incursions, mass migrations, trade in women and children), environmental (severe water shortages, risk of plagues in the immediate area), or logistical (operating area deep inland with altitude and other constraints on resupply).

Each of you understands better than most Americans that conflict is the norm, not the exception, around the world. However, I want to take a moment to summarize just how bad it is, because this is the global context in which you work.

Challenge	Number
Conflicts Between States Killing >1000/Year	23
Conflicts Between States Killing <1000/Year	79
Violent Internal Political Conflicts within States	175
Number of Dictators Still Active	44
Number of “Failed States” in Declared “Complex Emergency	32
Number of Regional Complex Emergencies	20
Number of Countries Suffering from Millions of Displaced Refugees	66
Number of Countries with Food Security (Starvation) Issues	33
Number of Countries with Modern Plagues & Epidemics On-Going	59
Number of Countries Routinely Using Child Soldiers	41
Number of Active Genocides Today	18
Number of Countries with Common Corruption at All Levels	80
Number of Countries with Very High Censorship	62
Number of Countries with Water Scarcity or Severely Contaminated Water	Many
Number of Conflicts Engaged in Resource Wars	Many

Figure 11: Global Realities Impacting on All Regions¹

Existing area studies—the ones that are frequently cited as the source for critical information in support of CA or PSYOP missions—tend to be dated in terms of both time (when completed, sometimes 15 years ago) and focus (generally state-level, not sub-state). Most area studies, while doing a good job of outlining major demographic categories, do not reflect readily available open source information about specific sub-state ethnic conflicts or recent specific droughts, plagues, or other forms of local catastrophe that alters or threatens the existing balance of power. This section will focus on general lines of inquiry that you can make at the operational level of warfare.

¹ Cf. Steele on *THE NEW CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE* for chapter length discussions and sourcing.

Regional Power: Sources, Status, Change Agents

At the operational level of warfare we are focused with trans-state and state-level power, not with sub-state or individual power. This is where you develop a sense of the larger issues that are of concern to your target audiences.

Historical ethnic conflict is a big one. Staying with Thailand as an example, it is very important to understand the ethnic divisions and conflicts that cross borders. Between Thailand and Malaysia, between Thailand and Myanmar (Burma), between Thailand and Viet-Nam, between Thailand and Laos, between Thailand and China. A big part of the intelligence preparation of the PSYOP battlefield will concern the careful identification of these larger ethnic conflicts, the specific terrain and specific organizations engaged in ethnic conflict, and the manner in which this non-traditional non-state “order of battle” can impact on the larger US or SOF mission that you are supporting.

At the operational level we also focus on the determinants of legitimacy, security, stability, prosperity, as they are influenced by geo-political, geo-economic, geo-demographic, and geo-environmental sources of power. Water, or the lack of water, will impact on trans-state relations and a specific state’s power. Key natural resources, and especially newly-discovered or emerging sources of power, as well as declining natural resources, provide an appreciation for the “wealth of nations.”

The Revolutionary Analysis Model introduced earlier can be helpful here, primarily as a frame of reference and a means of suggesting specific search terms to use in your open source research. The point is not to rely on a “one size fits all” search strategy, but to have a starting point and then be able to flexibly adapt, take note of useful references, and move on with variations of your search.

<Thailand elites> leads to several books on the changes in the power elites since the 1930’s, and also suggests that corruption among the elites is a major issue. It leads naturally to <Thailand democracy culture> and the discovery of a fine piece on the Thai revolt of the people in 1992, and the continuing obstacles to rural peasants feeling empowered, and to Muslims accepting Buddhism as a shared path.²

Similarly, <Thailand concentration of wealth> leads immediately to relatively recent World Bank and other studies that address this economic pre-condition for revolution and instability.

<Thailand crime> shows us a marvelous listing of statistics that is also a source for all other countries and for other aspects of crime, and it has a graph creation and comparison capability as well, NationMaster’s Country Profile offering.³

<Thailand transportation> leads to branches into water, air, and rail transportation, as well as to branches on electricity, energy, and power generally.

² Democracy and Culture: A Case for Thailand, by Soraj Hongladarom, *Paper presented at the Seventh East West Philosophers’ Conference, January 8-20, 1995, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii, USA.* <http://pioneer.netserv.chula.ac.th/~hsoraj/web/Dem.html>

³ NationMaster Country Profile, Thailand/Crime, at <http://www.nationmaster.com/country/th/Crime>.

SOF OSINT HANDBOOK—Operational Understanding for Campaign Planning

It merits comment that the simpler the search, the more likely you are to have useful hits that will allow you to branch creatively.

In the cultural arena, <Thailand culture> does not prove satisfactory, in part because of an excess of superficial tourism sites, and many “cultural studies” programs. Interestingly, <Thailand socialization” leads to a discussion board of disgruntled and largely abused non-Thai teachers teaching on contract in Thailand, mostly of U.S. and European origin.⁴ This is precisely the kind of person who could be considered for overt—legal, ethical, upfront—interviews to establish a baseline understanding of the local society and culture as well as the themes that have been in play locally.

<Thailand national myth system> leads to a number of articles, most of them useless, but within the top twenty, one gem emerges of value to the CA/PSYOP professional:⁵ “Is Culture Destiny? The Myth of Asia's Anti-Democratic Values” by Kim Dae Jung, as published in *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 1994. Checks for <Thailand prejudice>, <Thailand censorship> and <Thailand violence>, all keywords from the Ideo-Cultural column of the Revolutionary Analysis Model, all yield useful entries worthy of some study.

<Thailand demographic>, <Thailand education>, <Thailand urbanization>, <Thailand technology assessment>, <Thailand pollution> and <Thailand research & development R&D> all round out our sources on the Techno-Demographic column.

Similarly, in the Natural-Geographic, rapid searching for Thailand combined with, but not in quotes, land holdings, natural disasters, natural resources, regional integration, organic growth, urban rural and water use, all yield snapshots helpful to a current strategic appraisal.

The above examples are all at the national level. For the best possible results, searches should be done at the provincial level, but that will be emphasized in the chapter on tactical sub-state understanding. However, to make the point, because it is relevant to the operational level of understanding, a quick search at Satun Province, the southern Thai province that not only borders on Malaysia but is also open to the sea paths from Pakistan and Sri Lanka, leads us directly to an overview from the United Nations population agency that tells us that Satun is 67.8% Muslim, that 36.8% of the population in the age range 6-24 is not attending school, and that the average education in this province is 15 years.⁶ This province is a major CA/PSYOP challenge.

In passing, the search produces a useful chapter on Muslim separatist movements in Thailand and the Philippines, and we can note that “Muslim separatist” is a term worth noting for further searching,⁷ as in <Thailand Muslim separatist>.

⁴ <http://www.ajarn.com/quote-unquote.htm> is the disgruntled teacher sub-page. The larger page, the Thailand Discussion Board, is at <http://aries.lunarpages.com/~tithai2/cgi-bin/ib/ikonboard.cgi> and offers a range of discussions on living and teaching in Thailand.

⁵ <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19941101faresponse5158/kim-dae-jung/is-culture-destiny-the-myth-of-asia-s-anti-democratic-values.html>

⁶ <http://www.unescap.org/esid/psis/population/database/thailanddata/south/satun.htm>

⁷ Chapter Nine “MUSLIM SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES AND THAILAND,” in *Indonesia's Transformation and the Stability of Southeast Asia* by Angel Rabasa, Peter Chalk (RAND, 2001), chapter at <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1344/MR1344.ch9.pdf>.

Internal Security Issues

The core reference on PSYOP⁸ discusses the hierarchy of human needs and many other key concepts relevant to doing target audience analysis and other PSYOP research and that information is not repeated here. We will just emphasize instead that *security*—the feeling of the various groupings as well as of the individual members of those primary and secondary groups—is *the* core issue around which all PSYOP themes should be evaluated.

A simple search on <Thailand security> yields an article dated 10 February 2004 with the following information in its first three paragraphs:⁹

Thailand's government today urged local security volunteers to participate in state efforts to pacify the situation in the troubled southern border region in Thailand, while conceding that the government would have to work harder if it was to gain the support of The Muslim religious leaders.

Speaking in response to the recently declared refusal of Islamic leaders in Thailand's 3 southern border provinces to help ease the situation, Mr. Sucharit Pachimnan, director-general of the Department of Local Administration, admitted that problems had arisen in the past due to the fact that Thai state officials were often aware of information from the "opposing" side in the conflict.

However, he pledged that the Thai government would work to resolve the situation, and said that 1,400 security volunteers in those 3 border provinces would be asked to work together with a further 800 volunteers from the neighbouring provinces of Nakhon Sri Thammarat, Trang and Pattalung to liaise with Muslim religious leaders.

Now let's try <Satun security>. From Australia, we get an official current warning.¹⁰

Thailand

This Advice is current for Wednesday, 02 June 2004, EST The Advice was issued on Friday, 30 April 2004, 22:25:17, EST This advice has been reviewed and reissued with change to safety and security information. The overall level of the advice has not changed.

Australians in Thailand should exercise extreme caution, especially in tourist and resort areas and other commercial and public areas known to be frequented by foreign tourists or expatriates. We continue to receive reports that terrorist elements in the region are planning attacks. Thai separatists have publicly warned foreigners against travel to parts of southern Thailand. Australians are advised to defer non-essential travel to the provinces of Yala, Pattani, Narathiwat and Songkhla, including deferring non-essential overland travel to and from the Malaysian border through these provinces. Australians should also exercise particular vigilance in the provinces of Phuket, Krabi (including Ko Phi Phi), Phang Nga, Pattalung and Satun. ... Travellers should not accept any food or drink offered by others as there have been druggings with spiked food and drinks and subsequent sexual assault, assault and robbery after such druggings.

⁸ FM 3-05.301 (FM 33-1-1) *Psychological Operations, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures* (December 2003).

⁹ 2000 volunteers to beef up South Thailand security, Thailand Online News, 4 February 2004, http://www.thaipro.com/news_00/189_south_thailand_security.htm

¹⁰ Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia, <http://www.dfat.gov.au/zw-cgi/view/Advice/Thailand>

Internal Prosperity Issues

<Thailand prosperity> brings up both a formal McKinsey study that is geared toward being positive for prospective investors, and some more detailed examinations that will give you a good sense, together with your earlier results for <Thailand concentration of wealth> for where the economic fault lines lie in Thailand (and within Thailand, at the provincial level, among the separatists who wish to succeed from Thailand and join the Malaysian Islamic state).

We quickly identify a site with three critical and relevant articles,¹¹

April 26, 2004

Governance Thailand Noticed any progress on governance?

Institutional resistance to transparency is hurting Thailand's competitiveness. When the idea of "good governance" first came to Thailand more than a decade ago, academics and policy-makers found it hard to think of an equivalent Thai expression. The intensity over semantics serves as an indication of the seriousness of the desire to popularise the expression. However, if its semantic value was in doubt, even more so was the struggle over how best to demonstrate in action how good governance would lead to less corruption in both the public and the private sector. The results have been far from satisfactory.

September 26, 2003

Democracy: Thailand faces prosperity and contradictions

In the name of economic development, PM Thaksin is moving to centralise all power in his hands. Forget about allocating power to the people. Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his Thai Rak Thai Party won't do that. It was never their plan. To say they will is a big lie.

August 7, 2003

Corruption: Going by the book for a change

In a straightforward ruling, the Constitution Court on Tuesday dismissed Deputy Transport and Communications Minister Pichate Satirachaval and banned him from public office for five years. The court found him guilty of assets concealment. Pichate became the first incumbent minister...

Looking down the line further, we find this headline, "Thailand dismisses call in Jakarta for jihad" from 29 May 2004, in the *Straits Times* of Singapore.¹² The article reveals three important things: first, that 108 Muslims were killed in late April, allegedly while attacking Thai police and military installations; second, that Indonesia's radicalized Muslims are acutely aware of the situation and calling for a regional jihad, and third, that the Thai government appears to be in denial about the seriousness of this situation. This is the kind of current reference that you will not find in any prepared documents from "back home," nor will you get this kind of information quickly from the classified intelligence world. You can get it, both quickly and for free, from the Internet.¹³

¹¹ <http://www.thinkcentreasia.org>. Cited UK English from original sources is never converted to US English.

¹² <http://straitstimes.asia1.com.sg/asia/story/0,4386,253423,00.html>

¹³ I am emphasizing the Internet in this Handbook, but want to stress that OSINT requires the full range of open sources, most of which cost money to buy, and are discussed in the NATO Open Source Intelligence Handbook. The COLLUSIUM system is the proper way to request commercial intelligence support from the Special Operations Command Joint Intelligence Center (SOCJIC), which buys OSINT for SOF as needed.

If you have used the Expeditionary Factors Analysis Model and the Revolutionary Analysis Model to methodically seek out useful Internet sources relevant to your PSYOP Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB), you are now in a position to do two things: a preliminary analysis of weak links, both theirs and ours, and a preliminary listing of Essential Elements of Information (EEI) that are not available to you via the Internet and need to be requested via the COLLUSIUM system, or possibly through direct reachback to the PSYOP parent command at Fort Bragg, to the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC), or the Foreign Military Studies Office (FSMO) at Fort Leavenworth, or possibly even to one of the training classes at Fort Huachuca, where your problem could be nominated for one of the practical exercises.

Weak Links (Theirs & Ours)

The most common weak link within any foreign government is its unwillingness to admit it has a problem. This is clearly an issue with the Thai government. As you prepare for a mission in-country, doing your homework will help you address this problem, tactfully, in your varied encounters with your professional counterparts.

The second most common weak link within any foreign government—and one that we share as well—is an unwillingness to share information that they or we might consider “derogatory,” as in “anything less than everything is fine.” If you have been called into play, everything is not fine, and the sooner you get to a common appreciation with your counterparts of what the problems are and what the key themes are going to be, the faster you can get to work.

We have a weak link as well, and your core reference is very good for understanding and explaining this point: PSYOP does not work if it lacks supporting action. This is worth stressing through quotation:¹⁴

- It is imperative that the supported commander clearly understands that unilateral PSYOP (PSYOP without supporting actions) will not be successful and can be a very risky method to accomplish the commander’s objectives.

At the operational level, what is important to focus on is that reality and truth matter, as do the perceptions of the target audiences about reality and truth.¹⁵

In many ways, PSYOP is not just about communicating to external target audiences, but also about understanding ourselves. Properly done, PSYOP can help the US Commander understand how we are seen, how the target audience perceives reality, how the host or allied or coalition government perceives reality (or is in denial about reality), and all of this can impact on mission accomplishment.

REMEMBER THIS: If you do your job right, you don’t just push PSYOP out the door, you bring reality in the door. You *are* your Commander’s best source of intelligence on reality as it is understood by both the target audiences and the host government elements in touch with the target audiences. PSYOP *produces* intelligence, not just by nurturing the willingness of indigenous sources to volunteer intelligence, but by being a trusted direct source on what is real and what is not.

¹⁴ FM 3-05.301 *Psychological Operations, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures* (December 2003), p. 4-17.

¹⁵ In the technical chapter, a final section on self-inflicted wounds will discuss the damage to US PSYOP that comes from well-publicized abuses of Muslim prisoners elsewhere.

Tactical Sub-State Understanding for Unit Effectiveness

Tribal Orders of Battle & Geospatial Information Handling

Since roughly 1994 it has been clearly understood by those in the front ranks of intelligence reform that sub-state orders of battle—and especially tribal orders of battle—were the new top priority for helping US forces engaged in Third World nations. There are four dimensions to tribal orders of battle:

- What are the tribal geographic areas of influence and interest? Often these span more than one country and permit free movement of tribal allies across borders.
- What villages and demographics and resources are within the tribe's power?
- What are the geospatial locations of each village or resource (e.g. a mountain pass, or opium fields, or critical water sources)?
- What can indigenous language open sources of information tell us about the tribe, the tribe's relations with wanted terrorists or criminals, and the tribe's relationships with the host government, including radicalized elements of the government hostile to the US?

Let's take each of these in turn, with the observation that having accurate 1:50,000 combat charts is very helpful as a means of structuring the information, including network mapping.

In most cases tribes have histories that go back hundreds of years, and their areas of influence have remained substantially unchanged. For both the Afghanistan campaign and for the entry into Iraq, historical maps of tribal areas of influence were obtained from European national archives, and proved superior to what was available to US intelligence agencies.¹

The tribes are very important when attempting to interdict smuggling of any kind. They are inherently not conventional in nature, have no fixed posts, do not wear uniforms or emit radio signatures, and know the hidden trails better than any government scout or foreign invader.

¹ OSS.Net, Inc. and its partner InfoSphere, AB from Sweden created the tribal studies for Afghanistan and Iraq, and more recently for Sudan and Waziristan. We have also studied tribal orders of battle in the Pacific, from Thailand through Malaysia, the Philippines, and into Indonesia. Academic studies, especially those originating in centers of excellence indigenous to the region (e.g. Pakistan and India for Central Asia, Russia as well, the United Kingdom and Australia more often than not) provide a fine starting point.

SOF OSINT HANDBOOK—Tactical Sub-State Understanding for Unit Effectiveness

Tribal demographics are covered by government censuses to one extent or another, but sometimes the political lines of demarcation can be confusing, because they are inspired by a national government's sense of how it wants to divide the lands, rather than actual tribal occupancy.

Tribal resources more often than not include illegal activities, such as the cultivation of opium in Afghanistan, trade in women and children, and the smuggling of contraband.

Tribes do not always use conventional banks. It helps to be familiar with the *halawa* system of money changers and word of mouth money transfers, when studying tribal finances.

Tribes can be surprisingly well-armed. Although there are many tribes that have very ancient weapons and limited numbers of crew-served weapons, the going-in assumption should always be that they have been supplied by either the government or warlords or small arms merchants with the best tactical weapons that money or opium can buy.

The geospatial location of villages can be confusing. Although the National Geospatial Agency (NGA) has a top-notch Gazetteer that is available online, and there are other useful gazetteers online, some of them free, the confirmation of specific village names and accurate geospatial locations sufficient for calling in fires is something that warrants very careful attention. This is especially so when operating in the 90% of the world where NGA does not have 1:50,000 combat charts on the shelf, and SOF has to operate with Russian military combat charts, which can be quite good, or a rushed job to integrate one-meter imagery and digital terrain elevation data.

The matter of geospatial accuracy is one that needs a little more explanation. It is helpful to understand that maps are rough depictions, and charts are accurate representations. Charts differ from maps in that hundreds of man-years of imagery analyst have gone into making them, converting images in the one to two meter range into accurate depiction of where the contour lines are, where the cultural features, and so on. When NGA rushes something into production, marrying up one meter imagery with digital terrain elevation data, they will get a lot of it right, but they will not be providing the hundreds of man-years that the Russians invested in mapping the Third World at the tactical level.

The ideal combination begins with a Russian military combat chart at the 1:50,000 level, translated into English; updates that with specialized imagery exploitation at the ten meter level for rural areas and one meter level for urban areas and critical target areas; then overlays the digital terrain elevation data, and finally asks for a hands-on evaluation by recent legal travelers and especially SOF pathfinders and defense attaches.

If you do not insist on the Russian military combat charts and their decades of cultural features being considered by NGA, they probably will not be. NGA does not have adequate Russian translation capabilities, and tends to be loath to out-source commercial geospatial services.

There is a second important aspect to the accuracy of military charts, and that is what are commonly referred to as ground control points. Ground control points are available to those who actually occupy or are on the ground, whether overtly, as in Afghanistan, or covertly, as in some African nations. The Russians worked hard to use ground control points to improve their military maps for the wars of national liberation across the Third World, and the same cannot be said for the

SOF OSINT HANDBOOK—Tactical Sub-State Understanding for Unit Effectiveness

Americans for the simple reason that we chose not to make maps of lower tier or Third World countries.

In short, commercial geospatial sources and services could be critical to your mission. The SOCIJIC OSINT Branch knows how to get this stuff for you, make sure they know your needs early on.

Finally, there is the matter of going beyond the historical record and focusing very carefully on what can be known about the tribes through open sources of information. It has been our experience that very little is published about the tribes in English, and slightly less so in the main European languages. For Afghanistan, Russian and Polish turned out to be the important languages, because they spent ten years studying the tribes on the ground, with the Poles being the specialists.

Dari radio broadcasts monitored by the Norwegians, Urdu underground press reports from Karachi, Farsi and other Arabic dialects used by Islamic charities reporting on their “good works,” these are the grist from which we can begin to understand the past year to six months of the tribes actual behavior, attitudes, and contacts with target personalities of interest.

Centers of Gravity Profiles and Key Communicator Biographies

Tribes have sub-tribes, and some sub-tribes are more equal than others. Some sub-tribes have special relations with elements of the government, for example, within Waziristan on Pakistan’s Northern Frontier, with radicalized elements of the Pakistani intelligence service. Hence, in addition to mapping the tribal geographic and economic areas of influence, a tribal study should also address where the centers of gravity are, and who the key communicators are across three networks:

- Relations of the tribe with specified terrorist or criminal leaders and elements
- Relations of the tribe with specified host government elements
- Relations of the tribe among the sub-tribes and with the external population

Key communicator biographies are not as hard to construct as some people would have you think, provided that you are able to work in all of the relevant indigenous languages. As a general rule, an adequate key communicator biography, including a photograph less than three years old, can be done for under \$500 and frequently for as little as \$250. Where the US-based commercial intelligence sector breaks down—the “beltway bandits” as they are known—is in relying on English-language sources, or on US-based foreigners with limited direct access to indigenous sources, many of which are not readily available outside the target area of interest.

Those agencies and vendors that insist that their translators be U.S. citizens or have a secret clearance, are also handicapping themselves to the point of being largely ineffective.

Local Media: How They Communicate

Entering the Google search terms <Thailand media directory> immediately brings up an English-language guide with hot links to the major newspapers, television stations, and radio stations. At the next level down you need to be able to speak Thai, but this is a fine starting point for beginning to create a “map” of how each region gets its broadcast news.

However, be aware that most people in Thailand do not have television sets or even FM radios, which are on the high end, so we need to go a step further. Searching for <Thailand AM radio> begins to get us what we are looking for, but does not drill down to the province level.

So we go on to try <Thailand Satun AM radio> and “bingo”, we hit:

<http://www.asiawaves.net/thailand/satun.htm>

which gives us a 10kW AM station and 4 1kW FM stations that we should begin monitoring immediately.

When we try a similar search for newspapers, we get both what we were looking for, and two unexpected leads that an alert CA/PSYOP analyst should notice and cut out for pasting into the binder:

First, about six hits down, from the *World Press Review*, a 6 January 2004 article from *The Nation* that was considered important enough to make it into the March volume of the *Review*.

On Sunday [Jan. 4, 2004], some 20 schools were burned down; an army barracks in Narathiwat overrun and its armory looted, leaving four soldiers dead. The next day, two policemen were blown up by a time bomb in Pattani. These attacks were boldly executed by armed insurgents who knew exactly what to do and what they expect to achieve. ... The main reason why Thaksin is so worked up by the unrest and why the Thai public should shake off its complacency is that it is the first time in recent memory that a permanent army base of battalion strength has been infiltrated by insurgents.²

However, scanning along the same page, what jumps out at us but

Psychological Warfare Along the Thai-Burmese Border

Chakrit Tongsrichum, *Nation Sudsapda* (center-left weekly tabloid), Bangkok, Thailand, May 27-June 2, 2002

The headline is useful: War, Drugs, and Politics in the Golden Triangle: Psychological Warfare Along the Thai-Burmese Border, Chakrit Tongsrichum, *Nation Sudsapda* (center-left weekly tabloid), Bangkok, Thailand, May 27-June 2, 2002. The content ties in US counter-narcotics policy, Thai support to Burmese rebels, drug lords, and the Burmese defense ministry as well as local Burmese troops that may be considered to be running drugs on the side.

The key point: read what the local media are saying, not what US media are reporting. Some of this can be done in English, the more important part of it will have to be done in Thai.

² <http://www.worldpress.org/Asia/1785.cfm>

Content Analysis: What Are Their PSYOP Themes?

It is helpful when beginning a new content analysis project to think in terms of at least distinct constituencies. In the case of Satun Province in Thailand, these would be:

- Western media
- Bangkok media reflecting government views
- Satun media reflecting local views
- Malaysian media, especially northern Malaysia, reflecting Muslim Malay views

This section is not intended to be a primer on content analysis methods, just a suggestive overview. Note, however, that the Internet is now a great place to find “basic” orientation materials on just about anything. Googling for <“content analysis” primer>, for example, immediately brings up a short guide to content analysis, and a more detailed web site that aggregates documents and links about content analysis.³ “Primer” is the key word because that is the word folks use when they are trying to communicate the most basic and elementary introduction to anything.

Remember the Revolutionary Analysis Model, Chapter 3? Now is the time to break out that frame of reference, with specific attention to the broad categories:

- Political-Legal
- Military
- Socio-Economic
- Ideo-Cultural
- Techno-Demographic
- Natural-Geographic

Now think in terms of a matrix that combines the media constituencies across the top, and the categories down the side. This will be your template, perhaps on a piece of butcher block paper, for starting to think about what themes are being played out.

On the next page is a very rough depiction of the kinds of themes you might start to see for Satun Province in Thailand.

³ “Overview: Content Analysis” at <http://writing.colostate.edu/references/research/content> and “Content Analysis: People, Places, and Projects” at http://bama.ua.edu/~wevans/content/ppp/ppp_menu.htm.

SOF OSINT HANDBOOK—Tactical Sub-State Understanding for Unit Effectiveness

	Western Media	Bangkok Media	Satun Media	Malay Media
Political-Legal	Terrorism	Under control	Military atrocities	Irresponsible Thai policies
Military	Terrorism	“Minor incidents”	Widespread insurgency	Border violations
Socio-Economic	Terrorism	Drugs & criminals	poverty	discrimination
Ideo-Cultural	Terrorism	Assimilation is needed	Fair treatment is needed	Provincial self-determination is needed
Techno-Demographic	Terrorism	A few bad apples	Groundswell for separatism	Let the people decide
Natural-Geographic	Terrorism	Geography determines border	Religion determines border	Governments determine border

Figure 12: Template for Content Analysis

The above is simplistic, but intended to show that there are distinct differences in perception among the four relevant constituencies. Remember that your commanders and the policy makers in Washington will only be reading the Western media.

The point of this exercise is three-fold:

1. To establish your own best possible sense of what ground truth is
2. To establish the perceptual differences between the constituencies
3. To develop a sense of what your PSYOP might impact on their PSYOP

Remember what we noted earlier: sometimes your most valuable role will be in educating your chain of command about a reality that neither they nor the traditional intelligence community are seeing.

Technical Understanding for Policy, Acquisition, Operations

Introduction to NATO OSINT Handbook

The *NATO Open Source Intelligence Handbook* is the “methods” companion to this SOF OSINT Handbook, while the guide created by Ran Hock, *Utilization of Internet Tools and Resources for Open Source Intelligence*, is the “sources” companion. This handbook is more about mind-set than it is about sources and methods. Having said that, I want to spend just a couple of pages emphasizing some of the high points from the NATO handbook.

First off, it is “Ref A” for both NATO and coalition forces, and it is the only handbook signed off on by a U.S. Army flag officer, General William F. Kernan. A team of allied field grade and enlisted officers participated in designing and evaluating the final product for which I was ultimately responsible.

Second off, in the Commander’s Overview, which you can use to orient your future Commanders, it makes some key points that I want to stress:

1. OSINT is a combination of sources and methods. Open sources by themselves are just information. OSINT comes from applying the proven process of discovery, discrimination, distillation, and dissemination from the world of intelligence.
2. OSINT reduces the strain on classified resources, and allows you to meet the needs of the commander and their staff, of logisticians, or varied others.
3. OSINT is ideal for those situations where you are working with coalition and non-governmental partners and need to have a shared view of the battlefield without compromising secrets sources and methods.
4. OSINT is not just about electronic sources, but about hard-copy and human sources as well.
5. OSINT is not a substitute for satellites, spies, or existing organic intelligence capabilities.
6. OSINT can be combined with Operations Security (OPSEC) to conceal the commander’s intent, the source of the inquiry, and other sensitive aspects. Don’t ever let anyone tell you that OSINT cannot be used because of security concerns.

SOF OSINT HANDBOOK—Technical Understanding for Policy, Acquisition, Operations

7. OSINT goes well beyond the Internet and commercial online “fee for service” databases to include “gray literature,” direct debriefing of human experts, and commercial geospatial services including Russian military maps of Third World areas where you will often not have U.S. military maps.
8. OSINT, just like the other intelligence collection disciplines, demands that you apply the intelligence cycle. If you don’t get the requirement right in the first place, you will not get the right answer. If you don’t seek multiple sources, you may get blind-sided. If you don’t process everything in tandem and expeditiously, you may be overtaken by events. Finally, if you don’t get the OSINT to the right person at the right time, your efforts will be irrelevant.
9. OSINT is not rocket science and it is not hard labor. You can and will learn how to scope out anything in less than four hours.¹ However, as you become proficient, you must never forget the basics: source authentication and evaluation, proper sourcing, logical analysis, clean presentation.
10. OSINT is easier if you have a structured means of keeping track of useful sites, and a structured means of sharing new discoveries.
11. OSINT is easier if you remember that there are seven intelligence tribes, not one, and that you can use OSINT as a medium of exchange with national, law enforcement, business, academic, non-governmental, media, citizen, labor, and religious organizations and representatives.
12. OSINT is a new enabler for Civil Affairs and Psychological Affairs—think of it as going nuclear, a major step up from traditional CA liaison and PSYOP leaflets.

Understanding U.S. Policy & U.S. Presence

Never assume that U.S. policymakers are paying attention or know what they are doing. U.S. Army Major Kristan Wheaton, in his book *The Warning Solution: Intelligent Analysis in the Age of Information Overload* (AFCEA, 2001), makes the point that U.S. policymakers are so overwhelmed with \$50 billion problems, that they simply do not have the time or energy to deal with the low-intensity conflict and little “under \$1 billion” problems that are so often the focus of Special Operations.

Mr. Bob Vickers, the National Intelligence Officer for Warning (NIO/Warning) at the Central Intelligence Agency, has spoken about “inconvenient warning,” which is where U.S. policymakers simply don’t want to hear from the intelligence professionals about “little warnings” that struggle to get attention when the policymakers are pre-occupied with “big issues” like Russia, China, and North Korea. In England they talk about “warning fatigue” and how British policymakers have limited attention spans that make it difficult for intelligence professionals to communicate more than one warning at a time. In short, the world is complex, policymakers have human limitations, and your particular operation may not be getting the attention it deserves.

¹ See the *NATO OSINT Handbook*, page 19, for the NATO/OSS recommendation on how to spend those four hours. Roughly two hours in collection, one hour in analysis, and one hour in production & presentation.

At the same time, never assume that the U.S. presence has been carefully calculated. As General Tony Zinni points out in his book (written with Tom Clancy), *BATTLE READY*, the military is more often than not the only force that is responsive to policymaker direction, the only Department of the U.S. Government that has the resources to put boots on the ground and eyes on the target anywhere in the world. General Zinni is specifically concerned about the lack of an inter-agency planning process, the lack of an inter-agency management and budgeting process for ensuring that the U.S. presence in complex emergencies is there in time, with the right mix of diplomats, economic assistance, cultural and religious attaches, and military forces delivering both combat power and logistics power.

Sometimes, a part of your job will be communicating to the commander what part of the U.S. presence is *not* present, and needs to be. As General Zinni observes in *BATTLE READY*, sometimes half the battle is to get the food flowing—getting the food into the hostile environment is often the quickest way to reduce the violence, and you need to help the commander understand that food can be the most important PSYOP message around.

Understanding Other Players: What Are They Saying or Doing Now?

Never assume that our “allies” are actually friendly or on the same sheet of music. At the same time, never assume that traditional antagonists, for example, Russia, are actually opposing us. You need to use situational awareness and content analysis to evaluate who is actually playing, what their actual behavior can tell you about their objectives, and what they are actually saying *in their own languages to their own media*. A major short-fall in U.S. operational intelligence is the lack of focus on the home country media for each of the parties working the game.

If you are part of a complex emergency with a United Nations, and you have Belgian, Finnish, Nigerian, and Italian troops engaged, part of your job is to map what their home country media are saying about the local situation, and help the commander understand how the other players are explaining their plans and intentions at home.

Embarkation & Acquisition Intelligence

Embarkation Intelligence answers the question: what should we leave behind and what should we take with us? OSINT can be helpful, especially if you take the time to understand the demography of the target population. Are children or old people in the majority? What mix of medical, water, food, and other solutions will best help this population? Can you pre-order major deliveries of humanitarian supplies to help calm the situation? Bottom line: the U.S. Government in general, and the U.S. military in particular, do not focus enough on the “soft power”² aspect of intervention and influence. It is not enough to go in armed and dangerous, and the SOF Mind-Set understand this—but most theater commanders and their staffs do not, General Zinni being an exception. More typical is the Airborne Colonel who said in Afghanistan that “we don’t do sewing machines.” Civil Affairs and PSYOP *are* “soft power” and a big part of your success is going to come from pre-planning and enabling what can be brought in that will calm the situation.

² Cf. Joseph S. Nye, *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone* (Oxford, 2003). His more recent book, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (PublicAffairs, 2004) is a light-weight rendition of the earlier book. Reading my reviews of both books at Amazon will give you most of what you need to understand Dr. Nye’s powerful ideas.

SOF OSINT HANDBOOK—Technical Understanding for Policy, Acquisition, Operations

Acquisition intelligence answers the question: what can I obtain locally that will help accomplish my mission, and what have I learned from this mission that should be converted into a Joint Required Operational Capability (JROC) so that future teams have all the tools they need? Let's take each separately.

General Zinni, in *BATTLE READY*, points out that the South Vietnamese Marines used very lightweight mesh hammocks that could fit in a trouser pocket, and cost a tiny fraction of what U.S. hammocks with all the rubber and heavy weight cost. SOF is famous for adopting local equipment and methods, for being flexible. Think about this as a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), and indeed, it ought to be a top question to be asked and then answered by the advance team, What do the locals use that they have proven in the field? Should we leave our heavier versions at home and use theirs? This can apply to food (leaving no US smell on the battlefield), to weapons, to mobility systems, even to communications equipment, in those instances where wide swaths of bandwidth simply don't work in-country. The point is to use OSINT to carefully study what local forces—both uniformed state forces and tribal sub-state forces—are using, and think through how adoption of their ways and means might be helpful to the mission.

Planning for the future is an inherent responsibility of every officer, every non-commissioned officer, and every enlisted person down to the brand-new private. A National Achievement Medal was awarded by the Commandant of the Marine Corps to a new private who discovered that space blankets (the lightweight ones that keep heat in) also concealed the thermal signature of a body from infrared detectors. This is precisely the kind of field smarts and innovative thinking that I am talking about. Instead of complaining about the beltway bandits spending all their time designing ekto-skeletons that will require two maintenance contractors for every soldier in the field, think about innovative solution to big problems. Should we be doing more to harvest night dew into full canteens? Should we be trying those solar back-packs to power radios and dump most of the batteries? You can make a difference to future generations of SOF.

Gaming the Mission: Any Self-Inflicted Wounds?

OSINT is more useful than people realize in understanding the "Red Team" perspective. In 2003 the Secretary of Defense sent out a global message when an Al Qaeda manual was captured and translated, and the Pentagon read the Al Qaeda statement that "80% of the intelligence they needed about Americans was available from open sources."

We use OSINT in two ways: first, to examine what the enemy can know of our mission and our plans through OSINT (don't forget that OSINT includes legal observation—Haiti knew Airborne was on the way from one man standing outside the perimeter fence and calling home from a pay phone). Second, we use OSINT to think critically about our mission, looking for any self-inflicted wounds. Are we describing our mission as a "crusade" as we are about to enter a Muslim country? Are we failing to get a public blessing from the Muslim Prime Minister of Malaysia as we begin rather obvious exercises in northern Malaysia? Are we drinking up a storm on liberty, fueling local perceptions of us as being in league with their version of the devil? Although SOF is much more culturally-sensitive than conventional forces, we can forget, and part of the CA/PSYOP contribution, in my personal view, is helping the commander and staff see us as others see us, from day to day.

Part III: Applying Open Sources to Specific Mission Areas

Part III is hollow. It needs to focus on five specific applications of OSINT relevant to SOF—Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, Target Analysis, Terrain Analysis, and Weather Analysis—but since this is a voluntary “off-line” effort and many of the best sources that are free are only open to .mil addresses, it really needs to be created by SOCJIC, NGIC, and Mr. Ben Benavides. However, I have put together a few words in each chapter, mostly intended to provoke reflection. This is not the operationally-oriented conclusion that I envisioned when I first conceptualized this needed book.

Civil Affairs discusses OSINT in relation to human intelligence (understanding the demographics, the socio-economic environment, displaced persons, and crime, among other topics); to technical intelligence about the local command & control, communications, computing, and intelligence environment, the infrastructures of transportation, power, and finance; to welfare intelligence (water, food, medical); cultural intelligence about protected or restricted targets, and liaison intelligence.

Psychological Operations discusses OSINT in relation to strategic, operational, and tactical campaign plans; revisits the mapping of themes in play, especially anti-U.S. themes; the original collection and testing of themes for possible U.S. play, and the litmus test for successful PSYOP: does it produce actionable intelligence from indigenous volunteers?

Target Analysis discusses how OSINT might fulfill team needs in the absence of classified intelligence support, to create a detailed description and vulnerability assessment, evaluate the natural environment and the human environment, and carry out route planning.

Terrain Analysis discusses in very general terms key factors in terrain analysis relevant to special aviation and covert ground movement, and provides a very general introduction to commercial and Russian military combat charts, to commercial imagery, and to alternatives for terrain reconnaissance including unmanned aerial vehicles and indigenous scouts.

Weather Analysis discusses OSINT as a means of rapidly getting to the basics of temperature, visibility and timing of sun and moon, wind, and inclement weather.

Part III is not a substitute for any of the excellent field manuals that discuss these topics in detail. The intent of Part III is to illuminate the utility of OSINT in each of these areas, and to encourage self-study and experimentation when facing real-world challenges.

It is my hope that the Army professionals that are mentioned several times by Congressman Simmons and myself will be given the resources they need to actually create this part of the book.

[This Page Blank]

Civil Affairs

Nothing in this Handbook is intended to be a substitute for existing Army doctrine and other training and education materials, and nothing in this Handbook is intended to suggest that OSINT can do it all or that other traditional sources of classified information will not be helpful. Having said that, I want to stress two points:

1. OSINT will often be the only thing that you can control directly, the only means by which you can attempt to answer important questions for yourself in advance of arriving in the area of operations.
2. Once in the area of operations, you, and the indigenous personnel as well as the non-governmental personnel with whom you are able to interact, will probably know vastly more about the key factors in country than any all-source intelligence analyst at the battalion, theater, or national levels.

This chapter will discuss some of the key factors relevant to civil affairs understanding and mission accomplishment.

Let's start by emphasizing that original open source intelligence collection and analysis is above all about *relationships*. The following is an excerpt from my summary of key findings in the book by Tom Clancy and General Tony Zinni, BATTLE READY:

Most impressive is Zinni's focus on pre-emptive relationship building across the region. Relationships matter, and relationships forged in advance go a very long way in avoiding misunderstanding and defusing crises. If you have to fight, relationships are the single best means of reducing the fog of war and assuring good integration of effort across cultures, nations, and armies.

There are two types of relationships that you will be developing: those that can be established prior to ever reaching the battle area, and those that are established after your arrival. In both cases, being able to establish trust is going to be a major factor. OSINT that you can share will be a part of your success.

For every country that you are responsible for on a contingency basis, you should be mapping what organizations are engaged there now, and you should be doing what you can, through direct travel, through the Embassy, through correspondence and particularly information sharing, to create your own network of indigenous, international, and U.S. experts and contacts that can help you understand in advance, and once you are on site, act effectively.

It helps to think in terms of the seven tribes of intelligence:

National Military Law Enforcement Business Academic NGO-Media Citizen-Labor-Religion

SOF OSINT HANDBOOK—Civil Affairs

Each of these “tribes” has representatives in-country, and experts or action officers in the home country. If you just think in terms of seven countries that you can talk to, that makes for 49 “clusters” where you can and should be developing relationships. Let’s plot these for Thailand.

	National	Military	Law Enforcement	Business	Academic	NGO-Media	Citizen-Labor-Religion
USA							
Thailand							
Malaysia							
Pakistan							
Myanmar							
France							
Australia							

Figure 13: Template for Mapping Civil Affairs Contacts

The national intelligence tribe is best tasked through the J-2. This is fairly obvious, but what is frequently not obvious is the fact that other countries should be asked for their opinion. It’s a no-brainer to ask US intelligence about Thailand, and to ask for internal Thai reporting relevant to the conflict in the southern provinces. What is less obvious is that both Pakistan and Myanmar (Burma) have deep interests in Thailand, that Malaysia is a major player and probably the best source of classified intelligence on those aspects of the southern insurgency that the Thais do not want to discuss, and that France and Australia for differing reasons have some of the best Asian intelligence around.

The national intelligence authorities do not think in these terms. Questions about Thailand tend to be tasked to the Station in Thailand, and not to others. You have to work at it. The same is true for the Defense Attaché system. Most requirements on Thailand will go to the U.S. Defense Attaché in Bangkok, but we will forget to ask for help from our Attaché’s in Paris, in Canberra, in Kuala Lumpur. “It’s all connected.” This matrix will help you think about tasking or cultivating both tribes and countries.

Similarly, in law enforcement, local liaison with the Thai police, and even the Malaysian police, is obvious. Less obvious is direct contact with INTERPOL, and with the Chiefs of Police Association in the USA, which can poll its members about personal friendships with their police counterparts in Thailand, Malaysia, Australia, and other countries. There is no substitute for a personal introduction by a trusted third party.

Businesses survive because they learn how to reduce risk. Trucking businesses that have drivers and vehicles criss-crossing the conflict area are especially interesting as potential sources of raw information and cultural insights. International and U.S. firms that have energy, cement, and other production facilities in the region, or that rely on the region for specific supplies feeding into their production process, are all relevant. Insurance companies that have concerns about the security of specific properties they have insured will have someone following the situation. Chambers of Commerce in Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur will have a sense of which of their member organization is active in the region.

SOF OSINT HANDBOOK—Civil Affairs

Academics were discussed in the introduction to social networking. Here the U.S. Army seems to have done fairly well. Don't settle for the local academic—use them to reach out to others, including graduate students that are doing dissertations relevant to your contingency mission. Pay special attention for foreign academics who do not have the U.S. party line burned into their brain, and will offer you alternative perspectives.

Non-governmental organizations are the best source of “ground truth” and your efforts, in advance of entering the area, to create relationships with them, and to nurture those relationships by sharing useful information, will pay dividends on the ground. The European Centre for Conflict Prevention (ECCP) is emerging as the foremost organization, after the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and Doctors without Borders, for tracking who is doing what. Their directories of who is doing what in the way of conflict prevention and peace building activities are becoming standard references.¹

Now, before we move into a few cursory examples on Thailand, don't overlook the obvious. If you Google for <Civil Affairs> you will find a wealth of references, including compiled lists of links, handbooks, and so on.

The Unofficial **Civil Affairs** Page

... Action; Civil Defense. General **Civil Affairs** Resources Include: ... Afghanistan. My Old Unit - The 432nd **Civil Affairs** Battalion in Action. ...
my.athenet.net/~bestul/ca.html - 13k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

US Army **Civil Affairs** and Psychological Operations Command ...

Essential US Army **Civil Affairs** and Psychological Operations Command information. ... The US Army **Civil Affairs** and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne). ...
globalspecops.com/capcom.html - 43k - Jun 17, 2004 - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command

Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command. ... **Civil Affairs** soldiers are the field commander's link to the civil authorities in his area of operation. ...
www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/ca-psyop.htm - 24k - Jun 17, 2004 - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

Civil Affairs Association Homepage

... CAA Current Events - Headlines, Photos. World Wide **Civil Affairs** Conference 2004 ... Meeting Minutes 2004 Meeting Photos. World Wide **Civil Affairs** Conference 2004. ...
www.civilaffairsassoc.org/ - 25k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

US Army **Civil Affairs** and Psychological Operations Command ...

www.soc.mil/usacapoc/capoc_default.htm - 1k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

¹ Cf. Monique Mekenkamp, Paul van Tongeren, and Hans van de Veen (eds.), *Searching for Peace in Central and South Asia: An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities* (Lynne Renier, 2002).

Similarly, <Civil Affairs Thailand> leads to directly relevant materials:

ADPC - Training and Education - Training Calendar 2001

... in Sakaew **Thailand**, Started in 24-25 July 1999 and will continue until 120 training is completed. Disaster Management Course for the **Civil Affairs** Department ...

www.adpc.net/training/calendar2001.html - 16k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

US and **Thailand** to hold Cobra Gold '98 Joint Exercise May 19- June ...

... The exercise will also provide constructive benefits to the people of **Thailand** through combined **Thailand-US** medical and **civil affairs** projects. ...

bangkok.usembassy.gov/relation/mil-cg9801.htm - 10k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

Thailand

... Colonel Harit Pumhiran, Dir, Policy & Planning Division, Directorate of **Civil Affairs** Bangkok, **Thailand** 10200, 22821157, harit99@hotmail.com. ...

www2.apan-info.net/pams/pams25/countries/Thailand.html - 3k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

This is just the Internet. If you access commercial fee-for-service (big bucks, and if you make a mistake or are unfamiliar with the databases, bigger bucks), you get even more stuff, to include technical information about roads. My basic philosophy is that most folks ought to learn to leverage the free Internet to the fullest extent possible, and refer all requirements for OSINT where money needs to be spent, back to the SOCIIC (and eventually, to the theater OSINT facilities, but with SOCIIC always part of the requirements loop). So if you were expecting to see a lot of complex stuff here, that's not part of the plan.

Now on to Thailand. A Google for <Thailand directory non-governmental organizations produces two very useful hits in the top ten listings:

Thai websites : : Social Issues, **Non-Governmental Organizations** in ...

... Pattaya Newspapers. D-Pal Club. Searched Results for Category Social Issues, **Non-Governmental Organizations** (NGOs) in **Thailand**. The Anglo ...
www.thaiwebsites.com/social.asp?mode=social - 37k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

Non-Governmental Organizations in the Asia Pacific Region

Directory of the International NGO Community in the Asia ... Lard Phrao Junction Bangkok 10901, **Thailand** Phone / Fax ... html Free Burma is a **non-governmental** network of www.caprn.bc.ca/directory/ngo.htm - 84k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

Similarly, searching for <Thailand Labor Unions> produces two starting points:

Labour **Unions** in the Asia Pacific Region

... MBC **Union** Email: mbcunion@interpia.net Web Site ... 30/1 Soi 61 Sukumrit Road Bangkok, **Thailand**. ... American Federation of **Labor** - Congress of Industrial Organizations ... www.caprn.bc.ca/directory/national_tu.htm - 25k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

By Subject | International Studies | **Directories**

... of **Thailand Directory** of information servers in **Thailand**. ... Presents a **directory of labor** organizations in ... company **directory** Electronic **directory** of Malaysian ... www.lib.washington.edu/subject/International/dr/eldir.html - 16k - Cached - Similar pages [[More results from www.lib.washington.edu](http://www.lib.washington.edu)]

You get the idea. Combine your own understanding, a key word search strategy, and a methodical approach to finding starting points, and you will do well.

Human Intelligence (Demographics, Socio-Economic, Displaced Persons, Crime)

There has been a sea-change in the Internet in the past two years. Whereas once it was fashionable to talk about the “deep web” and how the vast majority of the web’s information was not indexed or visible at first glance, this is less true today. Simple searches can yield amazing results, especially if all you are looking for is an overview.²

Some searches are obvious. <Thailand demographics Satun> immediately reveals some current summaries.

“Socio-economic” on the other hand, is not a helpful term. Words like poverty, instability, drought, bankruptcy, suicide, tend to be more revealing. In India, for example, over 2,000 individual farmers have committed suicide in association with the vanishing of water and their consequent bankruptcy.³ Once you start to see articles in this arena, you will quickly identify the key words that give you the best results—the words that capture the pressure being placed on the people at the bottom of the socio-economic scale.

In Thailand, instead of displaced persons, one quickly sees that they refer to “ethnic rebels, refugees, and illegal immigrants.” These are the terms to use in relation to Satun and the other provinces.

<Thailand crime> is good, <Thailand ethnic crime> is more direct. At this point it also helps to enter the name of a source country that is exporting crime or terrorism into Thailand.

<Thailand Pakistan terrorism crime> or <Thailand Burma terrorism crime>.

As part of this search, other terms jump out: <Thailand Muslim crime>, <Thailand Islamic Insurgency>, and so on. At this point, right up to the late may be-heading of Buddhist monk by Muslims upset over being arrested, you have a fine starting point on the human factors.

² The *CIA World Fact Book* and the various Library of Congress area studies are excellent starting points but are usually severely out-dated and not reflective of the major changes that have taken place in the Muslim-Christian relations, to take just once example, since the Saudi’s decided to fund Bin Laden from 1989 onwards.

³ “In the past six years, 2,000 to 3,000 farmers - the state has not compiled an official tally - are believed to have committed suicide in this state,” Amy Waldman, *Debts Drive Indian Farmers to Suicide*, *New York Times*, 7 June 2004.

Technical Intelligence (C4I, Transportation, Power, Financial)

C4I is not that useful as a search term, but it does produce some industry newsletter overviews. More current information can be found by breaking it down:

<Thailand command & control> <Thailand communications>
<Thailand computers> <Thailand intelligence>

<Thailand “Command & control”> leads us to a primer on what the South Asian nations have learned in a recent wargame focused specifically on coalition C4I, and the following is relevant to your mission:⁴

6. A well thought out and executed public information campaign is critical to the success of the overall mission. Some parts of the mission, such as the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration process, require specially tailored public information campaigns to maximize compliance and support.

<Thailand communications> produces the table below, from Geography IQ:⁵

Telephones - main lines in use:	5.6 million (2000)
Telephones - mobile cellular:	3.1 million (2002)
Telephone system:	general assessment: service to general public adequate, but investment in technological upgrades reduced by recession; bulk of service to government activities provided by multichannel cable and microwave radio relay network domestic: microwave radio relay and multichannel cable; domestic satellite system being developed international: satellite earth stations - 2 Intelsat (1 Indian Ocean and 1 Pacific Ocean)
Radio broadcast stations:	AM 204, FM 334, shortwave 6 (1999)
Radios:	13.96 million (1997)
Television broadcast stations:	5 (all in Bangkok; plus 131 repeaters) (1997)
Televisions:	15.19 million (1997)
Internet country code:	.th
Internet Service Providers (ISPs):	15 (2000)
Internet users:	1.2 million (2001)

Figure 14: Mainstream Communications Overview for Thailand

⁴ “Mission Command & Control: Southeast Asia Single Issue Seminar” sponsored by Royal Thai Army, organized by The Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (Hawaii), 9-13 December 2002, <http://coe-dmha.org/APRI/Thailand02/index.htm>

⁵ http://www.geographyiq.com/countries/th/Thailand_communications.htm

However, let's not forget that we want to focus on the insurgents, so now we try <Thailand insurgent communications> and we get:⁶

Latest Technology Links Jungle Rebels Wired Revolution Helps Guerrillas

By Thomas Crampton *International Herald Tribune*

Although this refers to the rebels along the Burmese border, Malaysia is one of the most advanced Asian users of the Internet and cellular telephones, and it gives you an idea of where rebel C4I might stand.

<Thailand Muslim insurgent intelligence counterintelligence> yields a fine collection of items about the rebels themselves, including their ties from Bangladesh to Indonesia.

Among the most interesting, from an Indian perspective, is a report on the international linkages of Muslim terrorists. Among other things, this makes us realize that India must be included in our country line-up for information sharing. This is what they say about Thailand, but what they say about all the other countries including the United States, is well worth a read.⁷

Thailand

International terrorists have been taking advantage of Bangkok's lax tourism-promoting immigration procedures. Islamist terrorists were linked to a failed truck-bomb attack against the Israeli embassy in 1994 there. Links with Middle Eastern terrorist outfits were ascertained when Ibrahim Ghosheh, leader of the Palestinian terrorist outfit Hamas, was deported in June 2000. A small number of terrorist operatives belonging to Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda do live in Thailand.

There has been a revival of Islamist terrorism in four Muslim-dominated southern provinces of Thailand in the recent months. The Bersatu ("United" Malay) group was responsible for a bomb attack on the Hat Yai railway station as also a hotel in the Yala province in April 2001 and, more recently, has also indulged in abduction and extortion. Terrorist outfits, as also some of the countries in the Middle East, provide training, education, ideological succour and financial support for various Islamist fundamentalist groups in the southern provinces of Thailand.

In passing, we come across "Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial Network of Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah" by Zachary Abuza (*NBR Analysis*, Vol. 14, No. 5, THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF ASIAN RESEARCH, December 2003),⁸ which discussed the alternative financing systems for terrorists in South Asia, and why U.S. intelligence and counterintelligence turf fights and bureaucratic inertia have failed to disrupt terrorist financing in Southeast Asia fully two years after 9-11.

⁶ <http://junglefighter.panamanow.net/html/jungle%20rebels.html>

⁷ http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/usa/international_links.htm

⁸ <http://www.nbr.org/publications/analysis/vol14no5/145.pdf>

You may or may not want to go after information on the Thai transportation, power, and financial industry choke points. Usually we study infrastructure in order to develop PSYOP for getting the indigenous people to understand that we want to protect the infrastructure for post-war exploitation. It is generally a mistake to damage critical infrastructure that is both essential to the economic well-being of the indigenous population, and that will be difficult and expensive to repair or replace post-war.

You might instead study <Thailand insurgent transportation> or <Thailand smuggling southern> or <Thailand infiltration>, but the point is to keep your eyes open, follow interesting leads, and start cutting and pasting interesting stuff into your workbook, always being sure to log the Uniform Resource Locator (URL) and source information. One gem we found this way is an item that provides an unconventional view of the history of antagonism between the Muslims in the south of Thailand and the Thai government itself:

The guerrillas say more than 15 military coups and attempted coups in Bangkok during the past 65 years is reason not to integrate. "PULO chooses to follow...a political forum and armed struggle as an appropriate way to bring wisdom for the discriminated people of Greater Pattani," PULO said in a statement. PULO denounced Thailand's "racist policies" of pushing Thailand's 3.3 million Muslims to live under "Buddhist influence." In the past, Bangkok banished corrupt or incompetent police and military officials, teachers and civil servants to the south where they then made life miserable for local people, according to published reports. Unscrupulous locals "became either their agents, bandits or village gangsters," PULO said. "Some Thai police and army officers themselves are drug traffickers" fueling widespread addiction among Muslim youths, it said.

This is a good look at the local nature of the grievances that Al Qaeda is succeeding in harnessing, and it also emphasizes that corruption within the local government that we are trying to help, and a history of abuse by that government against the locals that are now supporting the terrorists, is often our biggest obstacle to pacification success.⁹

Welfare Intelligence (Water, Food, Medical)

<Thailand water> works just fine, and leads to starting points on the drought, flooding that cannot be controlled, and wastewater management. Cross-over articles discuss the relationship between water, disease, reduced crop production, and human disease.

Food is too general a term. <Thailand food shortages> on the other hand, produces a few current references to food shortages, border closures, riots related to food and border closures, and so on.

Broadening the search to <Thailand economy> leads directly to a key article on the relationship between the insurgency in the south, critical food production, and the over-all Thai economy.

⁹ Terrorists in Thailand? March, 2002 by Richard S. Ehrlich, Posting to Geocities, <http://www.geocities.com/glossograph/thai020306terrorismepn.html>

Thailand Terror

By Stephen Brown

FrontPageMagazine.com | January 21, 2004

It is the “weak underbelly” in Southeast Asia’s War on Terror.

That is how one observer has described Thailand’s five Muslim provinces, located in the country’s southern panhandle next to Malaysia, where a bloody outburst of Islamist terrorism has already occurred this year.

Among the highlights in this article, all relevant to Civil Affairs and PSYOP, are the fact that the Thai government’s sending of troops to Afghanistan and Iraq, combined with its own corruption and arrogance toward the Muslim minority, combined with Muslim penetration of the Thai armed forces and the wide open borders in the south, all make Thailand a center of gravity for achieving the extremist Muslim goal for Asia: super-Islamic state, comprising Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia, Cambodia, the southern Philippines and southern Thailand.

At a minimum, this article should also flag counterintelligence concerns. In the USA Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation who are Muslim have declined to press hard on investigations of Muslim terrorists. FBI employees who are Muslim and employed as translators have refused to properly translate Arabic intercepts. If this is what happens to the FBI, imagine what happens within the Thai Army. This is not profiling—this is common sense. The Muslim religion is very strong, and its fundamentalist who are fully integrated into the Thai Army, including its special forces, should be regarded with caution. It helps to know the religion of the Thai officials you are dealing with, and it helps to be candid with your senior Thai official of the Buddhist faith about your concerns.

Cultural Intelligence (Protected or Restricted Targets)

Although this section focuses on the identification of targets that need to be protected or restricted, there is also a PSYOP connection. “National patrimony” is code for grassroots anger over the theft of national treasures by Westerners, or for the imposition of Western values upon traditional societies. Other code terms are “hamburger virus” and “cultural imperialism.”

For Thailand, each of these produces differing results, with <Thailand “cultural imperialism”> being the most interesting.¹⁰

Mosques are the most obvious places needing to be identified and mapped as potential restricted targets, but with the observation that “the times, they are a’changing.” As the FBI has found, and as authors like Steve Emerson¹¹ discovered in the mid 1990’s, mosques tend to be safe havens for terrorists and Islamic radicals, it would be a mistake to give these places a “bye” on

¹⁰ Remember that quotation marks keep the words together, i.e. they must be found together, while the brackets are not used at all in the search, and appear here only to mark the search string.

¹¹ Cf. Steve Emerson, *AMERICAN JIHAD: The Terrorists Living Among Us* (Free Press, 2003).

surveillance and caution. The local authorities will have the lead, but religious locations are now just as much a threat as are armed guerrilla camps.

Liaison Intelligence (Continuity & Unity of Operations)

Remember the seven tribes? Be mindful of the reality that in Thailand the military may not get along with the police, that there are corrupt relations between the business community and both the military and the police, and that religious temples and sects tends to have “special relationships” with particular business benefactors (including drug lords) and politicians. In other words, liaison is neither straight-forward nor necessarily honest.

OSINT can help you get a grip on who the players are at the local level, and how they get along with one another. Working the archives in Thai, and doing deliberate interviewing and then link analysis, can help specify the nuances.

Ideally, you will have a different person “bonding” with each liaison element, but never take liaison at face value. Work at understanding the history of each liaison element in the local area. Above all, remember that everyone has their own agenda. In both Viet-Nam and in Iraq the U.S. has been fooled into jailing and sometimes mistreating and sometimes murdering people who have been “turned in” for crimes they did not commit—local interests use the cover of war to obtain revenge on people that they owe money to, on people that jilted them, on people that own land they want to take over, etcetera.

You should also consider the possibility of “indirect liaison,” for example, a particular non-governmental organization might be getting on very well with the local Buddhists, another with the local Muslims.

When it comes to liaison, you should be mapping personalities, organizations, and missions. They will overlap. OSINT is a legal ethical way to study your allied and coalition partners, and you should not hesitate for an instant to use the OSINT toolkit in support of your liaison responsibilities.

REMEMBER, PLEASE, THIS IS A NOTIONAL CHAPTER

THE ARMY OSINT PROFESSIONALS NEED TO LAY HANDS ON HERE.

Psychological Operations

In the several days it took me to prepare this draft SOF OSINT HANDBOOK, I tried to absorb several of your field manuals, including FM 3-05.301, *Psychological Operations, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, but it is not possible for me to equal your own knowledge. What I try to do here is show how OSINT can help you do things like Target Audience Analysis (TAA), by finding sources useful in identifying and analyzing attitudes, beliefs, vulnerabilities, and susceptibilities.

In my personal view, it all boils down to three things:

1. You will not succeed if U.S. forces and/or allied host country forces are being bullies and using force as a substitute for dialog and other proactive pacification measures. In the absence of strong supporting behaviors including the delivery of water, food, medicine, and security for the indigenous inhabitants, you may as well hang it up and spend your time telling the commander how the locals feel about us—you sure as shooting are not going to change their minds about us.

2. If you are fortunate and your commander has the right “white hat” capabilities going into the area, whether under military or civilian or humanitarian NGO control, then you have a fighting chance of making a difference.

3. If you think you have a shot, then it boils down to relationships, linkages, and follow-up.

- a. Relationships. It is not possible to develop good PSYOP from inside a bunker. If you are not out on the streets using all five of your senses, and interacting with indigenous personnel who are not tame translators or host government salesmen, then you are not going to have what the Germans call “the feeling in the fingertips” for the situation.

- b. Linkages. You need to see and to the extent possible be able to manage the linkages between your message and good things happening to the people that buy into your message.

- c. Follow-up. The word *will* get back. When folks do what you want them to do, follow your message, you want to be right in there with them, helping dispel the rumors in the camps, helping determine what they like and don’t like about their new situation, helping the commander understand potential boiling points, and recycling the whole message. Win one, get ten.

SOF OSINT HANDBOOK—Psychological Operations

Before we look at Thai applications, let's again go to the obvious, and see what <Psychological Operations PSYOP> offers us. I add the abbreviation to strengthen the pull.

Special Operations.Com -US Rangers

... The **Psychological Operations (PSYOP)** Group plans and conducts **PSYOP** activities authorized and implemented worldwide in support of all non-mobilization ...

www.specialoperations.com/Army/PSYOP/Unit_Profile.htm - 35k - Cached -

Similar pages

[More results from www.specialoperations.com]

POVA - Psychological Operations Veterans Association

... The **Psyop** Veterans Association regrets to announce the passing of Mr. Charles Barber, of ... Robert Alexis McClure, the father of modern **psychological operations**. ...

www.psyop.com/ - 22k - Jun 17, 2004 - Cached - Similar pages

PSYOP PSYOPS PSYWAR Psychological Operations Psychological Warfare

... **Psychological Operations (PSYOP)** and Psychological Warfare (PSYWAR), these words generate thoughts of North Vietnam's "Hanoi Hanna", Japan's "Tokyo Rose" and ...

www.psywarrior.com/ - 5k - Cached - Similar pages

Psychological Operations

... **Psychological Operations (PSYOP)**. ... The 3rd **Psychological Operations Battalion (POB)** is the **PSYOP** Dissemination Battalion (PDB) for the 4th **PSYOP** Group. ...

www.psywarrior.com/psyop.html - 19k - Cached - Similar pages

If you patiently go down through the top 100 hits, which should take less than ten minutes, you will quickly be able to sort the wheat from the chaff and end up with a fairly good list of ten starting points for refreshing your knowledge or getting ideas.

Now doing the same thing, but with specific reference to Thailand, we enter into Google <"Psychological Operations" PSYOP Thailand> and get back some slim pickings, but several screens down we find a short history of insurgency and why PSYOP are so important in dealing with insurgencies, and this comes with some great links—a keeper.¹ It leads in turn to PSYWARRIOR.COM, which has impressive links across the board, and came up in the first pass.

<Thailand Muslim attitudes>² produces 7,890 hits. The first one, from 1 October 2001. Although dated, it is useful. "Thailand Muslim Spiritual Leader Urges Neutrality," tells us that there are Muslim leaders in Thailand calling for reconciliation, that the Minister of Communications in Thailand is himself a Muslim, and that the key group for reaching Muslims in Thailand is called the Central Committee of Thailand.³

¹ **INSURGENCIES, PEACEKEEPING, AND NATION RE-BUILDING**

<http://faculty.newc.edu/toconnor/429/429lect17.htm>

² I realize this seems simplistic, but it works. This is more about mind-set than about magic—more about following a line of reasoning than about exhaustive research.

³ <http://www.islam-online.net/English/News/2001-10/02/article12.shtml>

SOF OSINT HANDBOOK—Psychological Operations

Further down we find two entries from JihadWatch, and the following cautionary advice against trying to do PSYOP by Christian toward Muslim:

Like so many judges and officials in the West who have lectured Islamic radicals about their own faith, Thammarak took the rebels to task for violating the tenets of Islam. This widespread behavior is both presumptuous and short-sighted. It fails to recognize that Muslims aren't going to care what a non-Muslim tells them about Islam, and refuses to acknowledge the potency of the religious appeals that radical Muslims are making within the Islamic community worldwide:⁴

Further down we find a useful book citation:

Yegar, Moshe. 2002. *Between Integration and Secession: The Muslim Communities of the Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand, and Western Burma/Myanmar*. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books.

Just for grins, lets go to Amazon now and check out both books on the Muslims of Southern Thailand, a references within books to these same Muslims.

The book costs \$90, and very disappointingly, the publisher has failed to post any useful information about the book. Let's not give up. <Book Review Yegar Moshe Between Integration and Secession> finds a short review:

*The book asks whether Muslim minorities can co-exist within non-Muslim states. This new excellent work examines the radicalisation of Muslim communities during the nationalist fervour that swept Southeast Asia in the aftermath of World War II. The book's grand historical scope traces the theological and political impact of the postwar Islamic renaissance on the creation of Muslim separatist tendencies and heightened religious consciousness.*⁵

We can do better. Looking further down, we find the following, with two emails for US-based experts on militant Islam:

POLS 562 Professors D. King and D. Unger Spring 2004 dunger@niu.edu, 753-7042 dking@niu.edu, 753-7054

Now, we don't have their area codes, but truncating the web address we are looking at, from

<http://polisci.niu.edu/courses/sp04courses/562.html> to <http://polisci.niu.edu>

quickly established that this is the Northern Illinois University, and that both professors can be reached by using area code (815) at the numbers above, or by calling the main line for the Department of Political Science, (815) 753-1011 or faxing to (815) 753-6302. I'm willing to bet

⁴ <http://www.jihadwatch.org/archives/000861.php>

⁵ http://www.asiabooks.gil.com.au/catalogue/the_region_06.html

they have professional colleagues in Thailand and elsewhere, and that they would be very eager to trade their knowledge for your unclassified on-the-ground insights, on the record or off.

Similarly, <Thailand Muslim beliefs> will lead you to both an understanding of their beliefs, and an understanding of why they oppose Thai schools that do not teach Muslim beliefs because Thailand is 95% Buddhist.

<Thailand Muslim vulnerabilities> can be expected to lead to discussions of both the Thai Buddhist government's vulnerabilities, and the vulnerabilities of the government to disruption from the south. This is indeed the case. Asia Times immediately emerges as a useful source, and we see the following:

Muslim separatists hankering to resurrect long-gone Pattani regency, to which the five predominantly Muslim provinces in Thailand's south - Yala, Songkhla, Pattani, Narathiwat and Satun - once belonged, and which was annexed in 1902 by Siam, as Thailand was then known, would be foolhardy indeed to waste their foot soldiers. The present raiders' amateurishness and the new vehicles they rode upon point to the hand of local influence-peddlers, whether politicians, crime lords or shady businessmen, seeking to win concessions from the big guys in Bangkok through backroom deals that exploit the ignorance and disaffection common to young men around the world taking adulthood's first, faltering steps.⁶

This to me, is interesting. It confirms the earlier report, that what we have in southern Thailand is not terrorism yet, but getting there, in part because of the ineptness of the government and the history of government inattention, bullying, and corruption. In short, the host government is part of the problem.

Looking further down within the Asia Times list, we find a story from 30 April 2004 that reports the Thai authorities were tipped off about the planned attacks that results in 110 dead insurgents and only a handful of Thai casualties. In a region where 67% to 85% of the population is Muslim, the government still got volunteered information that saved the day. This is very good news. We have something to work with. However, I would stress that we need to remember that Muslims don't want to hear from non-Muslims. Either we have to work through Muslim intermediaries, or we have to work hard to field our own SOF Muslims into the area, at least for the direct contact work.

I do see two themes emerging here:

First, the U.S. has to work hard, in close partnership with the Malaysian government as well as the Thai government, to improve services, reduce corruption, and address the sources of concern and friction in the Muslim south of Thailand. These people have legitimate grievances and legitimate concerns, and there are not enough guns in Thailand to hold them down.

⁶ **COMMENTARY Thailand: Tapping the Mr Bigs of jihadi terrorism** By David Fullbrook, Asia Times, 1 May 2004, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast Asia/FE01Ae04.html>

SOF OSINT HANDBOOK—Psychological Operations

Second, the Thai government, working with Malaysian Muslim representatives as well as an exclusively Muslim team of Thais, needs to drive a wedge between the “outsider terrorists” and the local disgruntled. It appears vital to me that keep these two classes of threat from merging.

Both of the above tasks have to be done by Muslims, with a very limited US footprint.

Target Audience Analysis (TAA)

The short views below are not a substitute for the more rigorous methodology that are contained in the formal Army instructions and doctrine. This is just a short-cut to considering how OSINT can help draw out some of the relevant information, perhaps by creating a matrix of the seven tribes combined with the domains of the revolutionary analysis model.

	Political	Military	Economic	Cultural	Demographic	Geographic
National						
Military						
Police						
Business						
Academic						
NGO						
Media						
Citizen						
Labor						
Religion						

Figure 15: Segmenting the Target Audience

The point I want to make here is that the Internet, cell phones, and ease of global travel have not brought us together—they have segmented us. The world is more nuanced now, and one size, one message, does not fit all. This matrix is a way of looking at the broader target audience—the Muslim policeman or soldier who has mixed loyalties; the journalist who wants to inform on forthcoming attacks but is not sure who to tell or trust; the businessman who may once have thought he could bribe his way out of risk, now confused about how best to assure the security of his business and family.

Another way of looking at the target audience, and I imagine your doctrine addresses this, is by age, education, and employment status. All over the world—in 41 countries to be precise—there are child soldiers and child rebels. The Islamic educational system sponsored by Saudi Arabia and other Muslim governments tolerant of radicalism and fundamentalism has created a massive army of uneducated, unemployed, angry youth.

No message you create is going to be effective unless the host country government is also offering them a clear path toward productive employment.

Mapping Legitimate Grievances and Related Enemy PSYOP

Don't kid yourselves. We are not the bringers of light and goodness. In our entire history, more often than not, U.S. troops have been enforcers for corrupt foreign governments and corrupt U.S. corporations, as well as largely selfish U.S. government interests. We tend to substitute force for consensus. This may not be what you want to hear, but you have to have this context if you are to be effective. Here is what General Smedley Butler, the most decorated Marine officer before Chesty Puller, has to say about his decades of service for the U.S. Marine Corps:⁷

"I helped make Mexico, especially Tampico, safe for American oil interests in 1914. I helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National City Bank boys to collect revenues in. I helped in the raping of half a dozen Central American republics for the benefits of Wall Street. The record of racketeering is long. I helped purify Nicaragua for the international banking house of Brown Brothers in 1909-1912. I brought light to the Dominican Republic for American sugar interests in 1916. In China I helped to see to it that Standard Oil went its way unmolested."

We do our duty to America by being loyal to the Constitution. That includes being responsible for disobeying illegal orders. Within the parameters of blind obedience and conscientious objection lies a middle ground, that of informed engagement. You need to understand reality from the perspective of the target audiences, and your commander needs for you to be loyal to the command by presenting that reality, which will often be in direct contradiction to what classified intelligence sources are saying. Want to know why? Because U.S. intelligence is too dependent on foreign liaison, and too uninformed to be able to filter deception and blatant lies from their government to ours. At least seven out of ten times, if you do your own OSINT and you follow this methodology, you will be more valuable to your commander and to the mission that billions of dollars worth of largely useless satellites equipment and hundreds of not-so-secret spies.

Use the Revolutionary Analysis Model to search for current and historical news items across the spectrum of grievances. Every pre-condition of revolution in Figure 7 on page 12 is rooted in a legitimate grievance. Each legitimate grievance is in turn the basis for an enemy PSYOP that seeks to leverage that grievance toward revolutionary insurgency.

You can use your superior understanding of legitimate grievances in two ways: first, to ensure the commander is aware of it, and sending up the chain of command strong recommendations for corrective actions; and second, assuming that corrective actions are forthcoming, in crafting your message that says essentially, we hear you, we have acted on

⁷ Smedley D. Butler (BGen, USMC, Ret.), *WAR IS A RACKET* (Feral House, 2003), page 10.

your grievances, here is what has been done, here is what is coming down the road, help us get there by not destabilizing the process.

Mapping Desired Objectives and Possible Friendly PSYOP

As best I can tell, the primary objective of PSYOP in support of friendly operations is to dispel rumors and keep bystanders from becoming combatants or interfering with coalition operations, while countering enemy PSYOP. In both instances, truth and morality have a weight that cannot be underestimated.

Strategic or tactical surprise may warrant deception, a “bodyguard of lies” as Winston Churchill put it, but over time—within weeks if not days—the local population is going to have a very good feel for whether you are a truth-teller or not. Avoid lies, they undermine everything you represent that is good.

In my personal view, not enough has been done in Army doctrine to tie “white hat” operations and specific applied humanitarian assistance resources, to the CA and PSYOP missions. General Tony Zinni has some good ideas, and I hope for the day when theaters are inter-agency operations with their own earmarked budgets.

In the meantime, I advise you to create new concepts and doctrine, new metrics for advising the commander. Specifically, you need to be able to make recommendations for what humanitarian assistance is needed, when, and how best to deliver it. I envision the day when CA and PYSOP serve as “forward aid controllers” and “reach back” means that you have the power to call in water, food, and medicine, not just munitions. A rough sample:

PSYOP Message	Reach Back Requirement
Stay out of the fight	Water, food, fuel to proven bystanders
We’re here to help	Sewing machines, engineering, etc.
Protect downed US fliers	Cash on hand for rewards—first one critical
Resettlement	Receiving area properly stocked, crews briefed

Figure 16: Connecting PSYOP Message to Reach Back & White Hat Power

These are really pedestrian examples. You know this better than I do. The point is to make a connection between the message and actual “deliverables” that back up the message. If you want to be more than empty words, you have to deliver soft “white hat” power into the operating area.

In order to be part of the solution, part of the outcome, PSYOP cannot just be thrown out there—PSYOP has to impact on the commander’s perception of the battlefield by bringing reality in the door, and PSYOP has to impact on the combat and non-combat power that is planned for and actually delivered into the area of operations.

Creating Actionable Intelligence—Litmus Test for Effective Themes

United Nations peacekeepers are learning over and over again that classified intelligence is simply not there for them, either in the planning phase or the operational phase.⁸ The same is true for Special Operations. Here is a quote from Maj Terry Guild, SOCOM CSO-IO, who recently told over 100 Top Secret Codeword intelligence producers from across the U.S. Government:

Frankly, I can't use ANY of the stuff you guys are producing. We need things with a speed and precision you don't even get close to. We have our own ways of doing it, though I wish we could get more from your organizations.⁹

That is a tactical and operational viewpoint. At the strategic level, Dr. Stephen Cambone, Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, has spoken publicly about the need to do universal coverage—all countries, all topics, all the time—but he has also spoken about the need to get to a much deeper granularity—what we can “neighborhood level intelligence.”

There are essentially five ways to get “neighborhood level” intelligence:

1) Overhead reconnaissance, both satellite and air-breather down to the micro-UAV, inclusive of both imagery and signals. This is generally not available for Third World countries, is neither persistent nor comprehensive, tends to be translated or processed too late to be useful, and requires a ton of security baggage to get to the man at the pointy-end of the spear.

2) Clandestine agents embedded into the local population. These tend to be few and far between, and are not able to cover the whole area of operations, only the limited group or district to which they are assigned. Their access is limited by their cover and local conditions.

3) “Hides” such as the British used very successful in Ireland, both in urban areas where hides are able to track movements on a block by block basis, and in the countryside, where hides detect ambushes being set up and are an essential part of protecting human patrols.

4) Human patrols with language-qualified personnel who are able to both observe directly, and gently interview bystanders that are encountered along the way. This is the number one source of intelligence for United Nations forces, and generally is also the number one source of intelligence for operations in low-intensity conflict.¹⁰

⁸ Cf. Ben de Jong, Wies Platje, and Robert David Steele, *PEACEKEEPING INTELLIGENCE: Emerging Concepts for the Future* (OSS International Press, 2003)

⁹ Personal communications among persons present and persons responsible for OSINT within SOCOM. When Maj Guild talks about “our own way of doing things” he is referring in part to the SOJIC OSINT Branch, which is doing amazing things in real time, to including global reach down to the neighborhood level.

¹⁰ You'll hear a lot of baloney about how national intelligence helped capture Saddam Hussein. The real story is that aggressive patrolling, with forward deployed intelligence analysts, from the Reserve no less, exploited every person they came across, mapped Hussein's extended family and the people they encountered, and narrowed the area down. The two individuals fleeing Hussein's tiny compound alerted the patrol, and intelligence soldiers on the ground found his “hide.” Satellites and spies did not contribute significantly.

SOF OSINT HANDBOOK—Psychological Operations

5) Finally, there's you. PSYOP. PSYOP is the best way to mobilize an entire population to support your command's mission, and the real truth-teller on PSYOP is not whether people resettle peacefully, or turn in arms, or avoid minefields, but if they come forward to volunteer actionable intelligence.

PSYOP is ground truth intelligence for the commander, and PSYOP is the "lure", the "complete package" (both message and soft power incentives) for eliciting intelligence from indigenous sources that the clandestine service, military interrogation, and all the secret technical sources in the world will never in a million years be able to get.

PSYOP is the heart of the battle, and the means of winning the battle without fighting, which Sun Tse tells us is the acme of skill.

Do not ever let any infantry puke tell you that PSYOP is a sideshow. In today's world, PSYOP is the main event.

REMEMBER, PLEASE, THIS IS A NOTIONAL CHAPTER
THE ARMY OSINT PROFESSIONALS NEED TO LAY HANDS ON HERE.

[This Page Blank]

Target Analysis

It used to be that target analysis could only be done through a complex combination of secret overhead imagery which involves a great deal of speculation and is not very good at establishing levels of alertness and other relevant data. Today, nearly every port and airfield of consequence has its own web site, ships and airplanes have schedules published on the web, suppliers to specific installations can be identified through the Internet or commercial fee-for-service databases,

This first draft of the SOF OSINT Handbook will not provide a complete guide to target analysis using open sources of information—that deserves its own volume drawing on the knowledge resident at the Special Operations Command Joint Intelligence Center (SOCJIC), at the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC), and the Foreign Military Studies Office (FSMO), and at Fort Huachuca, where Ben Benevides has what might be the best collection of open source links relevant to Army needs.

Here I will just walk you through a couple of southern Thailand examples. Don't forget that you are not expected to do all your own OSINT, only to do what makes sense given your circumstances and your Internet access. The SOCJIC OSINT Branch, NGIC, FSMO, and others, including theater intelligence staffs with rudimentary OSINT access, are all ready to respond to your needs for target analysis with both OSINT and classified sourcing. Most J-2s are not skilled at OSINT, so part of my intent here is to ensure that you understand that a) you can do more than you realize and b) SOCJIC OSINT Branch is “the” focal point for getting OSINT to work for you.

Let's start with a map. Here's one that comes up with <map southern Thailand>




Figure 17: Rough Map of Southern Thailand

Not the best in the world, but Phuket Island jumps out as a relevant place to look at possible ingress of terrorists coming in from South Asia.

We quickly get to a guide for Phuket Island.¹ The photos tell us that a) this is a fun place we definitely want to check out at government expense and 2) the coastline is wide-open for seaborne illegal immigration and terrorist transit.



Figure 18: Photo of Phuket Island Coastline in Southern Thailand

Now, looking for something as simple as <Phuket Airport>, we don't even need the country name, we get to the airport's own web site.² Although you might not think that military airports would have websites, do not underestimate what is available from commercial information providers like Jane's, or commercial imagery providers offering free thumbnail images. More on that later.

We learn right away that Phuket is Thailand's second largest airport after Bangkok, in terms of both passenger volume and cargo volume. Before we look at what airlines are serving this airport (mindful that private airplanes as well as leased aircraft are both affordable by Bin Laden, and common to this area), let's just check out the terminal.

¹ http://www.hotel-service.org/phuket/phs_information.htm

² <http://www.airportthai.co.th/airportnew/phuket/html>



Figure 19: Phuket Airport Terminal Lay-Out

Airline	(T)
The central phone numbers (Long distant code 076)	327230-7
Domestic Airlines	
1. Thai Airways International	Ext. 1202
2. Bangkok Airways	Ext. 1235
Winter Schedule 2000/2001	
1. Bal Air	Ext. 1240
2. Britannia Airways Ltd.	Ext. 1240
3. Britannia (Sweden)	Ext. 1240
4. China Airlines	Ext. 1222-3
5. Condor Eludienst GMBH	Ext. 1352
6. Far Eastern Air Transport	Ext. 1352-3
7. Finn Air	Ext. 1352-3
8. Hongkong Dragon Airlines	Ext. 1230
9. Lauda Air	Ext. 1238
10. Ltu Asia Tour Ltd.	Ext. 1240
11. Malaysia Airlines	Ext. 1232
16. Uni Airways Corporation	Ext. 1367

Figure 20: Partial List of Regular Airlines Serving Phuket Airport

So now we have the airport layout, and a list of airlines serving the airport. Background can be run on each one, and flights charted from the various South Asian locations. Remember that Pakistan is exporting terrorism, so flights from Karachi, where terrorist sympathizers allow free travel in and out, are of high interest. Also of interest would be flights from Sri Lanka, from Bangladesh, and from Nepal.

What about an overhead image to get a sense of the runway. Here is the result from a search of Google Images³ <Phuket Airport>.



Figure 21: Overview of Phuket Airport Runway

Other photos are surely available given more time to check out flying clubs, the specific airline sites, and so on. This is just to give you a taste.




Figure 22: Phuket Airport Orientation Map

³ The three main Google categories are Web, Images, and News. Each produces different results for the same search.

Now let's just check out Phuket Airport in the news. Presto, we discover that it is now possible to get from Karachi to Phuket, and from Phuket to Dubai, without ever passing through a primary airport where detection is most likely.

Phuket Air inaugural flight lands at Dubai International Airport

The Department of Civil Aviation welcomed the inaugural Phuket Air flight 9R817 from Bangkok to Dubai via Chittagong in Bangladesh.

United Arab Emirates, 23 May 2004⁴

And a little further down, amazingly so given the few headlines on this airport:

[AirAsia to offer RM99.99 Jakarta flights from July 1](#)

New Straits Times, Malaysia - May 31, 2004

... flights departing Kuala Lumpur to five, including Bangkok, **Phuket** (Thailand), Surabaya ... AirAsia also operates daily flights from the Senai **Airport** in Johor Baru

[AME Info Dubai's first Conrad Hotel to be built on prime site at Sheikh ...](#)

AME Info, United Arab Emirates - Jun 2, 2004

... on Sheikh Zayed Road, just 20 minutes from the Dubai International **Airport** and close to ... hotels are scheduled to open in Miami by late 2004, **Phuket**, Thailand in .

So, what have we got here? Phuket is the hub for moving terrorists between South Asia and the Pacific Rim Muslim countries, and onwards to and from Arabia, and just so they don't have to look for a safehouse, we have nice hotel going in under Dubai's control. Of course I exaggerate for effect, but you can begin to see how much fun OSINT research can be when it is directly related to your mission. You can do more for yourself than most people realize.

We'll skip over ports, where similar information is available, including information about cranes, piers, and trucking companies serving the ports, and go on to the natural, human, technical environments, and route planning. We have separate chapters on terrain analysis and weather analysis, and you know more about route planning than I do, so we'll stop here.

Again, this is just a superficial introduction—the real guide on OSINT in relation to Target Analysis remains to be written.

REMEMBER, PLEASE, THIS IS A NOTIONAL CHAPTER
THE ARMY OSINT PROFESSIONALS NEED TO LAY HANDS ON HERE.

⁴ <http://www.ameinfo.com/news/Detailed/40033.html>

[This Page Blank]

Terrain Analysis

In this chapter I just want to emphasize the depth of the private sector resources that are available and generally not made known to most military intelligence professionals, much less the operators, logisticians, and other specialists. I also want to emphasize that you don't have to worry about the details. SOCJIC, NGIC, and FSMO have a good grip on OSINT, the purpose of this chapter is primarily to make you aware of what is possible.

Key Factors in Terrain Analysis

Let's start with strategic generalizations. Use the Expeditionary Factors Study to get a feel for the sources (they are specifically listed) and the methodology for coming to conclusions about the following specifics relevant to tactical operations for any particular area (there are two pages of specifics on each in the EES).¹

General Geographic Conditions. Start by categorizing your specific area of operations. Consider the following summary of what General Zinni discovered during his extensive experience in Viet-Nam, as discussed in my review of *BATTLE READY*:

Zinni's understanding of war comes across very early in the book when he describes the six completely different wars that took place in South Viet-Nam, each with its own lessons, tactics, and sometimes equipment differences--nuances that conventional military policy, doctrine, and acquisition managers back in the US still do not understand: a) Swamp War, b) Paddy War, c) Jungle War, d) Plains War, e) Saigon War, and f) DMZ War.

Operational Elevation. Special Operations Forces know better than most how important operational elevation is—but most acquisition managers do not. It impacts on special aviation load, range, and loiter time.

Cross-Country Mobility. Much more of the world than is generally realized is completely unsuitable for cross-country mobility using vehicles of any kind. Our dependence on vehicles has to be re-evaluated. At the same time, we should be thinking about unconventional means of lightening the load for man-packed capabilities—while also increasing what we leave behind and don't take at all.

Line of Sight Distance (Intervisibility). This refers to the average distance at which you can engage a target. It makes no sense to worry about 3,000 meters ranges (and the weight that accompanies

¹ The individual country studies within the EES are current as of 1996 and later. The strategic generalizations were not repeated after the first study that I directed and reported out in 1990, so they are 15 years out of date and should be viewed accordingly. However, the methodology and the general averages are constant and can be used to your advantage in all future endeavors.

such systems) if your average Line of Sight is under 900 meters, as is the case in most of the expeditionary and special operations environments.

Hydrography. Generally, and depending on where the five fathom line is, the Navy can get close enough to provide naval gunfire support to coastal operations. There are, however, 24 countries where that is not the case. If you add coastal threat constraints, those situations where the U.S. Navy is out-gunned by local coastal artillery and missiles, the number doubles or triples, depending on who you choose to believe.

Mapping, Charting, & Geodesy Shortfalls. We stink at 1:50,000 combat charts for the Third World. Although the National Geospatial Agency (NGA) is busy trying to find digital solutions for on-the-fly map-mapping, my personal view is that they will not be able to replicate the hundreds of years of mind-eye coordination that it takes to extract cultural features from imagery, and that paper maps will remain a battlefield constant for some time to come.² In the absence of “on the shelf” stocks from NGA, Russian military combat charts remain the best in the world, and are available for almost all the countries where SOF is operating.

Introduction to Commercial/Russian Tactical Military Charts³

For the Phuket area in general, the following are available:

- Russian 200k (2 sheets)
- Russian 100k (2 sheets)
- RTSD (current Thai) 50k (2 sheets)
- RTSD (current Thai) 250k (2 sheets)
- US AMS (historical) 50k (2 sheets)
- NGA (limdis, I can't deliver this) 50k (2 sheets)
- NGA (limdis, I can't deliver this) 250k (2 sheets)
- Thai-produced tourist maps of Phuket
- non-Thai-produced tourist maps of Phuket
- nautical charts (Thai, US, Russian, British, other)
- other maps (geological, etc.)⁴

As a general rule, for African, Latin American, Central Asian and Pacific Rim countries where the U.S. does not have “on the shelf” 1:50,000 combat charts, the Russians do. Even in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russians continue to emphasize “out of area” military mapping, and especially in relation to the Third World where they had been extensively involved in the wars of national liberation, and more recently are concerned about Islamic terrorism.⁵

² With the name change of the National Imagery Mapping Agency (NIMA) to NGA, many in the operational community have not-so-jokingly begun to say that NIMA now stands for Not Interested in Maps Anymore.

³ A chart generally has grid squares and is accurate enough to call in fires on your position. A map (like a tourist map) is not. A map is a rough depiction rather than a very accurate chart.

⁴ This information comes from CEO Kent Lee of East View Cartographic, our partner for global geospatial information. Note that NGA does have LIMDIS products for Thailand. They do not have similar products for the northern region of Malaysia, should you be interested in border crossing operations.

⁵ Even if you did not have the recommendation from me, a Google on <Russian military maps> brings out www.eastview.com as the number one hit.

Never dismiss the obvious. <Thailand military maps> leads to a fantastic historical map collage from the Viet-Nam era, with zoom in that gives you the following image of Phuket island:⁶




Figure 23: Historical Military Chart of Phuket Area

Naturally this does not show the substantial urban build-up since then, but it provides an appreciation for the terrain (note the contour lines) for an immediate sense of what the terrain might be like.

⁶ The primary hit is <http://www.nexus.net/~911gfx/sea-ao.html>. The URL for the specific graphic shown above is http://www.nexus.net/~911gfx/vietnam/maps/nc48-05/nc48_05h.html.

Introduction to Commercial Imagery Options

The *NATO Open Source Intelligence Handbook* has a fine section on commercial imagery⁷ that should be replicated here in some future edition of the SOF OSINT Handbook, but I will not do that for now. Instead, let's review the levels of information that are available, and how they should be combined to get to the best possible depictions.

10-meter imagery is equivalent to 1:50,000 combat chart quality in terms of resolution, but does not offer the man-years of data extraction with follow-up ground observation to lead to truly good depictions. It is, however, the cheapest and fastest and also has the advantage of being able to cover wide areas in a single pass. One of the biggest problems with national imagery is that it takes postage stamps over different years, seasons, times of day and angles of look, with the result that a composite national image is like looking at vomit on a place—hard to digest.

1-meter imagery is superb for understanding urban terrain and critical installation, but it comes with cost, bandwidth, time of transmission, and storage requirements that vastly exceed those of 10-meter imagery.

1-meter and better Digital Terrain Elevation Data (DTED) is what allows NGA to quickly establish contour lines on the products that it creates where none existed before. When combined with fresh wide-area imagery that an average person can understand, and Russian military maps with details NGA has not had time to extract, you have the beginning of a winning combination.

Russian 1:50,000, Russian 1:100,000, and for ports and cities, Russian 1:10,000 and Russian 1:25,000 remain some of the best tools around for route planning and other special operations needs. The imagery, even with the DTED, just cannot replicate the utility of the Russian (or indigenous) military maps. My advice: always order the Russian stuff, even if NGA says it has it all. Redundancy saves time and lives.

Commercial imagery—and Russian military maps—cost money, and the U.S. military is used to getting everything that the U.S. intelligence community *offers* free (note: this is very different from everything that the U.S. military *needs* being free—most of what the U.S. military needs today on the fly is *not* available from the U.S. intelligence community).

For this reason, you should all get in the habit of submitting requirements for commercial imagery and Russian military maps to SOCIIC or via your theater JIC. Make the demands official and let them pile up. Eventually there will be a fund for commercial imagery that SOCOM and other theaters control, and it will make a real difference in your operational effectiveness.

Do not settle for some staff puke telling you that “national” can't get you the image you want. If lives are on the line, commercial imagery can be tasked and can deliver within 2-3 days precisely the image want. Don't worry about OPSEC—there are hundreds of ways to hide your interest, generally by associating the requirement with mineral or energy or water rights or agricultural exploration, and by having the requirement originate from a country in Europe or Asia.

OSINT is responsive, and secure, and it includes commercial imagery and Russian maps.

⁷ Pages 9-11.

SOF OSINT HANDBOOK—Terrain Analysis

For Phuket, and the northern Malaysian border, here is some additional commentary from CEO Kent Lee of East View Cartographic.

The imagery content would be as follows:

- all archived commercial satellite imagery (US, French, Russian, etc., perhaps 10-15 systems from 1967-2004)
- taskable satellite imagery options (perhaps 5-10 systems)
- archived aerial photos (Thai, other)

Other non-cartographic data which is essentially geospatial:

- terrain analysis reports (we have two for Phuket, in fact)
- local statistical publications of all kinds
- telephone books, guide books, internet-harvested content
- others

The digital content would be as follows:

- archived primary source digital data sets (SRTM DEMs, other digital data which are not contained in print)
- derived digital data from the above carto and imagery sources
- all languages are possible: English, Thai, Chinese, Japanese, Russian, etc.)
- all of this can culminate in original open-source geospatial data that we now publish under the EVMAP name; and if it is a map, then it gets printed. So the final result is a "branded" product, but the product technically never exists until someone orders it.

NGA is doing actually very well in all of Thailand at 1:50k (the new series L7018), thanks to a joint mapping program with the Thais (Royal Thailand Survey Department or RTSD). The southern border sheets with Malaysia are mostly from the 1997-2000 period, so that's pretty recent. Assuming that the maps were made well and are well-distributed, there is just not much for a commercial vendor to offer US forces with access to free NGA maps. Unless of course the maps were to be offered in vector format, which NGA currently does not offer.

In northern Malaysia it is a different story at 1:50k. There is zero NGA coverage, save for the overlap on the Thai boundary sheets, and I am pretty sure that nothing is in the pipeline. In this case the best topo maps are Malaysian-UK-produced 1:63,360 post-colonial maps (1960s-1970s), of which we have all, and the new Malaysian metric 1:50k maps, of which we have some.

Introduction to Alternative Terrain Reconnaissance

We don't do nearly enough with Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and we don't do anything at all with the concept of being able to process multiple UAV feeds simultaneously. Imagine a "stack" of UAVs over a hot area—a macro-UAV high up giving you the wide picture, a mini-UAV halfway down giving you the 500-1000 meter picture, and a micro-UAV right in the face of the enemy, just behind them, showing you what they can see and how to hurt them.

SOF OSINT HANDBOOK—Terrain Analysis

A special report on UAVs for SOF is being prepared. In the meantime you can Google on this for fun—just about every UAV, including the new cool micro-UAVs, has its own web site.

Remember that UAVs do not do well in rain or other inclement weather. Right now they are a “fair weather” friend.

Robots and ants are in my opinion unlikely to be very useful in the near term. More useful in my view are human scouts with digital cameras that also have geospatial positioning systems embedded, who can take photos of specific targets, and flash those back to whoever needs to see them. This has been the experience of LtGen Patrick Cammaert, Netherlands Royal Marines, who is today the Military Advisor to the Secretary General of the United Nations, and is personally overseeing UN Forces engaged in five complex emergencies in Africa, and many other peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions elsewhere.⁸

REMEMBER, PLEASE, THIS IS A NOTIONAL CHAPTER
THE ARMY OSINT PROFESSIONALS NEED TO LAY HANDS ON HERE.

⁸ As discussed throughout *PEACEKEEPING INTELLIGENCE: Emerging Concepts for the Future* (OSS International Press, 2003). A free copy of the Peacekeeping Intelligence Leadership Digest is available at www.oss.net, and discusses expeditionary and special operations intelligence terms of reference at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, for collection, processing, analysis, and security. Both this document and the NATO OSINT documents are at www.oss.net, click on Library, then on Reference Documents, and scroll down about three screens until you see them. Everything visible on this site is free.

Weather Analysis

There are three kinds of weather observation that I think about. The first is public weather information. Google for <Phuket weather> and you get:

Updated: **6:00 AM ICT on June 19, 2004**
Observed at **Phuket**, ([History](#))
Elevation: **33 ft / 10 m**



82 °F / 28 °C

Mostly Cloudy

HeatIndex: **90 °F / 32 °C**
Humidity: **79%**
Dew Point: **75 °F / 24 °C**
Wind: **9 mph / 15 km/h from the WSW**
Pressure: **- / -**
Visibility: **7.0 miles / 10.0 kilometers**
UV: **0 out of 12**
Clouds (AGL): **Few 1998 ft / 609 m**
Mostly Cloudy 30000 ft / 9144 m



Friday Night

Thunderstorm. Low: 78° F / 26° C Wind SW 8 mph / 14 km/h



Saturday

Chance of a Thunderstorm. High: 84° F / 29° C Wind West 11 mph / 18 km/h



Saturday Night

Thunderstorm. Low: 77° F / 25° C Wind WSW 8 mph / 14 km/h



Sunday

Chance of a Thunderstorm. High: 86° F / 30° C Wind WSW 8 mph / 14 km/h



Sunday Night

Thunderstorm. Low: 77° F / 25° C Wind WSW 11 mph / 18 km/h



Monday

Chance of a Thunderstorm. High: 84° F / 29° C Wind WSW 11 mph / 18 km/h

Figure 24: Phuket Weather Current and Three-Day Outlook

We can surmise from this that we are getting some unpredictable rains even though the official monsoon has not started. Note the Weather History option at the top.

SOF OSINT HANDBOOK—Weather Analysis

I'm not going to spend time on the obvious easy access to nautical almanacs and other specialty publications, such as *Sail Thailand 2002 4th edition updated and expanded to include Langkawi and Mergui Archipelago*.

The second kind of weather is U.S. Air Force Weather, which tends to be available only to those with .mil addresses. This section will be have to created by Ben Benavides, who has spent years cataloging official and public web sites useful to the U.S. Army.

Finally, there are in place ground observers for when it really matters. I want to make the point that it is possible, legally and ethically, to put a legal traveler on the ground just about anywhere on earth, within 24-48 hours, and they can have with them a digital camera, secure satellite telephone, and geospatial positioning system. Such individuals, with special forces qualifications and generally from neutral European countries, can do advance route and landing zone reconnaissance, logistics surveys including water availability and other critical factors, and so on. Never, ever, underestimate what can be done by the private sector in terms of reconnaissance with either legal travelers or indigenous legal assets.¹

REMEMBER, PLEASE, THIS IS A NOTIONAL CHAPTER
THE ARMY OSINT PROFESSIONALS NEED TO LAY HANDS ON HERE.

¹ Too many contractors rushed to get rich off the Iraq war and bid for contracts they were unable to fulfill. This then led to a rush to lure special operations and clandestine personnel out of their jobs, to many unqualified individuals off the economy getting into the picture, and to great instability within both official and private sector ranks engaged in Iraq. There are many people who claim to be able to do things in OSINT that they cannot (this includes select government elements that are not as competent in OSINT as they would have you believe). Your best bet is always to check with SOCJIC, NGIC, and FSMO.

Part IV: U.S Army Open Source Resources for SOF Needs

Part IV provides basic information for the four really competent OSINT elements in the U.S. Army:

Special Operations Command Joint Intelligence Center (SOCJIC)

National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC)

Foreign Military Studies Office (FSMO)

OSINT Training Cadre

[This Page Blank]

Special Operations Command Joint Intelligence Center (SOCJIC)

Created by General Pete Schoomaker, USA, when he was serving as the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command, SOCJIC has the only truly global and operational Open Source Intelligence capability in the U.S. Government. The Open Source Intelligence Branch (OSIB) is led by Mr. Ben Harrison under the oversight of Mr. James Hardee. Ms. Lori Lofts is a master librarian and an officer in the reserve. Mr. Mat Puls is the other permanent member of this team. Various short-term contractors and reservists lend support as needed.

There is nothing this Branch cannot do, although its limited budget requires that it ask for the cost of the out-sourced services from the requesting organization.

This extraordinary team answers 40% of all of the all-source intelligence requirements for the Command, with a budget of under \$1 million a year. Among its many routine accomplishments:

1. Rapid response deep Internet and commercial (fee-for-service) research
2. Acquisition of specified overtly available information products and data services
3. Procurement of Russian military maps and other forms of geospatial information
4. Translation of materials in 29 languages (includes acquisition, other languages as needed)
5. Provision of OSINT training or advisory services
6. Conduct surveys of terrorist groups, foreign Special Operations, other targets of interest
7. Produce open source intelligence reports on various regions and topics
8. Carry out such other tasks as might be required, including travel books, biographies, technology and countermeasures updates, and/or any other legal ethical source action

Communicate with them via:

Voice: (813) 828-4156
Facsimile: (813) 828-9821
Email: harrisb@socom.mil

SOF OSINT HANDBOOK—SOCJIC

Partial List of Accomplishments:

Identified and evaluated 396 terrorist, insurgent, and opposition websites in under 60 days, in the following languages:

Arabic, Catalan, Chinese, Danish, Dari, Dutch, English, Farsi, Finnish, French, German, Indonesian, Irish, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Kurdish, Kurmanji, Norwegian, Pashto, Polish, Portuguese, Russian, Serbian, Spanish, Swedish, Tamil, Turkish, Urdu

Created tribal studies, including maps of areas of influence, orders of battle, village coordinates, and key communicator biographies, for:

- Afghanistan
- Iraq
- Sudan
- Yemen
- Waziristan (Pakistan's Northern Frontier)

Produce weekly OSINT surveys on force protection, instability, and other key topics of concern for the following regions (all posted to the SOF web):

- Africa
- Caribbean
- Central Asia
- Latin America
- Pacific Rim (Muslim Countries)

Produce weekly OSINT surveys on the following special topics:

- Information Operations
- Proliferation
- Special Forces Worldwide
- Technology
- Terrorism

Obtain, on a no-notice basis, geospatial information including commercial imagery and Russian military maps for sensitive operational missions, using appropriate operations security measures and cover support plans.

Answer ad hoc rush questions that cannot be answered via classified means.

National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC)

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Open-Source Program Overview, National Ground Intelligence Center

The National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) performs open-source collection development on a 24x7 basis. NGIC OSINT is collected in all formats by all necessary methods, i.e., material ranges from hardcopy text to DVD, and collection methods range from land mail to automated data-mining techniques.

On a daily basis, NGIC collects 150 to 200 finished open-source information products, which are loaded onto the Olympus data bases for Pathfinder (an automated analytical tool) data mining, posted onto a push-pull system, or delivered directly to requesting analysts.

The NGIC OSINT program collects on all subjects pertaining to ground warfare threats to U.S. forces, including foreign ground forces (order of battle, geopolitical issues) and foreign ground systems (land and airborne threats to U.S. ground troops, military technologies, and equipment parametrics and specifications).

NGIC utilizes myriad sources to collect information of value to its analysts. Sources range from two dozen commercial vendors to Internet sites, and include corporate and individual assessments.

Once open-source information is collected, every effort is made to digitize or format the product for timely worldwide dissemination using web media. Digitization is an imperative, and material is often scanned into digital format regardless of content (i.e., map, text, photo).

The collection methodology driving the NGIC open-source program is a flexible one. While it is primarily analyst driven, based on stated requirements, the program relies heavily upon offerings from vendors and resource sharing among DoD agencies.

The “game plan” is to have multiple eyes from disparate viewpoints looking out for and recommending items of interest. Methods used to collect open-source information are often coordinated with the source itself. For example, data-mining techniques are used against those sources that are easily captured by that medium.

Vendor recommendations are often used for closed data bases such as proprietary data bases or foreign patents. Interlibrary loans fill a large percentage of analysts' direct requests for information. Also, listservs offer daily updates on news, S&T, and geopolitical trends.

SOF OSINT HANDBOOK—NGIC

Open-source information at NGIC is delivered to the customer in several ways. Our mandate is to load all open-source information into Olympus data bases for Pathfinder exploitation. However, that does not preclude providing analysts with immediate access to such information at their workstations via a push-pull system.

Much open-source information is still available only in hardcopy format and cannot wait for scanning because of immediate customer requirements. More than 7000 hardcopy documents were acquired in the past year.

NGIC also makes available training on the uses of open-source services, sources, data bases, and web sites to external and internal customers. Knowledge workers from the Information Services Division (434-980-7512) provide this training.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Foreign Military Studies Office (FSMO)

The Army's Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) is a research and analysis center under the U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine Command, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (TRADOC DCSINT). FMSO manages and operates the Ft. Leavenworth Joint Reserve Intelligence Center (JRIC) and conducts analytical programs focused on emerging and asymmetric threats, regional military and security developments, and other issues that define evolving operational environments around the world. Joint Reserve Component personnel and units—operating at the Ft. Leavenworth JRIC and in distance drilling analytical teams around the U.S. and abroad—make substantial contributions to all FMSO production efforts. The Intelligence Community's Open Source Information System (OSIS) provides access to FMSO's analytical products (organized by region and topic); World Basic Information Library (WBIL) emerging threats/regional databases using the Pathfinder visualization and text mining tool; numerous additional analytical products on the FMSO external home page; and links to the associated Phoenix JRIC information operations project and TRADOC ADCSINT-Threats products on OSIS. Specific FMSO support to the SOF community includes cultural and infrastructural information via the WBIL Library, studies on foreign military tactics and operations, and lectures in various SOF schools and forums.

The Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) researches, writes and publishes from unclassified sources about the military establishments, doctrines and strategic, operational and tactical practices of selected foreign armed forces. It also studies a variety of civil-military and transnational security issues affecting the U.S. military, such as peacekeeping and peace enforcement, counter-drug support, terrorism, insurgency and peacetime contingency operations.

FMSO's studies, articles, briefings, databases, and lectures broaden understanding of foreign military developments and support policy formulation, decision-making and military education. FMSO actively participates in military-to-military and academic outreach programs with the Commonwealth of Independent States and other countries around the world.

HERITAGE OF SERVICE

The Foreign Military Studies Office was formed in 1986 at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, as the Soviet Army Studies Office (SASO). Its original mission was to provide necessary content for those studying the Soviet Army. By exploiting open-source Slavic language materials, SASO provided soldiers and their leaders in-depth information about Soviet and Warsaw Pact military capabilities. The subsequent collapse of the Warsaw Pact in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 prompted reorganization of SASO into FMSO. As fundamental political-military changes took place in the world, FMSO expanded its research mission to encompass a broad range of transnational issues affecting U.S. military policy, strategy and doctrine. Today, FMSO works to anticipate security challenges and threats which may evolve in our rapidly changing global environment.

SOF OSINT HANDBOOK—FSMO

ORGANIZATION

FMSO provides direct support to the senior U.S. Army and Department of Defense leadership and general support to the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center. FMSO's three major areas of concentration are geo-strategy, operational art and tactics, and operations other than war, including "grey-area" phenomena. A support section provides translation, research database, library, automation and administrative support. FMSO has a small staff of civilian employees and, through the World Basic Information Library Program, has access to significant joint reserve capabilities. In addition, FMSO hosts the US Northern Command J-2's open source detachment and provides base support, analytical support, and connectivity to their efforts.

MISSION AND GOALS

FMSO's mission is to research, write, lecture and publish from unclassified sources, in both English and original languages, about the military establishments, doctrine and operational and tactical practices of selected foreign armed forces and about a variety of transnational security issues affecting the U.S. military.

FMSO goals, which are achieved through the development and implementation of the annual FMSO research plan, include: thorough, quality research; timely products, responsive to Army needs; accessibility to soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines; outreach to academe; and extensive networking with domestic and foreign military researchers and research organizations.

PRODUCTS

FMSO produces a wide variety of products on military security matters. The entire FMSO product line is electronically published on the OSIS Network—and some are found on the FMSO Internet site. The World Basic Information Library (WBIL) is the premier virtual open source library for the US Intelligence Community and is accessible at the FMSO OSIS site. Hardcopy *FMSO Blue Cover Studies* are available on request and associated commercially published journals (*The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, *European Security*, and *Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement*) are available by subscription. All FMSO publications are listed in the annual *FMSO Publication Program*, which is available on request. Available lectures and briefings are similarly contained in the annual *FMSO Lecture Program*. Further, FMSO hosts occasional conferences and seminars for selected audiences. These conferences and seminars typically bring together US and foreign military experts, academicians, and others to study military and military-civilian topics of common interest. Articles by FMSO analysts are frequently featured in US military and other publications. Finally, FMSO analysts regularly teach at the Army's Command and General Staff College, the US Intelligence Community Officer's Course, and are adjunct professors or guest lecturers at US universities.

FMSO on OSIS: <<http://www.fmsos.is.gov/fmsos.htm>>

FMSO on the Internet: <<http://fmsos.leavenworth.army.mil/fmsos.htm>>

FMSO Office:
101 Meade Ave
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027
913-684-5946

OSINT Training Cadre Fort Huachuca

OSINT training at the school is geared toward the operations other than war side of the house since this is where the majority of operations are taking place. However, the student is not immediately immersed into open source exploitation, but gradually introduced to it. The training begins with an introduction to the various global threats and how they threaten US/Global security. Generally speaking, these are threats that do not derive from a particular country or region of the world, and which do not appear to have a single national sponsor. Often these threats are non-national in nature, making it difficult for nation states to work cooperatively against the threats.

The global threats introduction is followed by a class on predictive analysis. Every paper that is written must have a predictive analysis section. Where does the student think the threat is going? Threat development class then follows where the student is introduced to the elements of national power that encompass political, economic, military, socio-psychological, scientific/technological, and demographic/geographic subjects. Each area has to be addressed when writing the research paper.

Finally, the open source class is introduced and the student is given a hands-on tour of the open source information system (OSIS). Subjects for research also are passed out at this time. Subjects can be such things as environmental degradation, AIDS/HIV, terrorism, drug trafficking, human trafficking, WMD (naturally), improvised explosive devices (new), depleting ocean resources, etc. We are only limited by our imagination and what we think has/will have military implications.

The students brief their products at an appointed time after being given time for research.

POC is Mr. E. Ben Benavides
U.S. Army Intelligence Center & Fort Huachuca
ben.benavides@us.army.mil
520-533-6529
FAX 7838

SOF OSINT HANDBOOK—OSINT Training Cadre

OSS Note: It's not possible to do full justice to Mr. Ben Benavides, but as Congressman Rob Simmons notes in his introduction, Ben is one of the originals and was instrumental in helping the 434th MID win its Golden Candle and "Outstanding USAR Small Unit Award" in 1995-1996.

Over the years he has created an extraordinary collection of links and references, including briefings on OSINT and sample OSINT products, that we anticipate will be institutionalized once the Joint Intelligence Training Center is established.

In the meantime, here is a summary listing of the contents of three CD-ROMS that contain the bulk of his collection.

Volume I: Open Source General

OSINT Course

OSINT 1997-2004 (separate folder for each year)

OSINT General

Volume II: References

Country Links

Data Mining Tools

FM 7-100

Manuals

Volume III: Miscellaneous

Web Favorites

Climate

Weather

Transport

Maps

Other

Terrorism

Weapons of Mass Destruction

North Korea

ST 100.7

Part V: Generic Open Source Resources for SOF Needs

Part V identifies eight generic open source resources for SOF needs:

COLISEUM Requirements Management System (SOCJIC)

HARMONY OSINT Document Database (NGIC)

World Basic Information Library (WIBL, FSMO)

NATO Open Source Intelligence References

USMC Expeditionary Factors Studies and Reports (MCIA)

OSS.Net (OSINT Proceedings 1992-2004, Networking)

[This Page Blank]

COLISEUM

COLISEUM is the requirements system used to document both the submission of a requirement, and its satisfaction. It is an essential management tool, and has been instrumental in documenting, over the past several years, that OSINT is in fact fully satisfying 40% of *all* of the U.S. Special Operation Command's "all-source" requirements.

The requirements system may be changing shortly, but in the interim, everyone is urged to learn how to use the COLISEUM method for submitting OSINT requirements.

Send any questions to SOCJIC.

[This Page Blank]

HARMONY

What is HARMONY?

HARMONY is a Department of Defense Intelligence Information System (DODIIS) Defense Information Infrastructure-Common Operating Environment (DII-COE)-compliant Oracle database containing detailed bibliographic descriptions of military, technical, and open-source documents acquired by U.S. intelligence agencies and military units and contains tracking information for requested translations of these documents.

Accessible through Intelink on the JWICS, SIPRNET, and StoneGhost: networks using either Netscape or Internet Explorer, it serves as a comprehensive Intelligence Community-wide reference to open-source translations and primary-source documents through the SECRET/NOFORN level. HARMONY provides links to electronic copies of the documents and translations it describes when they become available. You can access Harmony on these networks by searching the following URLs:

JWICS: <http://www.ngic.ic.gov/products/db/HARMONY/homepage2.html>

SIPRNET: http://www.ngic.army.smil.mil/products/db/Harmony_S/homepage2.html

StoneGhost: <http://sg-web.ngic.us qlat/harmony001/harmony/harmonypage5.htm>

HARMONY provides the community with a shared flexible tool for managing document acquisition, exploitation, and translation efforts and for identifying and eliminating duplicate translation efforts. HARMONY promotes standardized bibliographic data fields that make data retrieval by customers more convenient and efficient. Document specialists at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC), National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC), and Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) enter and maintain the data. Major contributing agencies include the National Media Exploitation Center (NMEC), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and INSCOM units responsible for tactical DOCEX. More agencies, to include the National Virtual Translation Center (NVTC), are expected to join in the near future.

HARMONY customers include warfighters deployed throughout the various theaters of operations and analysts throughout the intelligence community specializing in a wide variety of military, scientific and technical, and foreign-materiel fields. The customer interface consists of a Verity K2 search engine that searches against all metadata records and indexed searchable translations and English language foreign original documents. The databases are refreshed daily on JWICS and SIPRNET, and weekly on StoneGhost.

What does the HARMONY database currently contain?

The Harmony database contains documents and translations from ongoing military operations and raids in support of the Global War on Terrorism, Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom,

SOF OSINT HANDBOOK—HARMONY

as well as foreign civil and military documents collected by U.S. intelligence agencies. HARMONY also contains significant collections from legacy databases. A primary source of legacy data is the Foreign Documentation Information Management System (FORDIMS), a foreign document database maintained by NGIC. However, other legacy databases from DIA, NAIC, ONI, and MSIC are being added to HARMONY as resources permit. Translation tracking data are kept for all documents selected for translation.

What types of data are available in HARMONY?

HARMONY should prove useful in performing the following searches:

- Finding documents on a specific military or technical subject;
- Finding documents on specific military operations/raids;
- Finding information on captured personnel;
- Finding documents relating to foreign equipment or weapons;
- Finding documents on foreign tactics or training doctrine;
- Finding documents containing personalities and organizations with their associated location and contact information;
- Finding documents of a particular type, i.e., conference proceedings, periodical article, range table, technical description/bulletin, logbook, training manual, handwritten notes, etc.;
- Finding documents by a specific country, author, or organization;
- Finding a document with a particular foreign or U.S. number or studying foreign document marking systems;
- Finding documents associated with Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs);
- Determining whether a document has been or is being translated by one of the participating organizations;
- Determining the status of submitted document translation requests.

Customer Interface Tool - How to search HARMONY

There are two primary means for searching document on Harmony, the Original Document Search and the Assisted Document Search.

The *Original Documents* screen allows customers to search against descriptive text and metadata contained in original document records stored within the Harmony community database. Use the Full Text tab to search against attached translations or English language document files.

The *Assisted Document Search* allows customers to search original document metadata records by using Harmony Lists of Values (LOVs) that are displayed in pull down windows above. You may select one or more values in each pull down window and can enter additional query terms and Boolean logic operators in the text line to further refine search parameters.

To begin a search, first select the number of "hits" you wish to have displayed per page (default is 25 hits), enter the data to search for, and click search. List of Values (LOV) Use: Each pull down window contains a separate Harmony LOV. One or more LOVs may be used within a single query. When more than one LOV is used, they are connected by an AND relationship (e.g., *Country Of Information* = Afghanistan AND *Language* = Arabic).

SOF OSINT HANDBOOK—HARMONY

Value selection: Values can be selected either individually (by clicking on the selection), in multiples (click the initial selection, then press and hold the *Ctrl* key while clicking on each subsequent selection), or in groups (click the initial value of the group, then press and hold the *Shift* key while selecting the last value in the group to highlight all values between the first and last selection. When more than one value is selected within an LOV, they are connected by an OR relationship (e.g., *Language = Arabic OR Dari OR Pushtu*).

After a query is run, additional information may be added to the search parameter to refine the initial search. To start a brand new search, simply click the *Clear Form* button.

Documents are returned in alphanumeric order based on their Harmony primary identification numbers.

The *Help Tips* and *Detailed Help* buttons display additional useful information (including the metadata field definitions and how to use Boolean logic operators) to assist you in forming searches. Use the Customer Feedback button on the Harmony Homepage to ask questions, report problems, or provide suggestions for improving this search tool.

Personal Search Agent - Making Harmony work for you

You can use the *Personal Search Agent* to establish search profiles that will run against the Harmony database on a daily basis and notify you of any new documents that are acquired in an area of your interest. Currently you can establish a profile in one of three ways:

1. Select from a list of predefined categories supported by queries developed by the Harmony Program Office.
2. Select from the list of predefined categories and modify them by adding "and" or "or" statements of your own.
3. Build and save your own queries that will run on a daily basis against new data added to the system.

Customer Support

Harmony has a dedicated Help Desk and teams specifically focused to provide support for training issues, current operations, foreign materiel collections, and other DOCEX operations. You can submit requests for assistance by clicking on the "Customer Feedback" form on the Harmony Home Page or by calling the Harmony Help Desk at (434) 980-7206 DSN: 521-7206. A listing of Points of Contact is located at the top of the Harmony Home Page should you require additional assistance.

[This Page Blank]

World Basic Intelligence Library (WBIL)

The World Basic Information Library (WBIL) is a ‘virtual library’ of basic and background open source information offering context to more immediate and often classified reporting. The WBIL program is a two-pronged approach designed to do a significantly better job of exploiting open source information. First, using selected military reserve personnel, the WBIL program employs the talents and expertise of these reservists to search out and capture the best available open source information to answer known Intelligence Community, Unified Command, and other intelligence requirements. Secondly, the WBIL program combines Joint Reserve Intelligence Center-based teams with virtual teams to build the World Basic Information Library (WBIL). The WBIL program uses virtual connectivity among these volunteer military reservists to perform open source information mining, validation, and input of data into a virtual open source library that is available for use by the entire Intelligence Community (IC).

The use and management of Joint Reserve Component personnel are integral to all Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) research, analytical and data base development programs carried out for IC partners and Joint warfighters. WBIL is available to SOF and indeed any Intelligence Community users, via the IC Pathfinder data and text mining analytical tool on the Open Source Information System (OSIS), INTELINK-S (at the GISA site), and on INTELINK-TS (at the NGIC site).

The core of the World Basic Information Library (WBIL) program is a virtual library containing basic facts about world nations. The library contains information on more than 130 countries across Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, China, the Persian Gulf States as well as several emerging threat issues -- Terrorism, IO/IW, Arms/Drug Trafficking/WMD, and Homeland Defense. Over time, WBIL will contain information on every country in the world. Today the WBIL Virtual Library contains more than 200,000 entries in multimedia formats to include text, photos, maps, etc. Information spans more than 700 topic categories ranging from arms trafficking and biographics to geography and weapons of mass destruction. The Library is growing at more than 2000 entries per month and is updated as new information is available.

History

The concept of WBIL was developed by the Intelligence Community Open Source Program Office (COSPO) in 1995; the concept was developed so that the WBIL pilot test was run from Aug 1997 through March 1998. The WBIL Pilot proved the viability of using Virtual Teams, working when and where they choose, on an accessible private network, to populate a Virtual Library with basic information useful to many in the US Intelligence Community. From the pilot stage, executive agency for the WBIL program moved from COSPO to the Army’s Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO).

The Joint Reserve Contribution

Military reserves from all the Services have proven to be a tremendous resource for the exploitation and production of open source IC material. Reservists have performed the mining and vetting of material, as well as the administration of the system server and promotion of the program. Participants are volunteers, with various military and civilian skills that are valuable to the WBIL program. Today there are more than 160 reservists, from all Services, voluntarily participating in the WBIL project. Through word of mouth and the WBIL Recruiting site we see several volunteers per week for the program. Administration is done by the program Operations Officer and the FMSO Intelligence Administrative Officer whose duties center predominantly on the Reserve Component dimensions of FMSO programs. Reservists are organized into virtual teams and focused on geographic regions or emerging threat topics to find the best available open source data and enter it into the WBIL Library. In addition, several reserve units have chosen the WBIL library as a vehicle to better perform their existing reserve unit missions. These units, as directed by their gaining commands, perform research on their unit mission area, store the information in the WBIL Library, and use that information to produce studies and other products as directed by their gaining command.

Further, reserve organizations whose work depends on personnel with security clearances often use WBIL as a program that allows their personnel to get familiar with their areas of responsibility while exploiting open source data related to the WBIL program. Reservists are happier because they're contributing and units are content because their personnel will be knowledgeable when clearances are granted and they report for their normal duties.

WBIL data can be gotten through the Open Source Information System (OSIS), the INTELINK-S (SIPRNET), and on INTELINK-TS (JWICS). Customers regularly tell us they find the WBIL useful in focusing their all-source collection, analysis and production; quickly locating background material for planning or crisis support; or simply for staying up to date on contingency areas. Law enforcement customers find WBIL useful as background for case development and context on existing casework. SOF soldiers preparing to deploy into Iraq and Afghanistan have found WBIL useful as a quickly-accessible source of 'share-able' information that meets many of their information needs.

WBIL on OSIS: <<http://wbil.fmso.osis.gov/>>

WBIL on INTELINK-S: <tlpath.aspo.army.smil.mil>

WBIL on INTELINK-TS: at the National Ground Intelligence Center
site--choose Pathfinder, then pick WBIL in the source list.

WBIL Information: Karl Prinslow at 913-684-5963

NATO OSINT

Open Source Intelligence References¹

NATO Open Source Intelligence Handbook
(SACLANT, November 2001), 49 Pages

NATO Open Source Intelligence Reader
(SACLANT, February 2002), 109 Pages

Intelligence Exploitation of the Internet
(SACLANT, October 2002), 103 Pages

¹ Originally conceived by Brig. Gen. James Cox, CA, the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters Allied Command Europe (SHAPE), the task of devising an open source intelligence (OSINT) 'solution' for combined operations with the Partnership for Peace and Mediterranean Dialog Nations was delegated to the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT). Under the leadership of General William Kernan, USA, and Admiral Sir James Perwone, RN, a NATO OSINT Steering Group was formed at the field grade level, an experimental OSINT unit was formed to provide direct intelligence support to selected operations, and three manuals were written over the course of two years. Capt. David Swain, RN UK and LCdr. Andrew Chester, RN CA, have been the principals staff officers for this endeavour. Taken together, these three references comprise a starting point for any Peacekeeping Intelligence staff interested in optimising their access to and exploitation of OSINT for strategic, operational, and tactical (planning/context) purposes. All three references can be downloaded at no cost from www.oss.net by going to the Archives, then References. They can take between 5 and 8 minutes at the lowest computer connection speeds, but they do download reliably. Contact information for the NATO OSINT specialists is contained in each of the documents. They are not able to provide copies—these are *only* available via download from www.oss.net (click on Library (Archives), then References, about three screens down).

[This Page Blank]

Expeditionary Studies

Marine Corps Intelligence Command

The Marine Corps Intelligence Command no longer does a full scale Expeditionary Factors Study but has available copies of the last full set of country studies (7-15 pages per country) in a CD-ROM, and many other unclassified products designed for expeditionary and special forces operating in lower tier countries that do not get much attention from the national intelligence community.

Ms. Wise is the Dissemination Manager for MCIA, and can be reached at (703) 784-6167.

All of MCIC's products are posted to the various networks. "MCIA" (not MCIC) will get you to their web pages on any of the networks.

[This Page Blank]

OSS.Net

OSS.Net offers the public over 20,000 pages of original information on open source intelligence (OSINT) as well as intelligence reform and current studies in global intelligence.

Among the highlights of the site are these:

1. Current intelligence news. Generally three new postings each day, spanning the seven tribes of intelligence, the seven standards, and the seven issues. Frequent reference to the ethics of intelligence. Over 2,500 entries, sortable by Reference, Book Reviews, or the various topical categories, using the NewsSorter.

2. Archives. All presentation from all past annual international conferences on OSINT, from 1992-2003, are posted as easily downloadable and searchable PDF files. Also in the archives are most of the lectures on intelligence and the literature of intelligence, strategy, force structure, emerging threats, and intelligence reform as created by Robert David Steele Vivas.

3. Forthcoming conferences. The very best conferences around the world as they pertain to the generic topic of intelligence are posted for several months in advance of each event.

4. Local meetings. Using the capability from MeetUp.com (the same as used by Howard Dean to mobilize Deaniacs across America), over 51 OSINT meet-ups are now listed, with many more expected. Use the link or go directly to www.osint.meetup.com. It is possible to register anonymously.

5. Intelligence jobs. These are reachable through www.IntelligenceCareers.com, a permanent link on the home page. www.OSINTcareers.com is about to be established.

6. OSINT Links. An OSINT marketplace, with free “add-a-link” provided a quick guide to the main providers of open sources, open softwares, and open services. This needs to be dramatically expanded but that will not happen until the U.S. Government established a DoD or national OSINT program, and real leadership is available to the private sector, with financial incentives for being part of an open source marketplace.

7. Annual conference and networking. The annual OSINT conference brings together the “Top Guns” on OSINT from governments around the world, from Australia to China, from South Africa to Sweden, from Argentina to Canada. Email to OSS invariably results in connections being made, questions being answered, problems being solved.

www.oss.net

[This Page Blank]

